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 for  NYSERDA EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Recent federal policy proposals to reduce emissions of SO2, NOx, and mercury from the electricity sector 
promise important improvements in air quality and reductions in acid deposition in New York State and 
across the nation. The cost of achieving these reductions depends on the form and stringency of the 
regulation. In particular, the fact that technologies designed to reduce SO2 and NOx can reduce mercury 
emissions as well has important implications for how producers respond to different types of mercury 
regulation and for the cost of multipollutant policies aimed at all three pollutants.  
Summary of Main Findings 
Using four models, this study looks at EPA’s Clean 
Air Interstate Rule (CAIR) as originally 
proposed, which differs in only small ways from 
the final rule issued in March 2005, coupled with 
several approaches to reducing emissions of 
mercury including one that differs in only small 
ways from the final rule also issued in March 
2005. This study analyzes what costs and 
benefits each would incur to New York State and 
to the nation at large.  
Benefits to the nation and to New York State 
significantly outweigh the costs associated with 
reductions in SO2, NOx and mercury, and all policies 
show dramatic net benefits. 
 
The manner in which mercury emissions are 
regulated will have important implications not only 
for the cost of the regulation, but also for emission 
levels for SO2 and NOx and where those emissions 
are located. 
 
Contrary to EPA’s findings, CAIR as originally 
proposed by itself would not keep summer 
emissions of NOx from electricity generators in the 
SIP region below the current SIP seasonal NOx cap. 
In the final CAIR, EPA added a seasonal NOx cap to 
address seasonal ozone problems. The CAIR with 
the seasonal NOx cap produces higher net benefits. 
 
The effect of the different policies on the mix of 
fuels used to supply electricity is fairly modest 
under scenarios similar to the EPA’s final rules.  
 
A maximum achievable control technology (MACT) 
approach, compared to a trading approach as the 
way to achieve tighter mercury targets (beyond 
EPA’s proposal), would preserve the role of coal in 
electricity generation. 
 
Our evaluation of scenarios with tighter mercury 
emission controls shows that the net benefits of a 
maximum achievable control technology (MACT) 
approach exceed the net benefits of a cap and trade 
approach.   
EPA has taken steps toward requiring greater 
reductions in emissions of SO2 and NOx than 
mandated under current law from electricity 
generators. To facilitate compliance with the 8-
hour ozone standard and with new air quality 
standards for fine particulates with a size of 2.5 
micrometers in diameter and smaller (PM 2.5) and 
to meet statutory requirements for reducing 
emissions of hazardous air pollutants such as 
mercury, the EPA adopted two new rules early in 
2005 that together address SO2, NOx, and 
mercury emissions from the electricity sector. In 
its Clean Air Interstate Rule, or CAIR, EPA caps 
emissions of SO2 and/or NOx in a large region 
covering more than 20 states, mostly east of the 
Mississippi, and the District of Columbia. 
  1This regulation allows for emissions trading, and restrictions are imposed in two phases with the first 
beginning in 2010 and the second beginning in 2015. In the first phase, the program allocates 3.7 million 
tons of SO2 allowances and 1.6 million tons of NOx allowances to electricity generators within 25 states 
and the District of Columbia. In 2015, the total allocations for annual emissions drop to 2.6 million tons for 
SO2 and 1.3 million tons for NOx. Actual emissions are expected to exceed these targets for some years 
beyond 2015 due to the opportunity to bank emission allowances distributed in earlier years for use in later 
years. The percent reductions in emissions within the CAIR region are comparable to those that would be 
required nationwide under the Clear Skies Initiative, except they happen on a somewhat accelerated 
schedule. The regulation also institutes a cap on seasonal summertime emissions of NOx in a region with a 
slightly different boundary. 
In the second new rule, EPA adopts a national plan to reduce emissions of mercury from electricity 
generators using a cap-and-trade approach applied to all coal-fired generating units in the nation. The rule 
distributes allowances for 38 tons of emissions from all coal and oil-fired electricity generators beginning 
in 2010 and 15 tons beginning in 2018. The rule allows for emission banking. According to the EPA actual 
emissions are expected to exceed 15 tons for many years beyond 2015 due to the role of banking. In the 
final rule, the cap-and-trade approach to reducing mercury was selected over a maximum achievable 
control technology (MACT) approach, which was also included as an option for consideration in the 
proposed rule.  
We analyze four different multipollutant policy scenarios that coincide with recent proposals. All of these 
scenarios include EPA’s Clean Air Interstate Rule for SO2 and NOx in its original proposed form in 
combination with different approaches to reducing mercury emissions from electricity generators 
nationwide. 
1.  CAIR plus EPA Mercury Cap: The Clean Air Interstate Rule (CAIR) as originally proposed 
coupled with a companion national mercury cap, based on EPA’s mercury cap in the proposed 
and final mercury rule, with unrestricted trading of mercury emission allowances. Under this 
scenario, the seasonal cap-and-trade program for NOx for electricity generating units in the 
State Implementation Plan (SIP) seasonal NOx trading program is no longer in effect. In all of 
the CAIR and national allowance trading programs, allowances are distributed initially based 
on historic emissions.  
2.  CAIR plus EPA Mercury and Seasonal SIP NOx Policy: This scenario combines scenario 1 
with the continuation of the seasonal cap-and-trade program for NOx emissions from 
electricity generating units in the NOx SIP Call region. Although the originally proposed 
CAIR rule would have suspended the current seasonal NOx policy, in the final rule a seasonal 
program is reconstituted.  
3.  CAIR plus Tighter Mercury with MACT: This scenario includes the CAIR as represented 
in scenario 1 coupled with a national requirement that all coal-fired generators achieve either 
  2a 90% reduction in mercury emissions or a target emission rate of 0.6 lbs of mercury per 
trillion Btu of heat input, whichever is less expensive at the particular facility.  
4.  CAIR plus Tighter Mercury with Trading: This scenario models the CAIR coupled with a 
national cap-and-trade program for mercury where the national annual emission cap for 
mercury in each year is set at the mercury emission level realized under the version of the 
Tighter Mercury with MACT rule modeled in scenario 3. 
Our analysis shows that benefits to the nation and to New York State significantly outweigh the costs 
associated with reductions in SO2, NOx, and mercury, even under cautious assumptions about the valuation 
of the expected health effects. Depending on the policy, between 10 and 13% of the total national health 
benefits associated with reduced emissions of SO2 and NOx occurs in New York State, a function of the 
state’s population and its location downwind of major emission sources. This estimate is based on a 
calculation of expected improvements in human health resulting from changes in particulate matter and 
ozone concentrations, which are thought to capture the most important benefits. We find the health benefits 
of reducing particulate matter are nearly two orders of magnitude greater than the health benefits of 
reducing ozone. Several benefit categories including visibility effects, reduced acidification and other 
ecological improvements and the effects of mercury on human health and the environment would increase 
the calculated net benefits even further. The magnitude of benefits for ecological improvement in the 
Adirondack Park and for reduction of mercury emissions, based on recent unpublished estimates, is 
discussed in the analysis. 
We find that, with one exception, the set of policies will have fairly small impacts on the average price of 
electricity nationwide and in New York. However, the manner in which mercury emissions are regulated 
will have important implications not only for the cost of the regulation, but also for emission levels for SO2 
and NOx and where those emissions are located. 
Our research also shows that contrary to EPA’s findings, the CAIR rule, as originally proposed, by itself 
would not keep summer emissions of NOx from electricity generators in the SIP region below the current 
SIP seasonal NOx cap. As a result, average summertime 8-hour and 24-hour ozone concentrations in New 
York and elsewhere are higher under the originally proposed version of the CAIR policy than under the 
baseline. The remedy to this could include either tighter annual caps or continuation of seasonal controls. 
We find combining a continuation of the SIP seasonal NOx cap with the CAIR plus EPA Mercury scenario 
corrects this situation and does so at relatively low cost to firms and virtually no cost to electricity 
consumers nationwide. In the final version of the CAIR rule, EPA reconstitutes a seasonal cap-and-trade 
program for NOx in a subset of the region to address this concern. 
As an alternative to the EPA schedule of caps, we model a more stringent set of mercury policies that lead 
to about 67% further reductions in mercury emissions. An important environmental effect of the tighter 
mercury cap is that it brings about substantial ancillary reductions in emissions of SO2. Under Tighter 
Mercury with Trading, the SO2 cap is no longer binding by 2010 as generators rely more on installation of 
  3flue gas desulfurization (FGD) units (known as SO2 scrubbers) to reduce mercury and less on activated 
carbon injection (ACI).  
Despite showing positive and significant net benefits, we hasten to add two important qualifications that 
preclude an endorsement of the CAIR policy coupled with EPA Mercury Cap and the continuation of the 
NOx SIP Call - the policy that comes closest to the one embodied in the EPA’s final CAIR and mercury 
rules. First, this calculation does not include benefits from mercury reductions, which would increase the 
benefit estimates of the tighter mercury standard. In a discussion of potential benefits we draw on recent 
research by Rice and Hammitt (2005) on the benefits of mercury emissions reductions associated with the 
Clear Skies Initiative to infer estimates of potential benefits of different levels of mercury control. This 
information suggests that inclusion of benefits from the tighter mercury standard would reduce the gap in 
net benefits between the Tighter Mercury policies and the policies with the EPA Mercury Cap. Second, our 
study indicates the benefits of additional tons of SO2 reduction beyond the CAIR rule far exceed the costs. 
We do not investigate alternative levels of SO2 control. 
We provide an uncertainty analysis that varies the most important parameters in our estimations—the 
atmospheric model and value of a statistical life—and that includes somewhat more speculative estimates 
of the human health benefits of reduced mercury emissions and a partial analysis of ecological benefits. For 
the Low values in the uncertainty analysis, the CAIR policy coupled with EPA Mercury Cap and the 
continuation of the NOx SIP Call remains the policy with the greatest net benefits. However, under the High 
value cases, although all policies show dramatic net benefits, the policies with the Tighter Mercury 
standard have the greatest net benefits. 
The effect of the different policies on the mix of fuels used to supply electricity is also fairly modest. The 
scenarios that combine CAIR with the EPA Mercury Cap see a significant switch among types of coal, 
accounting for about 45% of the reduction in SO2 emissions, but there is only a slight switch away from 
coal to natural gas, which accounts for just 4% of the reduction in SO2 emissions. The switch from coal to 
natural gas tends to be much larger under the Tighter Mercury with Trading Policy, and this switch 
accounts for roughly 19% of the reduction in mercury relative to the baseline. The policy also produces 
large ancillary reductions in emissions of CO2, which fall by 11% of baseline levels nationally and 26% in 
New York State in 2020. Since it is often stated by the current federal administration that it is not the 
purpose of environmental regulation to force fuel switching away from coal, then a maximum achievable 
control technology (MACT) approach may be preferred to a trading approach as the way to achieve tight 
mercury targets (beyond the cap in EPA’s mercury rule) because it preserves the role of coal in electricity 
generation. 
A key factor in the design of environmental policy is the incidence of burden, which varies for consumers 
and for producers depending on whether a trading approach is used. Consumers bear all of the cost of 
EPA’s proposed policies in 2010. In New York, producers benefit from the policies. By 2020, nationwide 
we find the burden is shared fairly equally between consumers and producers. In 2020 the cost in New 
  4York State is very small, due in part to the implementation of New York’s multipollutant rule that is 
included in the baseline.  
Replacing the EPA mercury rule with the tighter mercury standards yields additional costs for both 
consumers and producers in 2010, when consumers bear an additional cost of about $1.3 billion nationwide 
and producers bear an additional cost of $2.2 billion. In 2020 the additional cost of the Tighter Mercury 
with MACT policy falls entirely on consumers, who bear an additional cost of $2.8 billion, while producers 
bear no additional cost. Overall, consumers bear over 75% of the cost of the Tighter Mercury with MACT 
policy in 2010 and over 70% in 2020. There is no additional cost of the tighter mercury standard using a 
MACT approach in New York State in 2010 or 2020.  
Implementing tighter mercury standards using a trading approach imposes significantly more cost on the 
electricity sector than using a MACT standard to achieve the same emission target due to the internalization 
of the opportunity cost of mercury emissions allowance prices and the corresponding change in resources 
use including fuel switching to natural gas. Consumers bear the entire burden from tight mercury controls 
with trading. In the aggregate producers actually benefit substantially due to higher electricity prices, but 
the effect on individual firms is likely to vary greatly, depending on the portfolio of generation assets they 
operate. 
In conclusion, we find that all four policies we investigated which would regulate multiple pollutants from 
the electricity sector, including policies with the tighter mercury controls, would deliver substantial benefits 
to residents of New York State and the nation. Contrary to EPA’s findings, CAIR as originally proposed by 
itself would not keep summer emissions of NOx from electricity generators in the SIP region below the 
current SIP seasonal NOx cap. In the final CAIR, EPA added a seasonal NOx cap to address seasonal ozone 
problems. The final CAIR with the seasonal NOx cap produces higher net benefits relative to the originally 
proposed CAIR. Our modeling indicates that additional SO2 emissions reductions beyond those called for 
by the EPA rules would yield benefits that substantially exceed the additional cost. Our evaluation of 
scenarios with tighter mercury emission controls shows that the net benefits of a maximum achievable 
control technology (MACT) approach exceed the net benefits of a cap and trade approach. It is important to 
note that we do not include estimates of the benefits of mercury reductions, which if included, would 
improve the net benefits of more stringent mercury controls.  
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REDUCING EMISSIONS FROM THE ELECTRICITY SECTOR: 
THE COSTS AND BENEFITS NATIONWIDE AND IN THE EMPIRE STATE 
Karen Palmer, Dallas Burtraw, and Jhih-Shyang Shih∗
Section 1 
INTRODUCTION 
The electricity sector is a major source of emissions of several air pollutants of concern, including sulfur 
dioxide (SO2) which contributes to acid rain and fine particle concentrations in the atmosphere, nitrogen 
oxides (NOx) which contribute to both of these pollution problems and to ground-level ozone, mercury, 
which is a toxic substance linked to neurological and other health problems, and carbon dioxide (CO2), 
which contributes to global warming. The electricity sector contributes roughly 68 percent of national 
emissions of SO2 emissions, 22 percent of NOx, 40 percent of mercury, and 40 percent of CO2.1 The effects 
of the emissions of SO2 and NOx are particularly strong in the northeast, which is downwind of the large 
number of coal-fired generators located in the Mid-Atlantic states and the Ohio Valley.  
A number of federal legislative proposals have emerged over the past few years that seek a long-term, 
coordinated approach to pollution control at power plants in the United States. All of these federal bills 
propose to make important cuts in emissions SO2 and NOx, and all rely on tradable permits as the central 
strategy for achieving the emission reductions in a way that minimizes the cost to society. The proposals 
differ in the timetable over which these cuts take effect, in the approach advocated for reducing mercury 
emissions, and in mercury emission reduction targets and whether or not they include CO2. None of the 
                                                 
∗ Karen Palmer and Dallas Burtraw are senior fellows and Jhih-Shyang Shih is a  fellow at Resources for 
the Future, 1616 P St New Washington, DC, 20036, www.rff.org. Palmer is the corresponding author and 
can be reached at palmer@rff.org. 
 
1 According to the EPA’s 1999 National Emissions Inventory.  
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federal bills has advanced to the floor of either house of Congress, largely because of the lack of consensus 
among various groups about the appropriate treatment of CO2. However, several states, including New 
York and North Carolina, have already adopted policies to reduce emissions of SO2 and NOx below levels 
required by federal law at electricity plants within their borders. New York State has been the leader in a 
regional initiative to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases (GHG).2 
Although federal multipollutant legislation has not yet been passed, the current administration has used a 
regulatory approach to be implemented by the EPA to advance a number of the key elements of its 
legislative proposal, known as the Clear Skies Initiative. One new regulation, the Clean Air Interstate Rule 
(CAIR), was promulgated in March 2005 and uses a cap-and-trade approach to reduce annual emissions of 
SO2 and/or NOx in the electricity sector in a region that covers more than 20 states, mostly east of the 
Mississippi, and the District of Columbia. These states are spelled out in a footnote below.3 In a second rule 
also issued in March 2005, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) established a national plan 
to reduce emissions of mercury from electricity generators using a cap-and-trade approach. 
This research project analyzes how the proposed regulations that led to these new federal rules to reduce 
emissions of SO2, NOx, and mercury from the electricity sector will likely affect air quality and acid 
deposition and the cost of supplying electricity to New York residents and to electricity consumers across 
the nation. The research analyzes CAIR coupled with a number of different proposed approaches to 
reducing mercury emissions from the electricity sector. How mercury emissions are regulated will have 
important implications not only for the cost of the regulation, but also for emission levels for SO2, NOx, and 
CO2 and where those emissions take place. 
                                                 
2 A number of states have adopted policies to reduce greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) emissions from 
electricity generators and other sources within their boundaries. The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative 
(RGGI) is an effort by nine northeastern and Mid-Atlantic States to develop a regional, mandatory market-
based, cap-and-trade program to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. The effort was initiated formally in 
April 2003 when New York Governor George Pataki sent letters to fellow governors in the Northeast and 
Mid-Atlantic states, and each of the nine participating states has assigned staff to a working group that is 
charged with developing a proposal in the form of a model rule. 
3 The final version of the CAIR rule targets different states for the annual caps on NOx and SO2 and for the 
seasonal caps on NOx emissions. Twenty-two states—Alabama, Delaware, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, 
Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, 
Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wisconsin—and the District 
of Columbia are included in both the annual and seasonal programs. Georgia, Minnesota, and Texas are 
included in the annual programs only and Arkansas, Connecticut, and Massachusetts are included in the 
Seasonal NOx program only. States covered by the annual program have been targeted because they are in 
danger of failing to comply with new stricter National Ambient Air Quality Standards for fine particulates. 
States in the seasonal program are at risk of noncompliance with the ozone standard.  
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This project brings together a suite of models, including RFF’s Haiku model of the U.S. electricity sector, 
an integrated assessment model of air transport and environmental effects, and a state-of-the-art air 
chemistry model for the eastern United States. These tools are integrated in a sophisticated analysis 
combining science, economics, and public policy that allows us to assess in a unified framework both the 
environmental benefits and the economic costs of a host of different regulatory proposals.  
The report is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the multipollutant policy debate. Section 3 
provides an overview of the modeling platform, followed in Section 4 by a description of the scenarios we 
investigate. The results of the policy alternatives on electricity generation, fuel choice, emissions, 
electricity price and other measures of social cost are presented in Section 5. The environmental public 
health benefits associated with reductions in ozone and fine particulate pollution are presented in Section 6, 
followed by a conclusion in Section 7. 
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Section 2 
THE MULTIPOLLUTANT POLICY DEBATE 
By some measures, the electricity sector is a story of successful air pollution policy and successful 
implementation of incentive-based approaches to pollution control. The Clean Air Act Amendments of 
1990 ushered in large reductions in pollution. Title IV of these amendments created the first national cap-
and-trade program for a major pollutant, capping total SO2 pollution from power plants. Roughly a decade 
later, regulations triggered by the ozone standards in this bill led to seasonal caps on total NOx emissions 
from electricity generators in the eastern half of the country. By 2010, total SO2 from power plants will be 
about 9.2 million tons, while national annual NOx emissions are forecasted to be about 4.6 million tons.4 
Both are roughly half the levels predicted in 1990 to occur in 2010 in the absence of the amendments.5  
Despite these important reductions in emissions, several regions of the country are still not in attainment of 
air quality standards for atmospheric concentrations of ozone to which emissions of NOx contribute 
importantly and many regions are not expected to comply with forthcoming standards for concentrations of 
fine particulates to which emissions of both NOx and SO2 contribute. The electricity sector also is a major 
emitter of mercury into the atmosphere and these emissions are subject to regulation under Section 112 of 
the Clean Air Act, the title that regulates emissions of hazardous air pollutants.6 To combat these and other 
pollution concerns the electricity sector faces a host of potential new federal environmental regulations to 
be promulgated by EPA over the next several years under current statutes. The timing and form of these 
anticipated regulations will have important implications for their cost and the timing of the associated 
benefits. 
To promote greater synergies across pollutants and a more predictable schedule of future regulation of the 
electricity sector a number of legislative proposals were introduced in the 108
th Congress.7 Senator Jeffords 
                                                 
4 Annual emissions of SO2 are expected to exceed allowance allocations in 2010 of 8.95 million tons 
because of draws on the allowance bank, which was built up in Phase I (1995-2000) of the trading program. 
The projection of 9.2 million tons is proximate to various projections from EPA and Energy Information 
Administration (EIA). See for example: http://www.epa.gov/air/clearskies/technical.html (accessed 4.5.05). 
5 U.S. NAPAP, 1991: 221-222. 
6 On March 15, EPA revised and reversed an earlier finding from 2000 that it was “appropriate and 
necessary” to regulate coal- and oil-fired coal-fired power plants under section 112 of the Clean Air Act. 
Instead the agency has chosen to regulate mercury under sections 110(a)(2)(D) and 111 of the law.  
7 The major legislative proposals are summarized in detail in Appendix 2. 
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(I-VT) reintroduced the most aggressive plan, Senate Bill 366, known as The Clean Power Act, which 
would cap annual national emissions of SO2 and NOx from the electricity sector at 25% of their 1997 levels 
and annual emissions of mercury at 10% of 1999 levels by 2009. This is equivalent to annual caps of about 
2.25 million tons for SO2, 1.5 million tons for NOx, and 5 tons for mercury. The bill also caps annual 
electricity sector emissions of CO2 at 1990 levels beginning in 2008. The bill allows for emissions trading 
for all gases except mercury. 
The Bush administration’s proposal, known as Clear Skies, though less aggressive, nonetheless offers 
important reductions. Senators Inhofe (R-OK) and Voinovich (R-OH) reintroduced it in the 108
th Congress 
as Senate Bill 485. The proposal caps annual emissions of SO2 at 4.5 million tons in 2010 and at 3.0 million 
tons in 2018, annual emissions of NOx at 2.1 million tons in 2009 and 1.7 million tons in 2018, and annual 
emissions of mercury at 26 tons in 2010 and 15 tons in 2018.8 This proposal permits the trading of 
emission allowances for all three pollutants.  
In between these two proposals is Senate Bill 843, the Clean Air Planning Act, sponsored by Senator 
Carper (D- DE). This act imposes emission caps for SO2, NOx, and mercury and timetables for achieving 
those caps, both of which generally fall in between the other two proposals. This bill also includes a 
phased-in cap on CO2 emissions from electricity generators, but allows for the use of emission offsets from 
outside the electricity sector to lower the cost of achieving those caps. Mercury emission trading is allowed, 
although generators must meet facility-specific emission reduction targets. 
Multipollutant legislation has not yet advanced in Congress. However several states have passed laws or 
regulations to reduce emissions of some or all of the same pollutants from electricity generators. Most of 
these laws or proposals, such as new regulations in Connecticut and Massachusetts that limit non-ozone 
season emissions of NOx, are formulated as limits on emission rates. The largest state action is in North 
Carolina, which has recently placed emission caps on its largest coal-fired plants. A similar plan has been 
adopted in New Hampshire for all existing fossil fuel generators. New York also has caps on emissions of 
SO2 and NOx from large generators within the state. 
EPA has also taken steps toward requiring greater reductions in emissions of SO2 and NOx from electricity 
generators than mandated under current law. To facilitate compliance with the 8-hour ozone standard and 
with new air quality standards for fine particulates with sizes 2.5 microns in diameter or less (PM2.5) and to 
meet statutory requirements for reducing emissions of hazardous air pollutants such as mercury, the EPA 
                                                 
8 The Clear Skies initiative does not include a cap on CO2 emissions, but instead proposes to cut 
greenhouse gas intensity on an economy-wide basis by 18% over the next 10 years using mostly voluntary 
initiatives and providing a formal mechanism for recognizing cuts that are made voluntarily. 
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issued two rules that together address SO2, NOx, and mercury emissions from the electricity sector. In a rule 
known as the Clean Air Interstate Rule, or CAIR, EPA imposes annual caps on emissions of SO2 and/or 
NOx in a region covering more than 20 states, mostly east of the Mississippi, and the District of Columbia.9 
This regulation allows for emission trading, and restrictions are imposed in two phases with the initial 
phase beginning in 2010 and the second phase beginning in 2015. Beginning in 2010 the program allocates 
roughly 3.7 million tons of SO2 allowances and 1.5 million tons of NOx allowances to electricity generators 
within the region. In 2015, total regional emission allocations drop to 2.6 million tons for SO2 and 1.3 
million tons for NOx. The percent reductions in emissions within the CAIR region are comparable to those 
that would be required nationwide under the Clear Skies Initiative, except they happen on a somewhat 
accelerated schedule.  
In a separate rule EPA caps emissions of mercury from all coal and oil-fired electricity generators at 38 
tons nationally beginning in 2010 and 15 tons beginning in 2018. This cap-and-trade program is national in 
scope.  
The final rules issued in March 2005 differ in some important ways from the proposed form of the rules 
analyzed here. First, the final CAIR rule includes a separate seasonal summertime cap-and-trade program 
for NOx emissions not included in the originally proposed rule. Second, the set of states included in the 
CAIR rule has changed slightly, with Kentucky being dropped from the list. A total of 22 states are 
included in both the annual NOx and SO2 annual programs and the NOx seasonal program established in the 
CAIR rule. Three states, Arkansas, Connecticut, and Massachusetts, are included in the seasonal NOx 
program only and three other states, Georgia, Minnesota, and Texas, are included in the annual SO2 and 
NOx programs only. Third, the change in the set of states covered by the annual program in the CAIR rule 
means there has been a slight downward adjustment in the annual emissions caps. The final mercury rule 
includes a more relaxed mercury emissions cap for phase I than the proposed rule with the expectation that 
generators will build up a bank of excess emission reductions during phase I that they can draw upon 
during phase II. Also, the final mercury rule does not include a safety valve price on mercury emission 
allowances, but instead the rule anticipates that the enlarged allowance bank will keep down the costs of 
compliance in the beginning of the second phase.  
                                                 
9 The EPA CAIR is summarized in Appendix 3. 
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Section 3 
OVERVIEW OF MODELS 
In this project, we use four models to analyze the costs and benefits of several different multipollutant 
policies within the electricity sector. The interrelationships among these four models, including the data 
flows among models, are illustrated in Figure 1.  
The Haiku model looks at the effects of the policies on the behavior of electricity producers and consumers 
and the resulting implications for costs, prices to consumers and the level and location of emissions. The 
TAF model is used to translate changes in emissions of SO2 and NOx from power plants into changes in air 
quality, human health and monetary benefits of those changes in health status. An important component of 
the TAF model is the source receptor coefficients that translate changes in emissions in source areas 
resulting from the policy to changes in concentrations of associated air pollutants in receptor areas, as well 
as changes in deposition of sulfur and nitrogen.  
As a part of this project we used information from the URM-1 ATM air quality model and an associated 
post-processing model called the SRG, which stands for Source-Receptor Generator, to update the source 
receptor coefficients in TAF for SO2 and NOx contributions to particulate concentrations and for NOx 
contributions to ozone. Previously, TAF contained source receptor coefficients from the Advanced Source 
Trajectory Regional Air Pollution (ASTRAP) model for particulates, but had no source receptor 
coefficients for ozone. Updating these coefficients represented an important and significant component of 
the research. We use the ASTRAP model as a point of comparison for the new coefficients. For deposition 
of sulfur and nitrogen we continue to rely on ASTRAP because of advantages discussed below, and use 
URM as a point of comparison. 
In the following sections each of the models is described in greater detail. 
 
3.1 HAIKU MODEL 
The Haiku model simulates equilibrium in regional electricity markets and interregional electricity trade 
with an integrated algorithm for SO2, NOx, and mercury emission control technology choice. The model 
calculates electricity demand, electricity prices, the composition of technologies and fuels used to supply  
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electricity, interregional electricity trading activity, and emissions of key pollutants. The main data inputs 
to the Haiku model, along with the sources for the associated data, are listed in Table 1.10  
The model solves for the quantity and price of electricity delivered in 13 regions, for four time periods 
(super-peak, peak, shoulder, and base load hours) in each of three seasons (summer, winter, and 
spring/fall). For each of these 156 market segments, demand is aggregated from three customer classes: 
residential, industrial, and commercial, each with its own constant elasticity demand function. Estimates of 
demand elasticities for different customer classes and regions of the country are taken from the economics 
literature. 
The supply-side of the model is built using capacity, generation, and heat-rate data for the complete set of 
commercial electricity plants in the United States from various Energy Information Administration (EIA) 
datasets. For modeling purposes, these plant-level data are aggregated into 39 representative plants in each 
region. The capacity for a model plant is determined by aggregating the capacity of the individual 
constituent plants in a given region that are of the same type as the model plant. However, no region 
contains every one of these model plants. For example, the New England region does not contain a 
geothermal plant.  
A model plant is defined by the combination of its technology and fuel source, which include coal, natural 
gas, oil, hydropower, and nuclear. There are steam plants that run on oil as well as gas turbine plants that 
run on oil. The same is true for natural gas. Coal is a little different from the other fuels in that it is divided 
into 14 subcategories based on the region the coal is from and its level of sulfur content. Table 2 provides  
a listing these subcategories. The users of coal are broken down into demand regions that have different 
costs associated with each type of coal, which reflect the varying interregional transport costs. Model  
plants might switch the type of coal they use in order to reduce their SO2 or mercury emissions, which may 
be more cost effective than installing new pollution controls. Table 3 gives a list of the various types of 
model plants.  
 
 
                                                 
10 The items listed in Table 1 are largely parameters in the model that rely on real world data or variables 
derivative of real world data. The Haiku model user also must make assumptions about a number of inputs 
including the discount rate, year in which to base net present value calculations, and expected rate of 
transmission capacity growth. Users must also input policy scenario assumptions. 
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Table 1. Inputs to the Haiku Model 
Category Variables Source* 
Existing Generation      
 Capacity  EIA 
 Heat  Rate  EIA 
  Fixed and Variable O&M Cost  FERC\EIA\EPA 
  Existing pollution controls  EPA/RFF 
 Planned  pollution  controls  RFF 
  Baseline Emission Rates  EPA (CEMS/NEEDS) 
  Scheduled and Unscheduled Outage Rates  NERC GADS data 
New Generation Facilities     
 Capacity  EIA 
 Heat  Rate  EIA\EPA 
  Fixed and Variable Operating Cost  EIA 
 Capital  Cost  EIA 
  Outage Rates  NERC GADS data 
Fuel Supply      
  Wellhead supply curve for natural gas  Interpolated based on EIA 
forecasts 
  Delivery cost for natural gas   
  Minemouth supply curve for coal by region 
and type of coal 
 
EIA 
  Delivery cost for coal  EIA 
 Delivered  oil  price  EIA 
Pollution Controls     
 SO2 – cost and performance  EPA 
 NOx – cost and performance  EPA 
  Hg – cost and performance  EPA 
Transmission    
  Inter-regional transmission capacity  NERC 
 Transmission  charges  EMF 
  Inter and intra regional transmission losses   
EMF 
Demand    
  Data year demand levels by season and 
customer class 
EIA 
  Load Duration Curve  RFF  
  Trends in Demand Growth by customer class 
and region 
EIA AEO 2004 
  Elasticities by customer class  Economics literature 
* Additional information on data is provided in Paul and Burtraw (2002). 
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Table 2. Mapping of Coal Supply Categories 
 
2000 Million  
Short. Tons* 
Haiku Coal Supply 
Mapping 
Northern Appalachia  PA, MD, OH, Northern WV  149.14   
   Medium Sulfur (Premium)  4.66  -- 
   Low Sulfur (Bituminous)  0.36  -- 
   Medium Sulfur (Bituminous)  72.61  NAMB 
   High Sulfur (Bituminous)  61.41  NAHB 
   High Sulfur (Gob)  10.10  -- 
Central Appalachia  Southern WV, VA, Eastern KY.  258.40   
   Medium Sulfur (Premium)  47.16  -- 
   Low Sulfur (Bituminous)  65.91  CSALB 
   Medium Sulfur (Bituminous)  145.33  CSAMB 
Southern Appalachia  AL, TN.  22.00   
   Low Sulfur (Premium)  6.82  -- 
   Low Sulfur (Bituminous)  6.03  CSALB 
   Medium Sulfur (Bituminous)  9.15  CSAMB 
Eastern Interior  IL, IN, MS, Western KY.  88.09   
   Medium Sulfur (Bituminous)  30.86  EIMB 
   High Sulfur (Bituminous)  56.33  EIHB 
   Medium Sulfur (Lignite)  0.90  -- 
Western Interior  IA, MO, KS, OK, AR, TX.  2.42   
   High Sulfur (Bituminous)  2.42  -- 
Gulf TX,  LA,  AR.  53.02   
   Medium Sulfur (Lignite)  36.44  GLML 
   High Sulfur (Lignite)  16.58  GLHL 
Dakota ND,  Eastern MT.  31.41   
   Medium Sulfur (Lignite)  31.41  DLML 
Powder/Green River  WY, MT.  376.88   
   Low Sulfur (Bituminous)  1.21  -- 
   Low Sulfur (Sub-Bituminous)  345.74  PGLS 
   Medium Sulfur (Sub-Bituminous)  29.93  PGMS 
Rocky Mountain  CO, UT.  55.80   
   Low Sulfur (Bituminous)  46.64  SWLB 
   Low Sulfur (Sub-Bituminous)  9.16  SWLS 
Arizona/New Mexico  AZ, NM.  40.43   
   Low Sulfur (Bituminous)  19.62  SWLB 
   Medium Sulfur (Bituminous)  0.00  -- 
   Medium Sulfur (Sub-Bituminous)  20.81  SWMS 
Washington/Alaska WA,  AK.  5.91   
   Medium Sulfur (Sub-Bituminous)  5.91  -- 
* Source: http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/aeo/supplement/sup_ogc.pdf   
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Table 3. Model Plant Types in Haiku 
Existing Plants  New or Planned Plants 
  Natural Gas Fired Combined Cycle    Coal Steam 
  Oil Combined Cycle    Conventional Natural Gas-Fired Combined 
Cycle 
  Efficient Natural Gas Fired Gas Turbine    Natural Gas-Fired Combined Cycle, 
Combustion Turbine Duct 
  Inefficient Natural Gas Fired Gas Turbine    Conventional Natural Gas Fired Gas 
Turbine 
  Oil Gas Turbine    Landfill Gas Internal Combustion 
  Conventional Hydro    Biomass IGCC 
  Hydro Pumped Storage    Wind 
  Solar    Advanced Natural Gas-Fired Combined 
Cycle 
  Wind    Advanced Natural Gas-Fired Gas Turbine 
  Biomass Steam    Geothermal 
  Geothermal   Coal  IGCC 
  Efficient Natural Gas Steam     
  Inefficient Natural Gas Steam     
  Efficient Nuclear     
  Inefficient Nuclear     
  Oil Steam     
  MSW / Landfill Gas     
  Coal Steam*     
* The model includes several different categories of existing coal steam model plants, which are distinguished by EIA coal 
demand region in which the model plant is located. This distinction brings the total number of model plants from the 29 listed 
here to 39. 
Investment in new generation capacity and retirement of existing facilities are determined endogenously in a 
dynamic framework, based on capacity-related costs of providing service in the future (“going forward costs”). The 
model determines investment and retirement of generation capacity and new generation capacity is assigned to a 
model plant representing new capacity of that type. The Haiku model determines the level of new investment in 
generation capacity and in post-combustion controls, as well as retirement of existing capacity. The model 
incorporates available information about planned units currently under construction. Generator dispatch in the model 
is based on the minimization of short run variable costs of generation. All costs and prices are expressed in 1999 real 
dollars.  
Interregional power trading is identified as the level of trading necessary to equilibrate regional electricity prices 
(accounting for transmission costs and power losses). These interregional transactions are constrained by the 
assumed level of available interregional transmission capability as reported by the North American Electric 
Reliability Council (NERC). The 13 NERC regions are displayed in Figure 2.  
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Figure 2. Haiku Model Regions 
 
Factor prices, such as the cost of capital and labor, are held constant. Fuel price forecasts are calibrated to match 
EIA price forecasts (U.S. EIA 2004). Fuel market modules for coal and natural gas calculate prices that are 
responsive to factor demand. Coal is differentiated along several dimensions, including fuel quality and location of 
supply, and both coal and natural gas prices are differentiated by point of delivery. All other fuel prices are specified 
exogenously. 
For control of SO2, coal burning model plants are distinguished by the presence or absence of flue gas 
desulfurization (scrubbers). Unscrubbed coal plants have the option to add a retrofit SO2 scrubber, and all plants 
select from a series of coal types that vary by sulfur content and price as a strategy to reduce SO2 emissions. For 
control of NOx, coal-, oil-, and gas-fired steam plants solve for the least costly post-combustion investment from the 
options of selective catalytic reduction (SCR) and selective noncatalytic reduction (SNCR), and also reburn for coal-
fired plants.  
The model accounts for ancillary reductions in mercury associated with other post-combustion controls including 
decisions to install retrofit SO2 scrubbers and NOx controls (SCR), and the model includes activated carbon injection 
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(ACI) as another means of reducing mercury emissions. Using activated carbon injection (ACI) only typically has a 
mercury removal efficiency of 90-95%, and adding on SO2 wet scrubbers increases this rate to 97%. For bituminous 
coal the combination of SCR and SO2 wet scrubbers yields a removal efficiency of 90%, though this combination is 
not nearly as effective for subbituminous and lignite coal. In this analysis we base our emission modification factors 
for mercury on those used by EPA in its analysis of CAIR and the proposed mercury rule and these factors are 
presented in Table 4. The EPA emission modification factors depend on coal type and the configuration of post-
combustion controls including particulate controls. In Haiku these factors are aggregated over particulate controls 
existing at each model plant to arrive at a weighted average emission modification factor for each combination of 
SO2 and NOx control at that plant. Table 5 reports the emission modification factors for one model plant in the 
Midwest (ECAR NERC subregion) that apply to that portion of the model plant that has SCR control for NOx in 
place. A different set of factors applies in the absence of SCR. Also reported are the emission modification factors 
for ACI. The variable costs of emission controls plus the opportunity cost of emission allowances under cap-and-
trade programs are added to the variable cost of generation when establishing the operation of different types of 
generation capacity. Utilization of each plant is flexible and demand also may respond to changes in the price of 
electricity in order to help achieve emission reductions. 
 
Table 4. U.S. EPA Emissions Modification Factors for Mercury 
Configuration  EPA Percent Mercury Removal 
SO2 Control  Particulate 
Control 
NOx Control  Bit Coal  Sub Bit Coal  Lignite Coal 
None BH  ---  89  73  0 
Wet BH  None  97  73  0 
Wet  BH  SCR  90 85 44 
Dry BH ---  95  25  0 
None CSE  ---  36  3  0 
Wet  CSE  None  66 16 44 
Wet  CSE  SCR  90 66 44 
Dry CSE  ---  36  35  0 
None HSE/Oth  ---  10  6  0 
Wet HSE/Oth  None  42  20  0 
Wet HSE/Oth  SCR  90  25  0 
Dry HSE/Oth  ---  40  15  0 
Notes: SO2 Controls: Wet = Wet Scrubber, Dry = Dry Scrubber; Particulate Controls: BH = baghouse/fabric filter, 
CSE – cold side electrostatic precipitator, HSE – hot side elctro static precipitator; NOx Controls: SCR – selective 
catalytic reduction, --- = not applicable; Bit = bituminous coal, Sub = subbituminous coal. 
Source: U.S. EPA at http://www.epa.gov/clearskies/techinical.html. 
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Table 5. Representative Emissions Modification Factors for Mercury Used in Haiku at an Existing Coal-
Fired Plant in the ECAR NERC Sub-Region with SCR Control 
  SO2 and Mercury Control Choice Combinations 
Coal Supply 
Category*  Wet  Wet & ACI  Dry  Dry & ACI  ACI  None 
NAMB  0.900  0.965 0.364 0.936 0.936 0.359 
NAHB  0.900  0.965 0.364 0.936 0.936 0.359 
CSALB  0.900  0.965 0.364 0.936 0.936 0.359 
CSAMB  0.900  0.965 0.364 0.936 0.936 0.359 
EIMB  0.900  0.965 0.364 0.936 0.936 0.359 
EIHB  0.900  0.965 0.364 0.936 0.936 0.359 
GLML  0.434  0.943 0.004 0.900 0.901 0.007 
GLHL  0.434  0.943 0.004 0.900 0.901 0.007 
DLML  0.434  0.943 0.004 0.900 0.901 0.007 
PGLS  +0.658 0.917 0.350 0.935 0.904 0.037 
PGMS  0.658  0.917 0.350 0.935 0.904 0.037 
SWLB  0.900  0.965 0.364 0.936 0.936 0.359 
SWLS  0.658  0.917 0.350 0.935 0.904 0.037 
SWMS  0.658  0.917 0.350 0.935 0.904 0.037 
* Coal supply categories are described in Table 2. 
 
3.2 TAF MODEL 
The output of the Haiku model is emissions of each pollutant by a representative plant within each of 13 NERC 
subregions. The emissions are allocated to actual plant locations (latitude and longitude) based on an algorithm that 
reflects historic utilization and the expected location of new investment. Changes in emissions of SO2 and NOx that 
result from the policies are aggregated to the state level and fed into TAF, a nonproprietary and peer-reviewed 
integrated assessment model (Bloyd et al., 1996).11 TAF integrates pollutant transport and deposition (including 
formation of secondary particulates but excluding ozone), human health effects, and valuation of these effects at the 
                                                 
11 TAF was developed to support the National Acid Precipitation Assessment Program (NAPAP). Each module of 
TAF was constructed and refined by a group of experts in that field, and draws primarily on peer-reviewed literature 
to construct the integrated model. TAF was subject to an extensive peer review in December 1995, which concluded 
“TAF represent[s] a major advancement in our ability to perform integrated assessments.” (ORNL, 1995) The entire 
model is available at www.lumina.com\taflist.  
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state level. Although our version of the model limits benefits only to particulate-related health impacts, these 
impacts account for the vast majority of all benefits according to the major integrated assessment studies of the 
impacts of electricity generation (Krupnick and Burtraw, 1996). 
In the original version of TAF, pollution transport is estimated from seasonal source-receptor matrices that are a 
reduced-form version of the Advanced Source Trajectory Regional Air Pollution (ASTRAP) model, which uses 11 
years of wind and precipitation data to estimate the variability of model results on the basis of climatological 
variability. In aggregating to the state level, the source-receptor matrix is calibrated to represent average effects 
observed in more disaggregate models. The model captures atmospheric chemistry as NOx and SO2 react to form 
nitrates and sulfates, which are constituents of particulate matter less than 10 microns in diameter (PM10). It 
estimates concentrations of these separate constituents of PM10 plus gaseous NO2 and SO2.  
As a part of this project, we develop another set of source-receptor coefficients that includes both the effects of 
changes in emission of NOx and SO2 on fine particulate concentrations and the effects of changes in NOx emissions 
on atmospheric ozone concentrations. The development of these source receptor coefficients is described in the next 
section of this report. The new coefficients developed with the Urban-to-Regional Multiscale (URM) One 
Atmosphere Model that is described below encompass only the eastern half of the United States, although this is the 
most relevant to this project. For the rest of the nation we continue to use coefficients from ASTRAP in our central 
case. We do a comparison analysis using only the ASTRAP coefficients.  
The TAF model does not include any information on transport and fate of mercury emissions and, thus, we are 
unable to assess the changes in concentrations of mercury in fish or to evaluate changes in consumption of 
contaminated fish, which is a major pathway for human exposure and adverse health effects. As a result we are 
unable to value the direct benefits from reductions in mercury emissions associated with the different policies. Given 
the wide differences in mercury emissions across the various policies that we evaluate, this omission suggests an 
important caveat to our results about the net benefits of the different policies. Policies that offer greater reductions in 
mercury could have greater health benefits than those that promise lesser reductions, and those benefits are not 
captured here. 
Health effects are characterized as changes in health status predicted to result from changes in air pollution 
concentrations. Effects are expressed as the number of days of acute morbidity effects of various types, the number 
of chronic disease cases, and the number of statistical lives lost. The health module is based on concentration-
response functions found in the peer-reviewed literature, including epidemiological articles reviewed in EPA’s 
Criteria Documents that, in turn, appear in key EPA cost-benefit analyses (U.S. EPA, 1997; U.S. EPA, 1999). The 
health effects modeled are listed in Table 6.  
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Table 6. List of Epidemiological Studies Used to Calculate  
Health Effects of Pollution Changes in TAF Model Runs 
Ozone Health Endpoint  Concentration Response Study [Weight] 
Respiratory Hospital Admissions – All Cause – 65 
Up 
Schwartz (1995) New Haven – Other: PM10 [0.5] 
Schwartz (1995) Takoma – Other: PM10 [0.5] 
Respiratory Hospital Admissions - All Cause – 
Under 2 
Burnett et al (2001) Other: PM2.5 [1.0] 
Asthma Emergency Room Visits – All Ages  Weisel et al (1995) Other: None [0.5] 
Cody et al (1992) Other: SO2 [0.5] 
School Absence Days – 5 to 17  Gilliand et al (2001) Other: None [0.08] 
Chen et al (2000) Other: CO, PM10 [0.92] 
Minor Restricted Activity Days – 18 to 64  Ostro and Rothschild (1989) Other: None [1.0] 
Short Term Mortality – All Ages  Ito and Thurston (1996) Other: PM10 [0.0825] 
Moolgavkar et al (1995) Other: SO2, TSP [0.45] 
Samet et al (1997) Other: CO, NO2, SO2, TSP 
[0.2175] 
Bell et al (2004) Other: PM10 [0.25] 
PM 2.5 Health Endpoint  Concentration Response Study [Weight] 
Mortality – Under 1  Woodruff et al (1997) Other: None [1.0] 
Mortality – 30 Up  Pope et al (2002) 1979 to 83 Air Data – Other: 
None [1.0] 
Chronic Bronchitis – 18 Up  Abbey et al (1995) Other: None [1.0] 
Non-fatal Heart Attacks – 18 Up  Peters et al (2000) Other: None [1.0] 
Respiratory Hospital Admissions – All Cause – All 
Ages 
Burnett et al (1997) Other: O3 [1.0] 
Cardiovascular Hospital Admissions – 18 to 64  Moolgavkar (2000) All Cardio – Other: None [1.0] 
Cardiovascular Hospital Admissions – 65 Up  Moolgavkar (2003) All Cardio – Other: None 
[0.979] 
Ito (2003) Ischemic Heart Disease – Other: None 
[0.007] 
Ito (2003) Dysrhythmia – Other: None [0.007] 
Ito (2003) Heart Failure – Other: None [0.007] 
Asthma Emergency Room Visits – Under 18  Norris et al (1999) Other: None [1.0] 
Acute Bronchitis in Children – 8 to 12  Dockery et al (1996) Other: None [1.0] 
Upper Respiratory Symptoms in Children – 7 to 14  Pope et al (1991) Other: None [1.0 
Asthma Exacerbations – 6 to 18  Ostro et al (2001) Cough – Other: None [0.3718] 
Ostro et al (2001) Wheeze – Other: None [0.2436] 
Ostro et al (2001) Short Breath – Other: None 
[0.3846] 
Work Loss Days – 18 to 64  Ostro (1987) Other: None [1.0] 
Minor Restricted Activity Days – 18 to 64  Ostro and Rothschild (1989) Other: None [1.0] 
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Of these effects, mortality effects are the most important. To characterize these effects we use a cross sectional study 
by Pope et al. (1995). While this study and others have documented the separate effects of PM10, PM2.5 and sulfates 
(a constituent of PM2.5) on mortality, none have documented the specific effect of nitrates. Accordingly, we use the 
separate Pope et al. estimates for the potency of sulfates, but assume that nitrates have the potency of the average 
PM10 particle. 
TAF assigns monetary values (taken from the environmental economics literature) to the health-effects estimates 
produced by the health-effects module. The benefits are totaled to obtain annual health benefits for each year 
modeled. For the most important aspect, the value of a statistical life (VSL), we have used an estimate of $2.25 
million (1999 dollars) from a recent meta-analysis by Mrozek and Taylor (2002) of 203 hedonic labor-market 
estimates. This estimate is lower than that used in most previous work and less than half of the $6.1 million estimate 
used by EPA (1997, 1999). The most important reason for this discrepancy is the attribution of wage rate 
differentials to mortality rate differences in previous studies cited by EPA, while Mrozek and Taylor attribute a 
larger portion of the wage rate differentials to inter-industry differences that occur for other reasons.12  
As with past research, values for chronic morbidity effects (e.g., emphysema) are transferred from individual 
studies, often using a conservative cost-of-illness approach. Values for acute effects are predicted from the meta-
analysis of Johnson et al. (1997), which synthesized contingent valuation studies of morbidity effects based on their 
severity according to a health-status index and other variables. 
We also use TAF to calculate expected changes in deposition of sulfur and nitrogen. For this purpose we rely 
primarily on the ASTRAP coefficients because they have the advantage of preserving mass balance between 
emissions and deposition and because the ASTRAP model has been compared favorably to the EPA’s Regional 
Acid Deposition Model (RADM).13  
                                                 
12 There may be other reasons to suspect that the traditional values are too high. Labor market studies rely on the 
preferences of prime-age, healthy working males facing immediate and accidental risks of workplace mortality. In 
contrast, particulate pollution primarily affects seniors and people with impaired health status and may occur years 
after initial exposure. This recognition has led to attempts to estimate values for life extensions (Johnson et al., 
1998) and future risks (Alberini et al., 2004). New surveys that use contingent valuation to describe mortality risk 
reductions in a more realistic health context and that are applied to people of different ages and health status, find 
that the implied VSLs are far smaller than EPA’s estimates, particularly for future risk reductions (Alberini et al., 
2004). However, the effects do not appear to be strongly related to age and, although many conjecture that poor 
health status would reduce willingness to pay, the study finds people in ill health tend to be willing to pay more for 
mortality risk reductions than people in good health. On the other hand, effects of dread and lack of controllability 
have not yet been factored into these new analyses. 
13 Shannon, et al. (1997) found the two models’ predictions reasonably in agreement for predicting atmospheric 
sulfate concentrations in the eastern U.S., though RADM actually predicts greater sulfate reductions in the more 
populated regions including the Mid-Atlantic. 
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3.3 URM 1-ATM AND SRG
14 
This study takes output from the Urban-to-Regional Multiscale (URM) One Atmosphere Model (URM-1ATM) for 
several air pollution episodes at a detailed geographic scale and uses that information to construct aggregate source-
receptor coefficients for state-level receptors using the Source-Receptor Generator (SRG) model.15 The episode-
specific, source-receptor coefficients are aggregated to annual source-receptor coefficients using weights developed 
based on a Classification and Regression Tree (CART) analysis of the episode data.16 The models that are used to 
perform these tasks and how they work together are described below.  
The URM-1ATM and the Regional Atmospheric Modeling System (RAMS) are used to account for the processes 
significantly affecting ozone and fine particulate concentrations in the atmosphere, including atmospheric physics, 
chemical reactions in the atmosphere, cloud and precipitation processes, and wet and dry deposition. RAMS is used 
to recreate the physics of an historical period of time, providing details and spatial coverage unavailable from 
observations. URM-1ATM solves the atmospheric diffusion equation (ADE) presented in equation (1) for the 
change in concentration, c, of pollutant of species i with time,  
  () ( ) i i i i
i S f c c
t
c
+ + ∇ • ∇ = • ∇ +
∂
∂
K u    (1) 
where u is a velocity field, K is the diffusivity tensor, fi represents the production by chemical reaction of species i, 
and Si represents sources and sinks of species i. As used here, a direct sensitivity capability using the Direct 
Decoupled Method in Three Dimensions (DDM-3D) is employed to calculate the local sensitivities of specified 
model outputs simultaneously with concentrations (Odman et al. 2002, Russell, McCue, and Cass 1998). As shown 
in Equation 2, the sensitivity, Sij, of a model output, Ci (such as pollutant concentration of species i) to specified 
model inputs or parameters, Pj (e.g., emissions of NOx from elevated sources) is calculated as the ratio of the change 









=  (2) 
                                                 
14 Much of this discussion is taken from Shih et al. 2004.  
15 For more information on the URM-1ATM model see Boylan et al. (2002) and Kumar, Odman, and Russell 
(1994). 
16 For more information about CART analysis see Breiman et al. (1984). 
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Equations 1 and 2 are solved concurrently and efficiently. The sensitivity in equation 2 is a local derivative, so a 
linear assumption is in effect when we extrapolate the result to a non-zero perturbation in emissions. This 
assumption has been well tested for the pollution concentrations of interest for this study, which include ozone and 
fine particulates. Although we continue to use the ASTRAP coefficients to account for changes in deposition of 
sulfur and nitrogen for reasons stated above, the URM-1ATM model also provides coefficients for wet deposition 
for much of the nation. We compare these results with those coming from the ASTRAP model. A more detailed 
description of the model is available from Boylan et al. (2002) and Bergin et al. (2004). 
URM-1ATM model uses a multiscale grid structure encompassing the eastern United States as shown in Figure 3. 
The finest grids are placed over major source regions such as the Ohio River Valley, where many power plants and 
large industries are located, and over highly populated regions such as the East Coast corridor. This approach allows 
evaluation of potential population exposure to pollutants and captures high-population-related sources such as 
automobile exhaust, fast food restaurants, and so forth. The vertical grid has seven layers, which allow different 
treatment of sources with low- and high-level stacks.  
URM-1ATM is applied to three air quality episodes: February 9 to 13, 1994, May 24–29, 1995, and July 11–19, 
1995. These three episodes are used to represent winter, spring and summer weather, respectively. These episodes 
were selected because high-quality and complete data were available and were previously modeled and because the 
data covered large meteorological variation with moderate-to-high pollution formation. Meteorological information 
is developed using the Regional Atmospheric Modeling System (RAMS), found in Pielke et al. 1992.  
The sensitivities from the URM-1ATM model are aggregated spatially on the receptor side using the SRG model. 
The hourly pollutant concentration sensitivity with respect to a uniform 30% reduction in emissions (by states and 
sources, both elevated and area) and population, for every grid in the entire study domain, are inputs to the SRG 
Model. The SRG program calculates spatially aggregated (receptor grids) source-receptor coefficients (S-Rs), both 
population weighted and nonpopulation weighted, for various averaging times (1-hour, 8-hour, and daily) for 22 
receptor regions covering a 27 state area.17 Population-weighted S-Rs are needed for estimating potential health 
benefits from application of source controls, and also give a better proxy for health effects than do area-weighted 
measures. The area-weighted S-Rs are useful to see the pure spatial and temporal effects of emissions on 
concentrations. 
                                                 
17 Three sets of states and the District of Columbia fully in the model domain are aggregated into multistate receptor 
regions. Maine, New Hampshire, and Vermont are aggregated into a single region as are Connecticut, Massachusetts 
and Rhode Island and Delaware, Maryland, and the District of Columbia. In addition, 11 states on the western 
border of the eastern domain are aggregated into a single region. 
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Figure 3. Multi-scale Grid Used to Model Changes in Ozone and  
Particulate Species from Changes in NOx and SO2. 
 
Note: The finest resolution has horizontal grids of 24km per side, and the other cells are 48km, 96km, and 192km
 per side. The 
shaded areas represent high population densities (urban areas.) Fine scale cells are placed over areas of high industrial or 
population densities. 
 
To use the output from the URM model, which is based on distinct episodes of six to nine days, in seasonal or 
annual policy contexts, the episodes must be re-weighted to reflect the entire season or year. To re-weight the 
episodes, we follow Deuel and Douglas (1998) in using a Classification and Regression Tree (CART) approach. 
CART is a non-parametric regression technique that predicts discrete (e.g. high-medium-low) levels of a variable of 
interest (e.g. PM10 or ozone levels) by grouping observations based on the similarity of predictive observables, e.g. 
independent variables. The model segments the N-dimensional space of independent variables into cells. Our 
independent variables include average humidity, precipitation, air pressure, average wind speed, resultant wind 
speed, temperature, and horizontal sigma (standard deviation of horizontal wind directions). Air quality and 
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meteorological data for this analysis are taken from the Whiteface Mountain Base monitoring station. Other upper 
air meteorological data was obtained from Radiosonde Data of North America from NOAA. From this data set we 
used upper air observations from the airport at Albany, New York as a proxy.  
Seasonal and annual weights are then based on the proportion of days in each cell for an entire five-year (1992–
1996) period experienced by New York relative to those in our episodes. Consider particulates as an example. First, 




3, and >24 µg/m
3). We then re-weight the days in each class by the 
proportion of days in the season/year, relative to the episodes. For example, if the episodes have fewer PM10 days 
below 6 µg/m
3 relative to the yearly average number of days, and more days above 24 µg/m
3, we would 
underweight the former and overweight the latter. Then, within each class, we re-weight each day by the proportion 
of days in the same cell of independent variables predicted to cause that class. For example, within the set of cells 
predicted to cause high PM10 days (>24 µg/m
3), if we find more hot days where the previous day was cool, relative 
to the actual number of such days, and fewer back-to-back hot days, we would under-weight the former and over-
weight the latter. In this way the episodes are re-weighted to represent the outcomes of interest, and the various 
types of conditions associated with similar outcomes. We use information on PM10 to develop weights for source-
receptor coefficients for fine particulates because only data on PM10 were available to us. 
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Section 4 
DESCRIPTION OF SCENARIOS 
4.1 OVERVIEW 
This analysis simulates the effects of different federal multipollutant policies on electricity costs, prices, emissions, 
air quality, and environmental health benefits both in New York and across the nation by comparing several 
different multipollutant policy scenarios to a baseline scenario using the models described in the previous section. 
To be relevant to the current policy debate we evaluate three different multipollutant policy cases that coincide with 
recent proposals. All of these policies include EPA’s Clean Air Interstate Rule for SO2 and NOx in combination with 
different approaches to reducing mercury emissions from electricity generators nationwide:  
1. CAIR plus EPA Mercury Cap: The Clean Air Interstate Rule (CAIR) as originally proposed coupled 
with a companion national mercury cap, based on EPA’s proposed cap, with unrestricted trading of 
mercury emission allowances. Under this scenario, the seasonal cap-and-trade program for NOx for 
electricity generating units in the State Implementation Plan (SIP) seasonal NOx trading program is no 
longer in effect. In all of the CAIR and national allowance trading programs, allowances are distributed 
initially based on historic emissions.  
2. CAIR plus EPA Mercury and Seasonal SIP NOx Policy: This scenario combines scenario 1 with the 
continuation of the seasonal cap-and-trade program for NOx emissions from electricity generating units in 
the NOx SIP Call region. Although the originally proposed CAIR rule would have suspended the current 
seasonal NOx policy, in the final rule a seasonal program is reconstituted.  
3. CAIR plus Tighter Mercury with MACT: This scenario includes the CAIR as represented in scenario 
1 coupled with a national requirement that all coal-fired generators achieve either a 90% reduction in 
mercury emissions or a target emission rate of 0.6 lbs of mercury per trillion Btu of heat input, whichever is 
less expensive at the particular facility.  
4. CAIR plus Tighter Mercury with Trading: This scenario models the CAIR coupled with a national 
cap-and-trade program for mercury where the national annual emission cap for mercury in each year is set 
at the national annual mercury emission level realized under the version of the Tighter Mercury with 
MACT rule modeled in scenario 3.  
The variations in how mercury emissions are regulated under these four different scenarios will have important 
implications for emissions of other pollutants. At many model plants the lowest cost way to reduce mercury 
emissions is to consider co-control of mercury, SO2 and NOx, which could lead to the installation of some 
  28Resources for the Future                                                                Palmer, Burtraw, and Shih 
combination of SO2 and NOx controls. Thus differences in mercury regulations across the different scenarios can 
affect the level of emissions of SO2 and NOx from individual plants and in the aggregate. Tighter restrictions on 
mercury emissions may necessitate greater use of scrubbers and of SCR, both of which can provide important 
reductions in mercury emissions, particularly when used in combination at plants that burn bituminous coal. The 
form of the mercury regulations for a fixed aggregate emission level could also affect the types of controls installed, 
the location of those controls and thus location of emissions of SO2 and NOx and the associated air quality and 
environmental and health benefits of a policy.  
 
4.2 ASSUMPTIONS THAT ARE MAINTAINED IN ALL POLICY SCENARIOS  
The simulations look at a roughly 16-year forecast horizon. The model is solved for the years 2005, 2010, 2015, and 
2020 and results are reported for 2010 and 2020. The underlying demand model assumes that national average 
electricity demand grows at a rate of about 1.8% per year over the forecast period. For New York, the electricity 
demand functions are scaled to replicate as closely as possible the 2004 NYSERDA electricity demand forecasts for 
the state in our baseline model run. The NYSERDA forecast assumes an average annual growth rate of about 1% per 
year between 2005 and 2020. All prices are reported in 1999 dollars. 
Throughout this analysis, we make several assumptions about underlying policies, both federal and state 
environmental policies and market regulatory policies that affect the performance of electricity generators. We 
assume electricity generators face no requirements to reduce mercury or CO2 emissions in the baseline scenario. We 
include all new source review (NSR) settlements announced as of April 2004 in our technical assumptions about 
emission control at existing generators.18 We also include a representation of two federal policies to promote 
renewables. We assume that the renewable energy production credit (for dedicated biomass and wind generation) is 
extended through 2005 and is then phased out between 2005 and 2010.19 We also include a perpetual 10% 
investment tax credit for new geothermal resources.  
We do not model the New York renewable portfolio standard (RPS) explicitly because it was not policy at the time 
that modeling was conducted; however, we do examine it in a special sensitivity analysis. We include several state-
                                                 
18 NSR settlements are those that electricity generating companies have reached with the federal government to 
bring their plants into compliance with New Source Review requirements for emission reductions that the 
government claims were violated by past investments at specific facilities. We assume the Cinergy proposed 
settlement is adopted. We do not include the NRG and AES settlements, although controls at the affected plants 
result from the policies that we model. 
19 In practice, facilities that qualify receive the credit for 10 years. In our model, they receive the credit indefinitely, 
but only as long as the credit is active. 
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level renewables policies in other states. To capture the anticipated effects of compliance with state-level renewable 
portfolio standards and other renewables policies and programs including green pricing on investment in new 
renewables, we incorporate EIA’s estimates of new renewable resource investments to be put into place to comply 
with these policies.20 
We incorporate the policies to limit SO2 and NOx in New York State under the Governor’s Acid Rain Initiative; 
however, we do not model potential restrictions on emissions of CO2 through the Regional Greenhouse Gas 
Initiative. In practice, the SO2 and NOx policies in New York State take the form of caps on emissions from 
electricity generators. The NOx policy applies to all fossil fuel–fired electricity generating units larger than 25 MW. 
This policy applies a cap on NOx emissions during the months not covered by the NOx SIP Call. We implement this 
policy in the model by requiring the NOx controls that were installed to comply with the SIP Call to run all year 
long, which results in total NOx emissions substantially below the effective annual cap of roughly 73,000 tons. The 
New York State SO2 policy applies to all Title IV–affected units and is imposed in two phases: 199,600 tons per 
year beginning in 2005 and 133,000 tons per year beginning in 2008.21 Unlike the other state-level environmental 
policies for which exogenous compliance strategies are imposed, we model compliance with this cap endogenously. 
We also include the anticipated effects of state-level multipollutant policies in the following states: Connecticut, 
Massachusetts, Missouri, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Texas, and Wisconsin.22 
With respect to electricity price regulation, we assume that electricity prices are set competitively in six NERC 
regions—New York, New England, Mid-Atlantic (MAAC), Illinois area (MAIN), the Ohio Valley (ECAR), and 
Texas (ERCOT)—and that there is time-of-day pricing of electricity for industrial customers in these regions. In all 
other regions of the country, we assume that prices are set according to cost-of-service regulation at average cost. 
                                                 
20 This means we are including the effects of state level RPS policies in Arizona, California, Connecticut, 
Massachusetts, New Jersey, Nevada, Texas, and Wisconsin. It includes the effects of green pricing programs in 
several states and renewables mandates in Minnesota. For more information see EIA (2004). This analysis does not 
include the effects of the New York renewables requirement that was finalized in 2004 or of other state-level RPS 
policies that were adopted after the end of 2003. 
21 We exclude the following three plants, which each have only one boiler that burns coal (at least in part), from 
New York’s SO2 trading program: Fort Drum H T W Cogenerator, CH Resources Niagara, and Fibertex Energy 
LLC (these were the names used to refer to these plants in 1999). These units are all historically non-utility 
generators and have PURPA exemptions. 
22 Several states have passed laws limiting emissions of some combination of NOx, SO2, mercury, and CO2 from 
electricity generators. Most of these laws or regulations, such as new regulations in Connecticut and Massachusetts 
that limit nonozone season emissions of NOx, are formulated as limits on emission rates. The largest state actions are 
in North Carolina and New York, which have recently placed emissions caps on their largest coal-fired plants. A 
similar plan has been adopted in New Hampshire for all existing fossil fuel generators. With the exception of New 
York, we model compliance with these policies exogenously. The state policies and how they are implemented in 
our model are described in Appendix 5. 
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We simulate the model through 2020 and extrapolate our results out to 2030 for purposes of calculating returns to 
investment choices. We report results for the years 2010 and 2020. 
 
4.3 BASELINE  
The baseline scenario includes environmental policies that were already in effect at the time the modeling was done. 
For SO2, we assume that the Title IV SO2 cap-and-trade program is in effect. National SO2 emissions are phased 
down over time to reflect the drawdown of existing bank of SO2 allowances. For NOx, we assume that the NOx SIP 
Call policy is in effect in all regions that contain SIP Call states. The cap that we model is increased from the actual 
SIP cap levels to incorporate emissions for extra plants within the regions that are not affected by SIP Call.23 The 
policy is modeled as a regional cap-and-trade program in summer months. Electricity generators face no restrictions 
on emissions of mercury or CO2 in the baseline scenario. 
For generators in New York, we assume that the restrictions on SO2 and NOx emissions under the regulations 
implementing the governor’s acid rain program come into place in 2005 with the SO2 cap being substantially scaled 
down in 2008. We model the New York NOx policy by assuming that controls put in place to comply with the NOx 
SIP Call will be operated year round. The SO2 policy is modeled as a cap-and-trade program that applies to coal-
fired generators affected by Title IV. Under this program, SO2 allowances are allocated to SO2 emitting facilities 
according to updating formula based on heat input.24  
 
4.4 CAIR PLUS EPA MERCURY 
The first policy scenario that we analyze is the EPA’s Clean Air Interstate Rule (CAIR) in combination with the 
version of EPA’s proposed mercury rule that includes mercury trading.25  
                                                 
23 For modeling convenience our version of the NOx SIP Call region includes all the generators located in New 
England, New York, MAAC, ECAR, and SERC. Thus, we inflate the summertime NOx emissions cap to be large 
enough to cover emissions from those generators in this region not covered by the regulation.  
24 Under the form of updating modeled in the New York SO2 policy, emission allowances are distributed to emitting 
plants based on their share of total electricity generation from all plants covered by the regulation in the year three 
years prior to the current year. As a facility increases its share of generation, it gradually increases its share of total 
emission allowances.  
25 The two competing proposals for regulating mercury from EPA and the resulting final rules are described in 
Appendix 4.  
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Under the originally proposed version of CAIR, emissions of SO2 and NOx are regulated within a 28 state region, 
mostly east of the Mississippi, plus the District of Columbia.26 The region is a supplement to the Title IV SO2 
trading program and a replacement for the seasonal NOx SIP Call program for electricity generating units. 
Under the proposed rule, regional annual SO2 allowance distributions are capped at 3.9 million tons beginning in 
2010 and 2.7 million tons beginning in 2015. Actual emissions will be higher over the modeling time horizon due to 
the allowance bank. We follow EPA modeling of the SO2 CAIR and Title IV within one national trading regime. A 
single national region is characterized using model results that account for the opportunity to use Title IV 
allowances within the CAIR region at an offset ratio that changes over time. The actual emission caps that we model 
are reported in Table 7.  
Under CAIR as proposed, regional annual NOx emission distributions are capped at 1.6 million tons beginning in 
2010 and 1.3 million tons beginning in 2015. The NOx caps that we model, as reported in Table 7, include an 
adjustment of about 331,000 tons for units outside the CAIR NOx region but within the MAPP and New England 




Table 7. Annual Emissions under CAIR policy with Proposed EPA Mercury Rule as Modeled in Haiku 
(tons)  2010 2015 2020 
NOx (million)  1.931* 1.631* 1.631* 
SO2  (million)  6.078 5.001 4.264 
Mercury   30.445 27.565 24.985 
*NOx caps include an adjustment of about 331,000 tons for units outside the CAIR NOx region but within the MAPP and New England 
electricity regions in the model. 
                                                 
26 The 28 states included in the region covered by the proposed version of the CAIR rule are: Alabama, Arkansas, 
Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, 
Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South 
Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wisconsin.  
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Under the mercury cap-and-trade program found in the proposed version of the mercury rule, the national annual 
allocation of emission allowances is capped at 34 tons beginning in 2010 and 15 tons beginning in 2018. Actual 
emissions will vary over the modeling time horizon due to the allowance bank and also due to the safety valve that 
places a ceiling on mercury allowance prices. We model cap and trade for mercury and we adopt as our mercury 
emission cap EPA’s prediction of annual emissions in the presence of a $35,000 per pound safety valve ceiling on 
the price of mercury permits and the ability to bank allowances. Hence, as shown in Table 7, the mercury emission 
targets that we actually model are 30.4 tons in 2010, which is lower than the allocation because firms are expected to 
bank emission allowances. We model emissions of 25.0 tons in 2020, in excess of the allocation for that year, as 
firms draw down the allowance bank and also because the safety valve price is reached in the EPA modeling. The 
safety valve ceiling on allowance price in the EPA’s proposed rule is implemented by issuing additional allowances. 
Allowances purchased at the safety valve price reduce the size of the allocation in the following year. However, if 
the safety valve price were achieved again in the following year then emissions over time would approximate the 
level that achieves a steady allowance price equal to the safety valve. The effect is to cause total emissions to exceed 
the intended emission cap, which is illustrated in Figure 4. In the EPA’s final rule, the safety valve is removed and 
replaced by an increase in the number of emission allowances that are distributed in phase I that be banked for use in 
subsequent periods.  
 
Figure 4. Mercury Allowance Allocation and Modeled Mercury Emissions 

































Continuation of the SIP Seasonal NO   x Policy 
The second policy that we model adds the SIP Seasonal NOx cap to the combination of the proposed version of the 
CAIR rule and the EPA Mercury Cap. We investigate this additional scenario because, as indicated in results below, 
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we find emissions during the summer ozone season within the eastern region increase under the CAIR rule as 
proposed and the EPA Mercury Cap when the seasonal NOx program is terminated as specified in the draft CAIR 
rule. Two possible remedies to this increase are tighter annual caps or maintenance of a seasonal cap. The policy 
scenario we model here is the latter. The policy ensures that emissions of NOx during the five-month ozone season 
do not exceed levels established under current policy to help reduce summer ozone problems. Having two NOx 
policies of this sort means that generators that are located within both the CAIR region and the SIP region must have 
two permits for every ton of NOx emitted in the summer season. The dual programs mean that the costs of NOx 
controls will be split between two regulatory targets and the prices of CAIR NOx allowances are expected to be 
lower when they are combined with the SIP Call than when they are not. 
 
4.5 PROPOSALS FOR TIGHTER RESTRICTIONS ON MERCURY 
The two other national policy scenarios that we analyze involve greater restrictions on emissions of mercury 
achieved through two different policy measures: a common MACT requirement on all coal-fired generators and a 
mercury emissions trading approach targeted to achieve the same level of aggregate mercury emissions.  
As mentioned above, the Tighter Mercury with MACT scenario includes a requirement that all coal-fired electricity 
model plants reduce emissions by 90 percent or achieve an emission rate of 0.6 pounds per trillion Btu of heat input, 
whichever is less expensive. This proposed flexible MACT standard has been advanced by several of the state 
government representatives to the Working Group for the Utility MACT of the Clean Air Act Advisory Committee, 
or CAAAC (Working Group for the Utility MACT of the Clean Air Act Advisory Committee 2002).27 The proposal 
results in an increase in mercury emissions over time as electricity demand increases and use of coal-fired generators 
also increases to help meet that demand. Under these scenarios we assume that the preexisting bank of SO2 emission 
allowances is drawn down at the same rate as under the CAIR plus EPA Mercury Cap scenario. As discussed below, 
this assumption may not be consistent with economic behavior if the industry anticipates the changes in SO2 
allowance prices that result from the tighter mercury standard.  
Under Tighter Mercury with Trading, the same level of aggregate mercury emissions is achieved as under the 
MACT standard. Under the trading approach, mercury emission allowances are distributed to coal- and oil-fired 
generators on the basis of historic emissions of mercury.  
                                                 
27 The CAAAC is a committee established to advise the EPA on how issues related to implementation of the 1990 
Clean Air Act Ammendments. The state recommendations are found in Appendix C of the Working Group report. 
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Section 5 
ELECTRICITY SECTOR RESULTS 
In this section, the results of the electricity model runs for the different scenarios are compared to the baseline runs. 
A subsequent section focuses on the results of the air quality modeling.  
 
5.1 BASELINE DEMAND 
As mentioned above, we modified the parameters of the electricity demand functions in our model to yield the 
NYSERDA electricity demand forecast for New York in the baseline scenario. Our baseline demand forecasts for 
New York State are compared to NYSERDA’s forecasts in Table 8. This comparison shows that our model came 
very close to replicating the NYSERDA forecast. These modified electricity demand functions, one for each 
customer class in each time block and season, are used throughout the scenario analysis. 
Table 8. Comparison of NYSERDA Electricity Demand Forecast and  
Haiku Electricity Demand Forecast for New York State 
 
2005 2010  2015 2020 
NYSERDA Forecast  145.2 157.6  165.0 169.3 
Haiku – New York  148.4 160.9  164.2 166.7 
% Difference  +2.2% +2.1%  -0.5% -1.5% 
  
 
5.2 ELECTRICITY PRICE, CAPACITY, AND GENERATION  
National Results 
With the exception of the CAIR policy coupled with the Tighter Mercury with Trading, the policies analyzed have 
relatively small impacts on the national average price of electricity or on the mix of fuels used to generate electricity 
across the nation. The Tighter Mercury with Trading policy scenario leads to the greatest shifts away from coal and 
toward natural gas, while the Tighter Mercury with MACT policy results in the smallest amount of shifting away 
from coal to other fuels. These effects are summarized in Table 9 for 2010 and Table 10 for 2020, which show new 
additions in capacity after 1999.  
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Table 9. Overview of Electricity Price, Generation, and New Capacity National Results for 2010 
   
CAIR plus 















Price (1999$/MWh)  61.9 62.8 62.7  63.2 67.3 
National Generation  
(billion kWh)        
Coal  2,326 2,271 2,257  2,283 1,960 
Gas  658.9 684.9 693.4  671.8 903.5 
Oil  31.5 23.7 24.8  26.1 37.0 
Nuclear  763.6 781.2 786.7  776.3 808.1 
Hydro  310.6 310.6  310.8  310.7  310.6 
Other Renewable  111 111.2 111.4  110.1 126.2 
Total  4,202 4,183  4,184  4,178  4,145 
New Capacity (MW)          
Coal  2,226 2,286  1,751  2,047  3,273 
Gas  239,500 240,700  240,100  239,400  242,000 
Renewables  11,320 11,320  11,320  11,200  12,100 
Total  253,100 254,400  253,200  252,700  257,500 
 
The price effects for the CAIR plus EPA Mercury (CAIR/m) both with and without the NOx SIP Call and CAIR plus 
Tighter Mercury with MACT scenarios are larger in 2010 than they are in 2020. National electricity price is roughly 
1.5% higher with CAIR/m than in the baseline in 2010 and 1.0% higher in 2020. The price impact is greater with the 
Tighter Mercury with MACT scenario in 2010, when prices rise by 2.1% in 2010 and by 1.9% in 2020. Reductions 
in demand from these policies are commensurately small. 
Under the CAIR plus Tighter Mercury with Trading scenario, the electricity price difference from the baseline is 
much more substantial. Average national electricity price is 8.7% higher than in the baseline in 2010 and 7.4% 
higher in 2020. This higher price impact follows from the use of an allowance trading system for mercury emissions 
and very high prices for mercury allowances under this scenario, which are discussed in Section 5.3 below. 
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Table 10. Overview of Electricity Price, Generation, and New Capacity National Results for 2020 
   
CAIR plus 















Price (1999$/MWh)  68.6 69.3 69.3  69.9  73.7 
National Generation  
(billion kWh)         
Coal  2,618 2,556 2,536  2,538  2,206 
Gas  940.6 988.9 993.5  1,000  1,233 
Oil  37 28.0  27.6  22.6 31.4 
Nuclear  780.6 798.0 803.8  792.7  825.9 
Hydro  310.8 310.8  310.8  310.8  310.8 
Other Renewable  170 171.79 171.1  170.8  186.6 
Total  4,857 4,853  4,843  4,835  4,794 
New Capacity (MW)          
Coal  30,650 28,590  26,860  27,620  33,440 
Gas  305,800 312,600  310,700  316,100  327,300 
Renewables  18,850 18,960  18,930  18,960  19,870 
Total  355,300 360,200  356,500  362,700  380,700 
 
The different policy scenarios have little effect on the mix of new capacity additions by 2010. Additions to coal-
fired capacity are actually virtually unchanged from the baseline to the EPA Mercury Cap policy without the NOx 
SIP Call, but they fall with the SIP Call and with the Tighter Mercury with MACT scenario. Additions to coal-fired 
capacity increase with the Tighter Mercury with Trading scenario. Under all scenarios the significant majority of the 
new capacity is gas-fired and the quantity of new gas-fired capacity brought on-line by 2010 varies little across 
scenarios. As indicated by Figure 5, most of this increment in new gas-fired capacity is actually on line before 2005. 
By 2020, the differences in the mix of new capacity additions across the different scenarios are more pronounced. In 
the Tighter Mercury with Trading scenario, new coal-fired capacity is 9% greater than in the baseline. In the other 
three scenarios we see a decline in capacity of comparable magnitude. In all cases there is a greater amount of 
investment in new gas than under the baseline. The greatest change is in the Tighter Mercury with Trading scenario, 
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when the change in new gas-fired capacity is over 7% greater than the significant investment already occurring in 
the baseline.  
The CAIR plus EPA mercury policy has a small but discernable effect on the mix of generation. Coal generation is 
roughly 2.4% below baseline levels in both 2010 and 2020. Under both the EPA mercury policy with the NOx SIP 
Call and the Tighter Mercury with MACT policies, coal generation is 3% below baseline levels in 2020. Under the 
Tighter Mercury with Trading scenario coal-fired generation falls 16% below baseline levels in 2010 and 2020. 
Coupled with an increase in new coal-fired capacity in the Tighter Mercury with Trading scenario, we see an 
important shift in generation away from older, dirtier capacity to generation at newer cleaner capacity in the face of 
a trading program. This shift is pronounced under the trading program because the high cost of emission allowances 
imposes a significant opportunity cost on mercury emissions that is not evident under MACT regulation, a point we 
return to at length below.  
 
Figure 5. Historic Capacity Additions by Year and Fuel  
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The overall drop in coal generation is largely offset by increases in generation with natural gas and at nuclear plants 
and small increases in non-hydropower renewables. Natural gas generation in 2010 increases by 1.8% to 5.3% in all 
scenarios, except the Tighter Mercury with Trading scenario when gas generation increases by 37%. In 2020 the 
increase in natural gas generation is 5–6% in all scenarios except the Tighter Mercury with Trading scenario, when 
gas generation increases by 31%.  
In actual magnitudes under the Tighter Mercury with Trading scenario, the nearly 366 billion kWh drop in coal 
generation in 2010 is partially offset by a 245 billion kWh increase in gas generation and a 45 billion kWh increase 
in nuclear generation. The high price of mercury emission allowances under this scenario provides a strong 
disincentive to burn coal that doesn’t exist under the other policy scenarios. Total generation is lower in 2010 and 
2020 in all the scenarios than in the baseline, but the only substantial decline of 1.1% occurs under the Tighter 
Mercury with Trading scenario.  
 
New York State Results 
The price results for New York State are presented in Tables 11 and 12. With the exception of the Tighter Mercury 
with MACT scenario, electricity price in New York under all the policies is higher in 2010, with the greatest 
increase of 9.8% occurring under the Tighter Mercury with Trading scenario. The magnitude of changes in New 
York in 2010 is slightly greater in absolute terms than for the nation as a whole. In New York, as for the nation, the 
additional costs of MACT compliance appears to be less than the cost of having to purchase mercury allowances as 
required under all other mercury policies. The CAIR plus EPA Mercury Cap scenarios (both with and without the 
NOx SIP Call) have a larger relative effect on price in New York in 2010 than at the national level. 
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Table 11. Overview of Electricity Price and Generation   
New York State Results for 2010 
   
CAIR plus 















Price (1999$/MWh)  90.9 93.2 94.4  89.5 99.8 
Statewide Generation  
(billion kWh)        
Coal  30.8 30.7 29.2  30.8  0.9 
Gas  35.8 35.3 35.5  36.5 57.5 
Oil  13.6 11.2 11.8  11.9 14.2 
Nuclear  38.8 38.8 38.8  38.8 38.8 
Hydro  25.7 25.7  25.7  25.7  25.7 
Other Renewable  2.4 2.4  2.4  2.4  2.9 
Total  147.1 144.0  143.4  146.0  140.0 
New Capacity (MW)          
Gas  3,128 3,128  3,128  3,128  3,886 
Renewables  63 63  63  63 102 
Total  3,208 3,208  3,208  3,208  4,006 
 
In 2020 results for New York differ systematically from results for the nation. None of scenarios lead to an increase 
in electricity price in New York above the baseline, and in some cases there is a price drop, although there is little 
change in general.  
There are two reasons why one would expect the Tighter Mercury with MACT standard to have a smaller effect on 
electricity price in New York than in other regions or in the nation as a whole. One reason is that in New York coal 
is responsible for only a little over 20% of all generation whereas nationwide coal accounts for closer to 50% of total 
generation.  
The second reason is that market-based pricing of electricity in New York means that electricity price is based on 
the cost of the marginal generator. The additional cost of mercury compliance is not automatically reflected in 
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Table 12. Overview of Electricity Price and Generation 
 New York Results for 2020 
   
CAIR plus 















Price (1999$/MWh)  104.5 104.5 104.3  104.1 104.2 
Statewide Generation  
(billion kWh)        
Coal  31.5 31.5 31.5  31.5  0.4 
Gas  33.5 39.5 36.2  37.7 75.6 
Oil  16.1 13.8 13.4  12.1 12.1 
Nuclear  39.8 39.8 39.8  39.8 39.8 
Hydro  25.9 25.9  25.9  25.9  25.9 
Other Renewable  2.8 3.0  3.0  2.8  3.2 
Total  149.7 153.5  149.8  149.8  157.0 
New Capacity (MW)          
Gas  3,242 4,201  4,192  3,277  6,397 
Renewables  105 106  114  105  131 
Total  3,365 4,324  4,323  3,399  6,545 
 
electricity price if coal-fired plants are not the marginal generator. Since coal represents a small portion of electricity 
generation in New York it is rarely if ever at the margin. In contrast, in other regions with market-based electricity 
prices, with more coal in the mix, a coal generator is more likely to be the marginal generator during a larger 
fraction of the year than occurs in New York, and thereby the cost of compliance with mercury standards is more 
likely to be reflected in price. On the other hand, in regulated regions like the Southeast, where electricity price is 
based on average cost, the cost of compliance automatically will be reflected in the price. The national average price 
is a combination of the prices set in competitive regions and in regions that regulate electricity price to be equal to 
average cost. Hence, we expect the change in the national electricity price to be greater than the change in New 
York because of greater reliance on coal and because of the way in which electricity prices are set across the nation. 
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The different multipollutant policies have no effect on cumulative investment in new generation capability in 2010 
in New York State with the exception of Tighter Mercury with Trading, when new gas-fired capacity increases by 
nearly 25%. By 2020 the EPA Mercury Cap (with and without the NOx SIP Call) and the Tighter Mercury with 
MACT policies both lead to substantially higher cumulative investment in new gas-fired generating facilities of 
roughly 30% in New York than under the baseline. Cumulative investment in new gas generation is virtually 
unchanged under the Tighter Mercury with MACT policy. But new gas is almost double that of the baseline under 
the Tighter Mercury with Trading policy 
The differences in generation in New York from the baseline across the scenarios are less than 2.5% in every case 
except with the Tighter Mercury with Trading policy. For all scenarios, total generation is less than baseline in 2010 
and greater than the baseline in 2020. One reason is that currently planned additions to capacity are relatively less 
important in 2020 than in 2010. By 2020 the electricity market provides a greater opportunity for new investment. A 
large share of that is natural gas, which can be located closer to demand centers in New York and can replace some 
of the generation at coal plants in neighboring regions that supply imported power and which see costs go up under 
the various policies. In New York, the policies are leading to a decline in oil generation, which is covered by all 
emission caps, in both 2010 and 2020. By 2020 new gas investment more than offsets the loss in oil generation. 
The mix of fuels used to generate electricity in New York changes very little under the EPA mercury and Tighter 
Mercury MACT policies in 2010. In 2020, there is an increase in gas-fired generation of 8%–18% across these 
policies. However, the Tighter Mercury with Trading policy leads to a virtually complete shift out of coal and into 
natural gas exhibited in both the 2010 and 2020 results. A small amount of generation of less than 3% of baseline 
levels reported in the tables reflects the survival of coal capacity as capacity reserve and its very occasional dispatch. 
This quantity of generation from the large existing capacity is not distinguishable from zero in the model results. 
The decline in coal generation is made up largely by greater generation from natural gas with a 61% increase in gas 
generation in 2010 and a 126% increase in 2020.  
The forecast of a complete shift out of coal in New York State under the Tighter Mercury with Trading policy 
invites analysis of the level of stringency that precipitates this shift. As an extension to this project, Evans et al. 
(2005) used the model and assumptions to evaluate a schedule of mercury targets, each to be achieved with trading. 
At a mercury cap level of 11.4 tons, less than one-half the EPA Mercury Cap level of 25 tons, 95% of the coal-fired 
generation in New York still survives in 2020. However, at levels of stringency beyond this level coal-fired 
generation falls rapidly. At a mercury cap of 10 tons, generation is just 75% of the level under the EPA Mercury Cap 
and at 8.73 tons, generation falls to 46% of the mercury cap level. Finally, as noted in Table 12, at the tighter 
mercury cap of 8.23 tons the level of coal-fired generation in New York is approximately zero. Hence, there appears 
to be a sharp turning point in fuel choice for generation in New York State that corresponds with a national mercury 
cap of about 12 tons. At caps above this level, the amount of coal-fired generation in New York State is fairly 
constant, and below this level coal-fired generation falls rapidly. 
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5.3 EMISSIONS AND ALLOWANCES  
The emissions and allowance price findings are reported in Tables 13 and 14 for 2010 and 2020, respectively. The 
top section of each table includes national annual emissions from the sector. Only mercury emissions from units 
affected by the policy including coal- and oil-fired generators are reported. The bottom section includes emissions 
from generators in New York. The middle section reports allowance prices for all pollutants regulated under a cap-
and-trade program including the New York State SO2 program. In New York State, SO2 emitting generators covered 
by Title IV must surrender both a national SO2 emission allowance and a New York State emission allowance for 
every ton of SO2 emitted. 
Table 13. Emissions and Allowance Prices in 2010 
   
CAIR plus 














National Emissions  
(million tons) 
        
  SO2 9.64 6.10  6.05  6.05  3.62 
  NOx 3.85 2.77  2.82  2.33  2.66 
  Mercury (tons)  53 30.57  30.57  9.50 9.63 
  CO2 2,866 2,808  2,798  2,814  2,555 
Allowance Prices ($ per ton)          
  National SO2  110 359  346  311  - 
  NOx 5,082 1,020  533  932  534 
  Mercury ($ per lb)  - 80,930 77,980  - 721,800 
  NY State SO2 481 14  -  100  - 
New York State 
Emissions (thousand tons)          
  SO2 193.1 182.4  162.9  173.0  43.2 
  NOx 55.7 65.7  51.6  44.6  39.3 
  Mercury (tons)  0.91 0.50  0.57  0.20  0.05 
  CO2 66,240 63,810  62,820  65,150  44,870 
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Table 14. Emissions and Allowance Prices in 2020 
   
CAIR plus 
















National Emissions  
(million tons) 
        
  SO2 8.94 4.26  4.30  4.31  3.28 
  NOx 4.04 2.59  2.56  2.13  2.39 
  Mercury (tons)  53.5 24.58  24.99  8.17  8.23 
  CO2 3,260 3,202  3,186  3,178  2,895 
Allowance Prices ($ per ton)          
  National SO2 184 1,347  1,222 1,948  - 
  NOx 7,140 1,042  1,048  2,155  581 
  Mercury ($ per lb)  - 36,040  35,760  -  1,429,000 
  NY State SO2 397 -  -  -  - 
New York State Emissions 
(thousand tons)          
  SO2 192.8 127.6  116.7  71.5  36.5 
  NOx 55.4 67.6  53.8  39.2  36.8 
  Mercury (tons)  0.92 0.48  0.52  0.17  0.03 
  CO2 67,230 68,220  66,000  66,000  49,880 
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CAIR plus EPA Mercury Cap 
All of the policies analyzed in this report lead to important reductions in national emissions of SO2, NOx, and 
mercury with varying degrees of ancillary reductions in carbon emissions. Under the CAIR policy with EPA 
Mercury Cap, national annual emissions of SO2 and NOx are 37% and 28% lower, respectively, than the baseline in 
2010 and 52% and 36% lower, respectively, in 2020. Figure 6 illustrates how emission reductions are achieved.28 
Compared to the baseline, about 60% of emission reductions in 2020 are due to an increase in generation at 
scrubbed units. This applies to increased generation at units with preexisting scrubbers and generation at units with 
new retrofitted scrubbers. About 32% of the emission reductions come from switching to lower sulfur coal at 
unscrubbed units. Switching of fuel from coal to natural gas accounts for just 5% of emission reductions. We find 
that 3% of the emission reductions are achieved by the use of lower sulfur coals than were used in the baseline at 
scrubbed units. Reduction in total electricity demand accounts for nearly zero reduction in emissions.  
 
Figure 6. How SO2 Reductions Are Achieved in the CAIR plus EPA Mercury Policy   
Increase in Generation 
at Scrubbed Units
60%
Fuel Switching Away 
from Coal
5%
Reduction in Total 
Generation
0%
Fuel Switching at 
Unscrubbed Units
32%
Fuel Switching at 
Scrubbed Units
3%
                                                 
28 These shares are calculated under the assumption that increases in generation of scrubbed coal facilities come 
from reductions in generation from unscrubbed coal facilities. To calculate the share of emission reductions for each 
option in Figure 6 we use one of two approaches. For changes in generation using a specific technology or fuel we 
calculate the change (increase) in generation for that option relative to the baseline generation (MWh) multiplied by 
the difference in the emission rate for that compliance option relative to the average baseline emission rate 
(lb/MWh) for unscrubbed coal. For changes in emission rates due to post-combustion controls or fuel switching, the 
emission reductions are calculated by multiplying the change in emission rate (lb/MWh) from the baseline by the 
amount of generation (MWh) for that compliance option in the policy case. We assume also that reductions in 
consumption lead directly to reduction in generation from unscrubbed coal. 
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The ratcheting down of the SO2 and NOx caps in the CAIR policy leads to large reductions in national emissions of 
these pollutants after 2010, and annual mercury emissions also fall over the 2010 to 2020 decade. The CAIR plus 
EPA Mercury Cap policy results in a slight (roughly 2%) drop in CO2 emissions from electricity generators 
nationwide.  
An important difference between the baseline and the CAIR plus EPA Mercury Cap policy is that summertime 
emissions of NOx increase. The CAIR policy imposes a national emission cap but it supplants the NOx SIP Call and 
as a consequence we find emissions increase in summer. Without the NOx SIP Call we find CAIR leads to emissions 
of NOx during the five-month summer season in 2010 that are 21% above those achieved when the NOx SIP Call is 
maintained, and about 19% above in 2020.  
As a result of the tighter cap on emissions, the price of an SO2 allowance is three times as large with the CAIR plus 
EPA Mercury Cap policy as it is in the baseline in 2010. In 2020, the ratio of the two prices is greater than seven. In 
the baseline, the NOx price is for a seasonal allowance in the SIP region and thus the capital costs of NOx control at 
the marginal unit are spread over a smaller quantity of NOx reductions. Under CAIR, the NOx policy becomes 
annual and the price per ton of NOx is substantially lower. In addition, NOx controls play a role in reducing mercury 
emission through the oxidation of mercury at SCR units, and this lowers the price of NOx emission allowances 
because the requirement to reduce mercury emission presents a second reason to install such controls and their cost 
is reflected in part in the mercury allowance price. Note that when CAIR is combined with the NOx SIP Call, 
generators in the SIP region must also surrender a SIP region NOx allowance for each ton of NOx emitted during the 
summer season. The price of the NOx SIP Call allowances is $3,287 in 2010 and $1,127 in 2020. The decline in the 
price over time reflects the increasing stringency of constraints on SO2 and mercury, which serves to reduce the 
opportunity cost of the NOx SIP Call constraint. These values are somewhat less than in the baseline, where the 
prices are $5,082 in 2010 and $7,140 in 2020. With or without the NOx SIP Call remaining in effect, the EPA 
Mercury Cap policy imposes a cap on mercury emission from coal-and oil-fired generators across the country. The 
allowance price is roughly $80,000 per pound of mercury emitted in 2010 and around $36,000 per ton in 2020, with 
the tighter caps on SO2 and NOx helping to lower the opportunity cost of mercury controls. 
In New York the CAIR plus EPA Mercury Cap policy results in a reduction in SO2 emission. Tables 13 and 14 show 
a price at or close to zero for New York SO2 emission allowances, indicating the New York SO2 cap does not bind 
under this policy in either 2010 or 2020.29 Emissions of NOx in New York are roughly 20% higher under the CAIR 
                                                 
29 If a constraint is important in determining the result of the model then the constraint is said to “bind.” 
Alternatively, if the constraint does not influence the outcome then the constraint is said to be “slack.” 
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plus EPA mercury policy without the NOx SIP Call than in the baseline in both 2010 and 2020, but they are still 
below the New York annual NOx cap of 72,972 tons. The addition of the NOx SIP Call remedies this increase and 
NOx emissions in New York are slightly lower than under the baseline. 
The effect of the CAIR policy with the EPA Mercury Cap on installation of different combinations of pollution 
controls is presented in Table 15. The policy without the NOx SIP Call results in roughly 30,000 MW of additional 
SO2 scrubbing above the baseline level of approximately 126,000 MW in 2010 and 70,000 additional MW of 
scrubbing relative to a baseline level of roughly 159,000 MW in 2020. With the NOx SIP Call in place there is a 
slightly smaller increase in scrubbing. The lion’s share of the additional scrubbers is wet and most of those are used 
in combination with SCR, which helps maximize the mercury reductions from bituminous coal.  
The total amount of SCR installed is about 12,000 MW lower with the CAIR plus EPA Mercury Cap policy than in 
the baseline in 2010 as firms have more flexibility and a wider market for NOx allowances under CAIR than they did 
under the baseline. When CAIR is combined with the SIP seasonal NOx policy, installations of SCR are unchanged 
relative to the baseline in 2010. However, the total amount of capacity without any NOx control falls by 7,000 MW 
reflecting some retirement.  
In 2020 there is an increase of SCR relative to the baseline in policies without and with continuation of the NOx SIP 
Call, but in the latter case the increase is more than double and in addition there is about 13,000 MW more capacity 
with SNCR controls in 2020. The EPA Mercury Cap policy also brings about the installation of approximately 
54,000 additional MW of new ACI controls in 2010 and about 76,000–79,000 additional MW in 2020, depending on 
whether the SIP Seasonal NOx Policy is in place.  
 
CAIR plus Tighter Mercury with MACT 
Combining CAIR with the Tighter Mercury with MACT standard leads to greater reductions in mercury and other 
pollutants as well. Tables 13 and 14 indicate that nationwide mercury emissions fall to 18% of baseline levels in 
2010 and 16% in 2020, levels that are about one-third those obtained by the CAIR plus EPA Mercury Cap policy. 
National emissions of NOx fall by almost half from their baseline levels by 2020, and about 18% less than under 
CAIR with the EPA Mercury Cap. Emissions of SO2 are 16% lower in 2010 in moving from the EPA Mercury Cap 
to the Tighter Mercury with MACT policy, but they are unaffected in 2020. In New York, the state SO2 cap has a 
minimal effect on compliance decisions, as indicated by the price of $100 in 2010 and the policy does not bind in 
2020 when state SO2 allowances have a price of zero.  
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Table 15. Incremental Pollution Controls Installed on Coal-Fired Capacity 
(Change from Baseline Measured in MW) 
 
CAIR plus 
  EPA Mercury 
CAP 
EPA Mercury Cap 







  2010 
SO2 / Mercury Controls        
Wet Scrubbers with NO SCR  -8,484 -2,605  -40,399 -3,464 
Wet Scrubbers with SCR  27,490 24,660  65,880  26,540 
Wet Scrubbers with ACI  7,994 4,145  7,319 21,524 
Dry Scrubbers without ACI  -555 -566  -11,382  -2,922 
Dry Scrubbers with ACI  3,815 2,356  33,102 60,972 
ACI Alone  42,681 46,521  134,661  27,881 
None  -87,400 -82,800  -249,867 -178,440 
Selected NOx Controls        
Total SCR  -11,800 -200  23,300 -38,300 
Total SNCR  -9,790 160  160  -7,950 
Total with No NOx Controls  12,400 -6,900  -35,700  -1,200 
  2020 
SO2 / Mercury Control        
Wet Scrubbers with NO SCR  -11,917 -7,127  -40,727  -11,127 
Wet Scrubbers with SCR  53,300 50,400  57,000  28,300 
Wet Scrubbers with ACI  14,317 9,927  23,387  24,927 
Dry Scrubbers without ACI  4,734 -1,366  -12,056  3,744 
Dry Scrubbers with ACI  10,036 13,876  44,766  69,586 
ACI Alone  56,941 55,891  115,661  34,761 
None  -143,100 -139,800  -246,332  -195,520 
Selected NOx Controls        
Total SCR  3,800 8,100  34,700  -29,400 
Total SNCR  -8,950 4,300  11,330  -4,760 
Total with No NOx Controls  -9,500 -27,200  -66,380  -14,900 
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National NOx emissions under this policy are also lower in both 2010 and 2020 than under the EPA Mercury Cap 
policy. Aggregate annual emissions of NOx within the CAIR region remain at the capped level set by the policy; 
however, emissions of NOx outside the CAIR region fall substantially. 
Lower emissions follow directly from more widespread application of SO2 and NOx controls at many plants to 
comply with the combination of the SO2 and NOx caps and the Tighter Mercury with MACT regulation. As shown in 
Table 15, more units install both wet and dry scrubbers with the Tighter Mercury with MACT policy than under the 
EPA Mercury Cap. Virtually all of the units that have wet scrubbers install SCR to get the added mercury reduction 
benefit. Use of ACI also grows substantially with the Tighter Mercury with MACT policy, although wider 
application of this technology yields no additional reductions in emissions of the other pollutants. 
The Tighter Mercury with MACT policy also yields important reductions in emissions from generators within New 
York State, where mercury emissions fall by close to 82% of the baseline in 2020, and they are roughly one-third the 
levels achieved under the CAIR plus EPA Mercury Cap policy. Emissions of SO2 from the electricity sector are 
roughly 63% below the baseline level in 2020 and emissions of NOx are roughly 30% lower than baseline, and they 
are also substantially lower than the levels achieved with the EPA Mercury Cap policy. 
 
CAIR plus Tighter Mercury with Trading 
This scenario uses a cap-and-trade approach to achieve the level of total emissions of mercury nationwide in each 
year that resulted under the Tighter Mercury with MACT policy. Because the MACT policy did not involve an 
explicit cap, but instead reductions in emission rates, the total level of mercury emissions obtained under a MACT 
policy changes over time. Annual mercury emissions from affected facilities are roughly 9.6 tons in 2010 and 8.2 
tons per year in 2020.  
The effect of the Tighter Mercury with Trading policy on emissions of other pollutants follows in part from the large 
shift from coal to natural gas that happens with this policy and from the mix of control technologies used to reduce 
mercury. By 2010 with the introduction of mercury trading, national SO2 emissions fall to 38% of the baseline level 
and 59% of the level achieved under the EPA Mercury Cap policy in 2010. These ancillary reductions mean that the 
federal SO2 cap is not binding in 2010 or 2020 and national SO2 allowance prices fall to zero. Were the bank 
allowed to adjust to the introduction of the tighter mercury standards, one would expect greater emissions of SO2 in 
the early years since there is no value to preserving emission allowances in the bank. However, by 2010 the role of 
the SO2 bank would be offset by the influence of additional controls on mercury, and we believe the results would 
be largely consistent with our findings. 
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NOx emissions under the Tighter Mercury with Trading policy are lower than with the EPA Mercury Cap, but not as 
low as under the Tighter Mercury with MACT policy. The CAIR NOx emission cap continues to bind and NOx 
prices are lower than under the EPA Mercury Cap. 
Fuel switching away from coal also yields a significant reduction in carbon emissions to roughly 11% below 
baseline levels in 2010 and 2020. These reductions are substantially larger than the carbon emission reductions 
obtained under the other two policies.  
Very high prices for mercury allowances under the Tighter Mercury with Trading scenario help to explain the fuel 
switching away from coal and toward natural gas. In the Tighter Mercury with Trading scenario, mercury permits 
are expensive. The cost is roughly $722,000 per pound in 2010, which is roughly an order of magnitude higher than 
the price in the EPA Mercury Cap scenario. This tenfold increase in costs corresponds with roughly a 68% further 
reduction in mercury emissions from coal and oil-fired generators. The mercury emission allowance price is $1.4 
million per pound in 2020. 
The reason mercury allowance prices can achieve such high levels is that at the stringent mercury cap the 
incremental cost of the last unit of reduction in mercury is great. A variety of compliance options are available to 
each facility, and most will have an average cost per ton removed that is significantly less than the marginal cost. 
The average cost per ton for an option is the cost of that option divided by the change in emissions relative to its 
control in the baseline. However, emission allowance prices reflect the opportunity cost or marginal cost of each 
compliance option, which is the comparison of the cost effectiveness of that option compared to the next least 
stringent option.  
First we provide an abstract example, and subsequently we illustrate the example with specific model results. For an 
example of the difference between marginal cost and average cost of mercury control, consider the options at a coal-
fired plant. Following conventional wisdom, imagine that the cost of ACI for mercury control approaches $30,000 
per pound. This notion is based on the total tons reduced divided by total costs at that plant, therefore it is the 
average cost of emission reduction (at a plant that is run with a high utilization factor). Allowance prices are based 
on marginal cost, e.g. the opportunity cost of removing the last pound of mercury. Imagine that a plant already has 
wet scrubbing for SO2 with SCR for NOx and burns bituminous coal, as it might if it were planning to comply with 
the CAIR plus EPA Mercury Cap policy. These controls for SO2 and NOx yield an emission modification factor of 
0.9 for mercury (depending on the coal that is used). For this plant to achieve further mercury reductions it would 
have to put on ACI in place of or possibly in addition to the SO2 control strategy, thereby achieving an emission 
modification factor for mercury of .94 to .96. The incremental emission modification is only 0.04 to 0.06. The 
opportunity cost of this investment balloons to roughly $570,000 per pound removed, when the ACI control option 
is compared with the next-best alternative. Moreover, if the mercury cap is sufficiently stringent then controls will 
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be added to plants with lower utilization rates or burning coals with lower mercury content, thereby driving up 
opportunity cost and emission allowance price farther. 
In analysis to determine the sensitivity of the mercury emission allowance price to the level of the cap we ran 
additional scenarios. We find the mercury price increases very quickly at the tighter mercury cap levels and as we 
loosen the cap, the allowance prices fall pretty dramatically. At a cap of 8.23 tons (our tighter mercury cap scenario) 
the allowance price in 2020 is $1,429,000 per pound. When we increase the cap to 8.73 tons we obtain an allowance 
price of $954,000. At a cap of 8.97 tons we obtain an allowance price of $762,000and, at a cap of 11.21 tons, the 
allowance price is $261,400. At a cap of 16.08 tons we obtain a price of $40,710. 
 
Figure 7. Variable Generation Cost of a Large Coal-Fired Model Plant 



























We illustrate the effect of the high mercury allowance prices under the Tighter Mercury Cap with Trading on the 
operations of this typical coal facility in the East Central Area Reliability (ECAR) region in Figure 7. This graph 
shows the fuel, pollution–control, and non-fuel operating cost components of total variable cost and compares total 
operating cost and its components under the two tighter mercury policies in 2010. The relatively small emission 
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allowance costs for NOx and SO2 are subsumed in the pollution costs, and mercury control costs are not separated 
from SO2 control cost. The figure shows that variable operating cost is $9.36 per MWh higher under the Tighter 
Mercury with Trading than it is under the Tighter Mercury with MACT, and that nearly three-quarters of the 
increment in variable cost is due to the cost of mercury allowances under trading. Fuel costs are also higher with 
trading due in part to a switch toward greater use of low sulfur coal as individual plants take advantage of the 
flexibility of the trading program. Some plants choose to use low sulfur coal in place of higher sulfur coal at an 
additional fuel cost in order to avoid the capital cost associated with post-combustion controls that would be 
required under a MACT approach. This large operating cost increase leads to a roughly 20% drop in generation from 
the plant illustrated in Figure 7 during the summer season as coal plants are dispatched less and gas generation starts 
to fill in.  
In New York State, the ancillary SO2 emission reductions from the tighter mercury policies are achieved on an 
accelerated basis under the Tighter Mercury with Trading, with emissions that are 22% of baseline levels in 2010, 
and 25% of the level achieved under the Tighter Mercury with MACT policy. In 2020 the SO2 emissions are only 
19% of baseline levels, and about one-half of the emissions achieved under the Tighter Mercury with MACT policy. 
Ancillary reductions in carbon emissions are 26% of baseline levels in 2020. This reduction is due to the virtual 
elimination of coal-fired generation in New York. In contrast, carbon emissions in New York under the other 
policies including the Tighter Mercury with MACT policy vary only slightly from baseline.  
 
5.4 COSTS OF CAIR COUPLED WITH DIFFERENT MERCURY CONTROL POLICIES 
The various multipollutant policies analyzed here impose different types and amounts of costs on regulated firms 
and on society. The effect of the policies on electricity price is one measure of those costs, but it is an incomplete 
one. The additional costs borne by the power generation sector include the costs of pollution control and the costs of 
switching fuels, either among different coal types or from coal and oil to natural gas. Another measure of the costs 
of the policy often used by economists is the effect of the policy on producer and consumer surplus in the electricity 
markets. All of these measures are summarized below, first at the national level and then for New York State. 
 
Measures of Costs of Multipollutant Policies at the National Level 
The effects of each of the three multipollutant policies on post-combustion control costs and the costs of fuel to 
industry in 2010 and 2020 for the nation as a whole are summarized in Table 16. This table reports annual 
incremental costs relative to the baseline scenario.  
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Table 16. Incremental Costs of Multipollutant Regulatory Policies Nationwide 
(Billions of $1999—Difference from Baseline)  
 
 CAIR  plus 














  2010 
Incremental 
Control Costs*   7.62 2.27 2.26  5.36  4.93 
Incremental 
Fuel Costs*   48.67 0.07  0.21  0.73  8.37 
  2020 
Incremental 
Control Costs*   8.12 4.57 4.47  6.19  5.29 
Incremental 
Fuel Costs*   63.33 0.80 0.58  1.69  10.84 
*Incremental costs do not include cost of changes in investment and retirement of generation capital. Also, generation 
is not held constant across the policy scenarios being compared.  
 
Table 16 shows that use of post-combustion pollution controls dominates fuel switching as a strategy for complying 
with CAIR coupled with the EPA Mercury Cap. Annual investment and operating costs of pollution controls 
increase by $2.27 billion ($2.26 billion with the NOx SIP Call plus CAIR) from a baseline level of $7.62 billion in 
2010 and by $4.57 billion ($4.47 billion with the NOx SIP Call) from a baseline level of $8.12 billion in 2020. The 
costs of fuel switching are just over 0.5% of baseline annual fuel costs to the industry in 2010 and 2020, which total 
about $48.7 and $63.3 billion respectively.  
In the Tighter Mercury with MACT policy fuel switching plays a somewhat more important role than with the EPA 
Mercury Cap. Fuel switching includes switching among different types of coal as well as increased natural gas–fired 
generation relative to the baseline. However, the use of post-combustion controls still dominates fuel switching 
under the Tighter Mercury with MACT policy. The policy results in more than double the amount of incremental 
annual pollution control costs in 2010 and about 38% more in 2020 relative to the EPA Mercury Cap policy. In 2020 
the increment in annual pollution-control costs of $6.19 billion approaches in magnitude the annual level under the 
baseline scenario of $8.12 billion.  
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As shown in Tables 9 and 10 switching among coals and from coal to natural gas is an important part of compliance 
under the Tighter Mercury with Trading policy, and the cost of fuel switching is more significant than incremental 
control costs. As Table 16 shows, total fuel costs are $8.37 billion higher in 2010 than the $48.7 billion baseline 
level and this increase exceeds by $3.4 billion the increase in annual capital and operating costs of pollution-control 
equipment. Incremental fuel costs rise to $10.84 billion in 2020, more than double the annual costs of additional 
post-combustion controls, which are an additional $5.29 billion.  
 
Figure 8. How Mercury Emission Reductions Are Achieved in the  
CAIR plus Tighter Mercury with MACT Policy  
Increase in ACI 
Generation
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Figure 8 illustrates how the emission reductions under the tighter mercury standards are achieved in the MACT 
policy. The figure shows that 69% of the decrease in mercury emissions relative to the baseline is achieved through 
an increase in the use of ACI. The category indicating the increase in generation at units with ACI includes stand-
alone ACI units as well as those combining a wet or dry SO2 scrubber with ACI. The second largest category is the 
change in the emission rate at scrubbed units. This category captures the addition of SCR at scrubbed units, plus in 
some instances changes in coal type. Fuel switching represents substitution away from coal to sources including 
natural gas, renewables and nuclear, which do not emit mercury. This fuel switching accounts for only 4% of the 
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emission reduction. The reduction in total generation accounts for only 2% of the emission reduction, assuming that 
reduction occurs entirely through reduced utilization of unscrubbed coal plants.30  
Figure 9 shows how emission reductions are obtained in the Tighter Mercury with Trading policy. The largest share 
is still the increase in generation at facilities with ACI, however this drops by almost one-third to account for only 
49% of the emission reductions. The second largest category remains the change in the emission rate at scrubbed 
units, including the installation of SCR, but this category grows by 10% compared to the to the MACT approach. 
The other large change is the role of fuel switching away from coal, which increases to account for 19% of the 
mercury emission reductions. The difference in compliance strategy, especially the additional fuel switching and the 
greater use of scrubbers, leads to the larger reductions in ancillary emissions of SO2 and NOx than are achieved with 
the trading policy. 
 
Figure 9. How Mercury Emission Reductions Are Achieved in  
the CAIR plus Tighter Mercury Cap with Trading Policy  
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30 The category reporting fuel switching at unscrubbed units is specious but it is included for completeness. For 
almost all model plants there is no coal type that achieves the MACT standard with no post-combustion controls. 
However, every model plant has about .0003%-.0005% of its capacity identified as having no control in order to 
maintain minimums in the model that allow for convergence. This category of capacity will often dispatch in the 
MACT run because there are no mercury prices. The presence of SO2 prices provides incentives to switch to lower 
sulfur coal relative to the baseline. Unscrubbed generation is about 1.3% of total generation in this scenario. 
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Another way to view the costs of the different multipollutant policies is to measure their effects on economic 
surplus, which is the sum of consumer and producer surplus, in the electricity market. Consumer surplus is an 
economic measure of the well being of consumers, and one can think of it as consumer profits. More technically, it 
is a measure of the difference between the willingness to pay by consumers for electricity and the amount they 
actually have to pay. Willingness to pay typically will differ among consumers, even if the price they actually have 
to pay does not. Producer surplus can be thought of as producer profits above the cost of capital to the firm. These 
measures of consumer and producer surplus are the standard way that modern cost–benefit analysis is performed. 
Table 17 shows a snapshot of the change in consumer and producer surplus in 2010 and 2020 under each of the four 
policies relative to the baseline at the national level. All the policies result in aggregate surplus losses in both years, 
indicating simply that the policies have a cost. In 2010 producers actually gain relative to the baseline under the 
EPA Mercury Cap with and without the NOx SIP Call, and producers gain substantially under the Tight Mercury 
with Trading policy. In 2020 producers also gain under the Tight Mercury with Trading policy. The greatest decline 
in producer surplus in 2010 occurs under the Tighter Mercury with MACT policy. By 2020 producers are largely 
indifferent in the aggregate between the CAIR plus Mercury Cap policies and the Tighter Mercury with MACT 
policy. Note that the producer surplus numbers reported here include only surplus changes within the electricity 
industry. 31  
The high cost of the Tight Mercury Cap with Trading policy relative to the MACT approach reflects only a partial 
accounting because it ignores changes in resource allocation between the electricity sector and other sectors of the 
economy. According to economic theory, the trading approach will always be more efficient within the entire 
economy because it will properly reflect opportunity costs in the price of goods and services. The Tight Mercury 
Cap with Trading leads to a higher electricity price than the MACT approach and a substitution by consumers away 
from electricity consumption. While this may be more efficient for the economy, it is not preferable from the 
standpoint of consumers and producers within the electricity sector, which is the measure of economic surplus 
reported in this paper. 
 
 
                                                 
31 The producer surplus calculations account for all costs including fuel costs. If fuel switching away from coal to 
natural gas or between different coal types pushes up the market-clearing price of a particular fuel, then the 
incremental fuel costs to electricity producers could be partially offset by surplus gains to fuel suppliers, which are 
not accounted for here. Likewise reductions in demand for a fuel could cause its price to fall, resulting in surplus 
losses for other fuel suppliers that are also not accounted for here.  
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Table 17. National Economic Surplus as Difference from Baseline 














  2010 
Consumer Surplus  -3.68 -3.14 -5.01 -21.06 
Producer Surplus  0.79 0.14 -1.45 4.91 
TOTAL  
Economic Surplus  -2.89 -3.00 -6.46 -16.15 
  2020 
Consumer Surplus  -3.08 -2.99 -5.90 -23.14 
Producer Surplus  -2.52 -2.21 -2.33 2.23 
TOTAL  
Economic Surplus  -5.60 -5.20 -8.23 -20.91 
 
The consumer surplus results confirm that electricity consumers bear at least half of the economic surplus costs of 
the pollution policies. The size of the consumer surplus loss increases with the stringency of the mercury policy. 
Under the Tighter Mercury with Trading policy, consumers are particularly hard hit relative to producers, who 
actually benefit from the policy. This result is due to the substantial increase in electricity price that harms 
consumers unambiguously but can benefit producers (See Table 9) Consumer surplus losses in both years under the 
Tighter Mercury with Trading Policy are several times their levels with either of the other two policies. As with 
producer surplus, the changes in consumer surplus account only for changes within the electricity sector. 
Overall the economic cost of the Tighter Mercury with MACT policy is over twice that of the CAIR plus EPA 
Mercury Cap in 2010, and about 50% greater in 2020. This comparison provides a somewhat intuitive glimpse of 
the cost of the tighter mercury policy. A more surprising comparison may result from comparing the use of MACT 
versus trading to achieve the tighter mercury policy. The cost of the Tighter Mercury with Trading policy is 2.5 
times as great as the Tighter Mercury with MACT policy. This measure accounts only for economic cost within the 
electricity sector. Economic theory suggests that emission trading leads to lower cost than would technology 
standards such as a MACT approach. However, the benefits of trading do not necessarily accrue within the 
electricity sector. The benefit of an emission-trading program accrues within the entire economy, and one outcome 
may be the allocation of resources away from electricity production and consumption in order to achieve a more 
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efficient distribution of resources in the entire economy. That reallocation stems from the increase in electricity 
price, which leads to higher costs from trading within the electricity sector but is expected to lead to benefits outside 
the sector. 
 
Table 18. Incremental Costs of Multipollutant Regulatory Policies in New York  
(Millions of $1999—Difference from Baseline) 
 
 CAIR  plus 














  2010 
Incremental 
Control Costs*   181.2 -43.3  -29  48.4  -169.5 
Incremental 
Fuel Costs*   2.2 -66.4  -59.5 -64.9  377.8 
  2020 
Incremental 
Control Costs*   192.0 -29.3  1.9  71.4  -182.2 
Incremental 
Fuel Costs*   2.5 194.0 10.7  3.1  1,024.7 
*Incremental costs are compared to Baseline. Incremental costs do not include cost of changes in investment and 
retirement of generation capital. Also, generation is not held constant across the policy scenarios being compared. 
 
Costs of Policy in New York 
The effects of the different policies on pollution control and fuel costs to electricity producers within New York 
State vary substantially across the different policies as shown in Table 18. With the EPA Mercury Cap annual post-
combustion control costs are roughly 20% lower in 2010 than the estimated $181 million in the New York State 
baseline. In 2020 they are just under 15% lower without the NOx SIP Call, and about comparable with the NOx SIP 
Call to the $192 million under the baseline scenario. Under the CAIR policy the seasonal NOx cap within the SIP 
Call region is no longer enforced. In the model scenario we assume New York State generators would be free to 
reduce the use of post-combustion controls for NOx during the summer season and would generally invest less than 
they would when subject to a seasonal cap. 
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Under the Tighter Mercury with MACT policy, the incremental costs of post-combustion controls in New York are 
positive, and they reflect an increase in costs of about 27% from baseline in 2010 and 37% in 2020. The increase in 
control costs is offset in 2010 by a larger decrease in fuel costs. This finding is consistent with the technology focus 
of this particular control technology, which essentially requires installation of some combination of pollution 
controls at all coal-fired power plants. In 2020 fuel costs are roughly unchanged relative to the baseline.  
Expenditures on post-combustion pollution controls in New York are lower under the Tighter Mercury with Trading 
Policy than under the baseline. This policy allows greater flexibility in how these reductions are achieved. In New 
York State firms comply by switching away from coal to greater use of natural gas. The substantial increase in fuel 
cost associated with this shift to natural gas is shown in the $378 million increase in fuel costs within New York 
under this policy in 2010 and the $1 billion increase in 2020, representing a 17% increase in 2010 and a 40% 
increase in 2020 over total fuel expenditures in the baseline scenario. 
The effects of the different policies on economic surplus within the electricity sector in New York State are 
summarized in Table 19.32 The producer surplus results mirror those at the national level in 2010, when producers 
tend to profit under all of the policies except the Tighter Mercury with MACT policy. That is, in 2010 producer 
surplus gains are greater under the policies that include trading of mercury allowances than under the MACT policy. 
However, producers typically lose in the trading regimes in 2020. Again the Tighter Mercury with MACT policy is 
the exception and in this case producers benefit in 2020.  
The effects of these different policies on consumer surplus in New York mirror the price findings in Tables 11 and 
12. When a policy leads to an increase in electricity price, there is an associated drop in consumer surplus. In 2010, 
only the Tight Mercury MACT policy results in a lower electricity price that brings about increases in consumer 
surplus, but this increase is not sufficient to offset the losses to producers and total economic surplus is negative. In 
2020 there is very little change in electricity price among all the policies, but all are at or below baseline levels. 
Hence, consumers in New York benefit by small amounts in all of the scenarios compared to the baseline.  
The net effect in New York of the change in economic surplus—the sum of changes in producer and consumer 
surplus—is varied. In 2010 economic surplus falls by $30 million under the CAIR plus EPA Mercury Cap policy 
                                                 
32 Allocation of NOx emission allowances to electricity generating units in New York State as originally proposed in 
CAIR and as modeled in this analysis was 52,448 tons in 2010 and 43,707 tons in 2015. In the final version of 
CAIR, the New York State allowance was reduced to 45,617 in 2010 and 38,014 in 2015. The reduction raises costs 
to producers in New York State. Many state allocations were increased or decreased in the final rule.  
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with the NOx SIP Call. At the tighter mercury cap economic surplus rises by $60 million under MACT regulation 
but falls by nearly $250 million under mercury trading. In 2020 there is a small loss in total economic surplus under 
the CAIR plus EPA Mercury Cap without the NOx SIP Call. Like 2010, there is a small gain in surplus in New York 
under the Tighter Mercury with MACT policy, but a significant decline of $174 million under the Tighter Mercury 




Table 19. New York State Economic Surplus as Difference from Baseline 
















Consumer Surplus  -380.0 -570.0 220.0  -1,420.0 
Producer Surplus  412.5 553.9 -160.1 1,171.3 
TOTAL  
Economic Surplus  32.5 -16.1 59.9  -248.7 
  2020 
Consumer Surplus  0.0 30.0  70.0  50.0 
Producer Surplus  -66.0 -54.0 42.0  -224.0 
TOTAL  
Economic Surplus  -66.0 -24.0 112.0  -174.0 
 
 
New York State Renewable Portfolio Standard  
In all the analysis described to this point the renewable portfolio standard adopted by the New York State Public 
Service Commission in September 2004 is not modeled. We conducted a sensitivity analysis to see how the adoption 
of the state standard would affect the costs of the national policies. 
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The New York State policy aims to increase the share of electricity sold in the state that comes from renewable 
generation from about 19 percent to 25 percent by 2013. The technologies that qualify as renewables that we 
modeled include biomass cofiring at coal-fired power plants, landfill gas, and wind. Change in hydroelectric 
generation in New York constitutes a very small portion of expected changes in total renewable generation, and we 
do not include this change in the analysis. In addition we model an increase in renewable energy as a component of 
imports from Canada. We model the policy by imposing the expanded capacity and generation that is forecasted by 
New York State as well as projected increases in electricity bills, which could have a small effect on aggregate 
electricity demand.  
Table 20. Overview of Electricity Price and Generation  
New York Results for 2020 
Sensitivity Analysis: New York State Renewable Portfolio Standard 
 
Standard Assumption: 
No NYS Renewable Policy 
Sensitivity Analysis with 
NYS Renewable Policy 
  Baseline  CAIR plus EPA 
Mercury Cap and 
Seasonal SIP NOx 
Policy 
Baseline  CAIR plus EPA 
Mercury Cap and 
Seasonal SIP NOx 
Policy 
Average Electricity Price 
(1999$/MWh)  104.5 104.3  $103.60    $104.3 
Statewide Generation  
(billion kWh)       
Coal  31.5 31.5 29.6  29.6 
Gas  33.5 36.2 28.7  29.8 
Oil  16.1 13.4 15.4  12.6 
Nuclear  39.8 39.8 39.8  39.8 
Hydro  25.9 25.9 25.9  25.9 
Other Renewable  2.8 3.0  11.4 11.5 
Total  149.7 149.8 150.8  149.2 
New Capacity (MW)       
Gas  3,242  4,192  3,219   3,845  
Renewables  105  114  2,365   2,365  
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Table 20 reports an overview of electricity price and generation for 2020. The first two columns of data repeat 
results reported earlier to enable a comparison with and without the New York renewable policy. We find a slight 
drop in average electricity price with the renewable policy in the absence of the CAIR rule. This can occur because 
renewables have low variable cost, and they displace generation with higher variable cost at the margin, which is 
typically natural gas. Since electricity price is determined by variable cost, one can see a decline in the market-
clearing price. This effect outweighs the increment to electricity price that is added to pay for the renewable 
program. However, with the CAIR policy and the EPA Mercury Cap-and-Trade policy in place (and the NOx SIP 
Call continued) electricity price in New York is unchanged in the presence or absence of the renewable policy. 
Generation by all fossil fuels declines due to the renewable policy. The greatest decline comes from natural gas. 
This is a familiar result because new renewables often compete with new natural gas, which is the technology 
chosen most often for new generation capacity. Also, gas and oil are typically the marginal supply of generation in 
the short-run, and this will be displaced by new renewable generation. 
Table 21 reports changes in emissions and allowance prices at the national level and in New York. The renewable 
policy leads to small declines in SO2, NOx, and CO2 at the national level in the baseline. There is a slight increase in 
mercury emissions at the national level. This occurs because of the slight decline in the SO2 allowance price and a 
small change in abatement strategy for SO2, which has an ancillary effect on mercury emissions. In the policy case 
emissions of SO2, NOx, mercury, and CO2 are very similar with and without the renewable policy. In New York 
State there also is a relatively small effect on emissions due to the renewable policy, with the exception of CO2, 
which declines by almost 8% in 2020 due to the renewable policy.  
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Table 21. Emissions and Allowance Prices in 2020 
Sensitivity Analysis: New York State Renewable Portfolio Standard 
 
Standard Assumption: 
No NYS Renewable Policy 
Sensitivity Analysis with 
NYS Renewable Policy 
  Baseline  CAIR plus EPA 
Mercury Cap and 
Seasonal SIP NOx 
Policy 
Baseline  CAIR plus EPA 
Mercury Cap and 
Seasonal SIP NOx 
Policy 
National Emissions  
(million tons) 
      
  SO2 8.94  4.30 8.93 4.25 
  NOx 4.04  2.56 4.03 2.54 
  Mercury (tons)  53.5  24.99 53.81 24.91 
  CO2 3,260  3,186 3,248 3,185 
Allowance Prices ($ per ton)       
  National SO2 184 1,222  167  1,235 
  NOx 7,140  1,048 - 1,013 
  Mercury ($ per lb)  - 35,760  -  38,180 
  NY State SO2 397 -  427  - 
New York State Emissions 
(thousand tons)       
  SO2 192.8  116.7 194.5 114.2 
  NOx 55.4  53.8 55.0 51.9 
  Mercury (tons)  0.92  0.52 0.91 0.52 
  CO2 67,230  66,000 62,760 60,880 
 
Analysis of Mercury Trading  
The results of the analysis above suggest several interesting findings about the effects of using a cap-and-trade 
approach with a tighter cap on mercury on the costs of mercury control. Three main lessons emerge. First, resource 
costs, which are the sum of incremental pollution-control costs and incremental fuel costs under Tighter Mercury 
with Trading, are not necessarily less than the costs under Tighter Mercury with MACT. Pollution-control costs can 
be lower or higher, but fuel costs are typically always higher. The trading policy internalizes in variable costs the 
opportunity cost of emissions through the introduction of an emission allowance price. With the tighter mercury 
policies, the allowance price is sufficiently high that it initiates substantial substitution away from coal, and greater 
resource costs are incurred in order to avoid the regulatory cost associated with allowances.  
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Second, producers strongly prefer the trading approach to MACT. Under the tighter mercury control scenario, 
producer surplus is higher with trading than with a MACT approach. 33 Greater producer profits under trading 
follows from the fact that electricity prices tend to be higher with trading and thus producers on the whole tend to 
profit. Although the variable costs of some facilities are dramatically affected due to the mercury allowance cost, as 
illustrated in Figure 7, the well being of producers in the aggregate can improve because the allowances are 
distributed at zero cost.  
Third, consumers strongly prefer the MACT approach to trading. Consumer surplus losses are typically substantially 
greater under the Tighter Mercury with Trading policy than under the MACT approach. This result also follows 
from the substantially higher electricity prices under this scenario, which in turn follow from the high price of 
mercury allowances.  
                                                 
33 Note that the producer surplus change calculation accounts for the difference in SO2 allowance expenditures 
under the two policies. 




The multipollutant policies analyzed here yield important changes in concentrations of fine particulate matter and of 
ozone in the atmosphere. They have an effect on visibility in national parks and residential areas.34 They reduce the 
amount of wet and dry deposition of nitrates and sulfates into forests, lakes, and streams. They also reduce the 
amount of mercury deposited from the atmosphere into water bodies and onto the soil.  
Reductions in these various pollutants yield a variety of ecological and environmental and health benefits. In this 
analysis we focus on the benefits that past studies have shown to be of the greatest magnitude, at least according to 
quantifiable information, and those for which we have good information.35 The effects of fine particles and ozone on 
human health are relatively well understood and a large literature has developed on the values of those health 
effects. The ecological effects of changes in ozone and reduced acidification can also be assessed, but the economic 
values of those changes tend to be small compared to the economic values of health effects of changes in 
particulates, and we do not calculate these values.  
As described previously, the predictions of two atmospheric transport models are used. Our central case estimates of 
changes in particulate concentrations rely on URM 1-ATM for the eastern states that it covers, and the transport 
coefficients for western states are filled in with the ASTRAP model. The eastern states are the most important region 
with respect to SO2 emissions in the aggregate and with respect to environmental effects in New York. However, 
important emission changes occur in the west that have a bearing on particulate concentrations there and in the 
eastern states. The western share of total emissions increases between 2005 and 2020 by roughly ten percent of total 
national emissions in the policy cases with the CAIR plus EPA Mercury Cap. The western percentage of total 
emissions is roughly unchanged in the Tighter Mercury with MACT policy, and it falls slightly in the Tighter 
Mercury with Trading policy. Hence we use the ASTRAP model coefficients to capture the different influences of 
emissions in the western states.  
                                                 
34 Visibility concerns are particularly key in states to the west of the CAIR region and given that wind patterns flow 
predominantly from the west to the east, reductions in emissions in eastern states are likely to yield few visibility 
benefits in the west. However, the ancillary reductions in SO2 and NOx with the tighter mercury policies, which are 
nationwide policies, could have visibility benefits in the western states. 
35 For example, Burtraw et al. 1998. 
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Less well understood are the effects of mercury on human health. There is a great deal of uncertainty about the 
nature of the different health effects, the relative importance of different pathways and the severity of the effects. 
Uncertainty also abounds in how to model the diffusion of mercury emissions from a source to receptor regions, 
which severely limits analysts’ ability to identify exactly where mercury pollution will decrease with a change in 
policy.  
Despite this uncertainty, Rice and Hammitt (2005) of the Harvard School of Public Health have analyzed the 
mercury emission changes and the results of mercury transport and fate modeling by EPA for the Clear Skies 
legislation in conjunction with other estimates of resulting changes in fish contamination, human fish consumption 
and associated health effects related to myocardial and neurological events. Their study finds that the annual health 
benefits associated with mercury reductions brought about by the Clear Skies legislation range from $2.8 billion for 
the 26 ton cap in the first phase of the program (representing an approximately 22 ton reduction) to $4 billion for the 
15 ton per year cap in the second phase of the program (representing a 33 ton reduction). The Rice and Hammitt 
analysis used a value of statistical life of $5.8 million (1999$) whereas the benefits analysis in this report assumes a 
more conservative $2.2 million. To put their estimates of the mercury benefits from Clear Skies, which are roughly 
comparable to the mercury benefits from the EPA Mercury Cap in the proposed rule, the mortality portion of the 
benefits would have to be adjusted by the ratio of these values or 0.36, which yields $1.1 billion in benefits for phase 
I and $1.6 billion in phase II. 
Analysis of the fate and transport of mercury emissions changes was outside the scope of this research and, thus, we 
do not attempt to quantify the ecological or human health benefits of reductions in mercury pollution from the 
different policies that we consider. This omission is an important one because there is a large distinction in the level 
of mercury emissions between the policies that include an EPA Mercury Cap and those that include the tighter 
mercury constraints. The missing mercury benefits must be kept in mind when comparing our incomplete measures 
of benefits across the different policies, especially in light of the high benefit estimates from Rice and Hammitt 
(2005). Based on the existing environmental economics and epidemiological literature, we believe that even with 
mercury benefits excluded we have captured the majority of the human health benefits by including those associated 
with mortality and morbidity effects of changes in concentrations of fine particles and ozone. Since in every case we 
find benefits that exceed costs, we focus on describing in detail the benefit categories that are well understood and 
that are sufficient to achieving this threshold. However, we can also offer some observations on what adding in the 
mercury benefits might mean for the relative ranking of different policies in net benefits terms. 
 
6.2 HEALTH EFFECTS OF PARTICULATES AND OZONE  
We use two approaches to analyze the health benefits of the policy scenarios based on two different sets of source-
receptor coefficients. In our central case analysis we use the source-receptor coefficients derived from URM-
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1ATM model in conjunction with the SGM model for an area covering the majority of the population of the United 
States. To measure the effects of particulate matter in other parts of the nation we rely on the source-receptor 
coefficients from the ASTRAP model. Estimates of the benefits from reduced ozone coefficients are limited to the 
area covered by the URM model, which includes the majority of area and population with problem achieving 
compliance with the ozone health standard. These coefficients were added to the TAF model for this project.  
In our alternative case analysis we use the ASTRAP source-receptor coefficients for particulate matter for the 
entire nation. To calculate ozone benefits we use the URM model, and these benefits are calculated only for the 
eastern United States. As the results below show our central case is a more conservative (lower) assessment of the 
benefits of the policy. 
 
6.3 HEALTH BENEFITS IN THE CENTRAL CASE 
A summary of our central case estimates of the incremental national health benefits of the different policies is 
presented in Table 22. This table provides separate estimates of the benefits of reduced mortality and morbidity for 
particulates and ozone in both 2010 and 2020. Our results are consistent with results from other studies (EPA 
2004a), which show that across the different policies the health benefits attributable to a reduction in particulate 
concentrations are nearly two orders of magnitude higher than the benefits from ozone reductions.  
National benefits of the CAIR policy coupled with the EPA Mercury Cap rise from more than $13 billion in 2010 to 
nearly $19.5 billion in 2020. Adding a SIP seasonal policy to CAIR raises has almost no effect on ozone-related 
benefits in 2010 but it yields a 7% increase in 2020. Particulate related health benefits rise by 2% in 2010 but fall by 
1% in 2020.  
When the CAIR policy is combined with the Tighter Mercury with MACT approach, the incremental health benefits 
from reduction in particulates and ozone relative to the baseline in 2010 are comparable to those when CAIR is 
combined with the EPA Mercury Cap. In 2010 the benefits are $340 million greater under the tighter mercury 
standard, and in 2020 they are $50 million less. The lower benefits in 2020 follow directly from the slightly higher 
level of estimated emissions of SO2 in that year, which differ by a small degree from the emission cap. The 
difference in emissions reflects the degree of convergence in the model.  
Allowing mercury trading under the tighter mercury cap hastens the realization of ancillary SO2 reductions and the 
associated health benefits from reductions in fine particles. Benefits from reduced particulate concentrations are 
roughly 50% higher than with the Tighter Mercury with MACT in 2010,and in 2020 they are about 13% greater.. 
This stems from the fact that there is significantly less investment in SCR for NOx control under the Tighter Mercury 
with Trading policy, and despite the fact there is less coal-fired generation there are greater NOx emissions on net.  
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Table 22. National Health Benefits – Central Case (URM Model*) 




EPA Mercury CAP  EPA Mercury Cap 








Ozone Mortality  61 61 60  28 
Ozone Morbidity  100 100 107  55 
Ozone Total  161 161 167  83 
PM 2.5 Mortality  10,590 10,830 10,930  16,380 
PM 2.5 Morbidity  2,555 2,617 2,647  3,938 
PM 2.5 Total  13,140 13,450 13,580  20,320 
GRAND TOTAL  13,310 13,610 13,750  20,400 
  2020 
Ozone Mortality  90 97 95  68 
Ozone Morbidity  163 173 179  133 
Ozone Total  253 270 274  201 
PM 2.5 Mortality  15,520 15,370 15,460  17,550 
PM 2.5 Morbidity  3,692 3,658 3,683  4,159 
PM 2.5 Total  19,210 19,030 19,140  21,710 
GRAND TOTAL  19,470 19,300 19,420  21,910 
*  The “URM model” has ozone and particulate benefit estimates for 22 eastern states. Particulate benefits for the remainder of 
the nation are calculated using ASTRAP, and there are no ozone benefits calculated for the remainder of the nation. 
 
Table 22 also indicates that ozone-related benefits fall, even as particulate benefits rise, when comparing the Tighter 
Mercury with Trading policy with the other policies. Emissions of NOx are comparable among the policies, however, 
the source of emissions changes. In the Tighter Mercury with Trading policy we find a significant decrease in coal-
fired generation, which is characterized by tall stacks and is considered an elevated source of emissions in our 
model. These emissions are made up by an increase from natural gas–fired plants, which have lower stacks and are 
considered a surface source. We find emissions from the lower stacks are more potent with respect to ozone 
formation, and so the ozone-related benefits of emission reductions are eroded. 
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Table 23. New York Health Benefits – Central Case (URM Model*) 




EPA Mercury CAP  EPA Mercury 
Cap and Seasonal 







Ozone Mortality  8 8 7  6 
Ozone Morbidity  12 13 11  11 
Ozone Total  20 21 18  17 
PM 2.5 Mortality  1,311 1,408 1,442  1,981 
PM 2.5 Morbidity  349 375 384  526 
PM 2.5 Total  1,660 1,783 1,826  2,506 
GRAND TOTAL  1,680 1,804 1,844  2,524 
  2020 
Ozone Mortality  11 12 10  9 
Ozone Morbidity  18 19 17  17 
Ozone Total  29 31 27  26 
PM 2.5 Mortality  2,059 2,081 2,057  2,183 
PM 2.5 Morbidity  538 544 538  571 
PM 2.5 Total  2,597 2,625 2,595  2,753 
GRAND TOTAL  2,626 2,656 2,622  2,779 
*  The “URM model” has ozone and particulate benefit estimates for 22 eastern states. Particulate benefits for the remainder of 
the nation are calculated using ASTRAP, and there are no ozone benefits calculated for the remainder of the nation. 
 
The ozone- and particulate-related health benefits of the different policies in New York for the central case are 
summarized in Table 23. Consistent with the high population of the state and its location downwind of important 
emission sources, between 10 and 15% of the national health benefits of these policies are realized in New York. As 
is the case nationwide, typically 99% of the benefits are due to reduced concentrations in particulates. In 2010, the 
Tighter Mercury with Trading policy brings about the greatest benefits. This policy also yields the greatest benefits 
in 2020 but the differences among policies are much smaller in that year. Continuing to require compliance with a 
seasonal NOx cap under the CAIR policy with the EPA Mercury Cap increases total health benefits of that policy by 
7% in 2010 and by 1% in 2020. 
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6.4 HEALTH BENEFITS IN THE ALTERNATIVE CASE 
In the alternative case we use the source-receptor coefficients from the ASTRAP model for the entire nation to 
analyze the health benefits of the SO2 and NOx emissions changes in the electricity sector resulting from the various 
policies. The national health benefits estimates from this exercise are presented in Table 24. The ozone-related 
health benefits presented here are the same as those in the earlier tables because the ASTRAP model does not 
include source-receptor coefficients for ozone and thus we continue to use the URM coefficients for ozone. 
The national health benefits in the alternative case are roughly 20% higher than those with the central case  
source-receptor coefficients for the two scenarios that combine CAIR with the EPA Mercury Cap. The difference  
is somewhat larger for the Tighter Mercury with Trading policy that results in larger changes in national emissions 
of SO2. 
Table 24. National Health Benefits – Alternate Case (ASTRAP Model*) 




EPA Mercury CAP  EPA Mercury Cap 








Ozone Mortality  61 61 60  28 
Ozone Morbidity  100 100 107  56 
Ozone Total  161 161 167  84 
PM 2.5 Mortality  13,030 13,210 13,230  20,320 
PM 2.5 Morbidity  3,139 3,185 3,192  4,882 
PM 2.5 Total  16,170 16,390 16,420  25,210 
GRAND TOTAL  16,330 16,550 16,590  25,290 
  2020 
Ozone Mortality  90 97 95  68 
Ozone Morbidity  163 173 179  133 
Ozone Total  253 270 274  201 
PM 2.5 Mortality  18,670 18,580 18,520  21,490 
PM 2.5 Morbidity  4,431 4,413 4,402  5,088 
PM 2.5 Total  23,100 22,990 22,920  26,580 
GRAND TOTAL  23,350 23,260 23,190  26,780 
*  The “ASTRAP model” calculates particulate benefits for the entire nation. Ozone benefits are calculated for 22 eastern 
states using URM. 
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Table 25. New York Health Benefits – Alternate Case (ASTRAP Model*) 




EPA Mercury CAP  EPA Mercury 
Cap and Seasonal 







Ozone Mortality  8 8 7  6 
Ozone Morbidity  12 13 11  11 
Ozone Total  20 21 18  17 
PM 2.5 Mortality  1,418 1,520 1,415  2,197 
PM 2.5 Morbidity  378 405 378  585 
PM 2.5 Total  1,797 1,925 1,793  2,782 
GRAND TOTAL  1,817 1,946 1,811  2,799 
  2020 
Ozone Mortality  11 12 10  9 
Ozone Morbidity  18 19 17  17 
Ozone Total  29 31 27  26 
PM 2.5 Mortality  2,116 2,151 2,074  2,323 
PM 2.5 Morbidity  555 564 544  609 
PM 2.5 Total  2,671 2,715 2,618  2,932 
GRAND TOTAL  2,700 2,746 2,645  2,958 
*  The “ASTRAP model” calculates particulate benefits for the entire nation. Ozone benefits are calculated for 22 eastern 
states using URM. 
 
 
Table 25 presents the alternative estimates of health benefits in New York State. Here the differences between the 
central case (URM) and alternative case (ASTRAP) estimates are smaller, but the alternate case estimates are 
generally larger than those in the central case, and particularly so under the Tighter Mercury with Trading policy. 
The differences in the estimates from the two models can be explained in part by the integrated nature of URM-
1ATM. One of the strengths of the model is that it accounts for ammonia and its interaction with sulfate and nitrate 
formation at baseline levels of concentrations. Ammonia as a limiting agent accounts for a slight bounce back in 
nitrate concentrations when SO2 emissions are reduced in the eastern United States because the associated reduction 
in sulfates frees up ammonia to contribute to the formation of nitrates. This tends to lessen the predicted benefits of 
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SO2 emission reductions. Another difference between models is the approach used to derive source-receptor 
coefficients. The URM-1ATM model uses the Direct Decoupled Method in Three Dimensions (DDM-3D) to 
calculate the local sensitivities of specified model outputs simultaneously with the levels of concentrations. This 
sensitivity is a local derivative, so a linear assumption is made and the effects of emissions changes on 
concentrations under the different scenarios are based on a linear extrapolation of the sensitivities at that point. 
However, if the relationship between emissions of SO2 and fine particulates is nonlinear and concave, say due in 
part to the role of ammonia in sulfate and nitrate formation, and the emissions perturbation is big, then the model 
may undervalue the effects of large changes in SO2 emissions on concentrations of fine particulates.  
In contrast, the ASTRAP model uses 11 years of data and takes advantage of the large variation in emissions over 
that time period to estimate a sensitivity of pollution concentrations to changes in emissions. The variations in 
emissions over the 11-year time period are probably similar in size to those occurring under the policies considered 
here, but they are from a time when baseline emissions levels were much higher. Both models are exercised in this 
analysis to project changes beyond the range of observable data on which the models are calibrated. 
 
 
Table 26. Acid Deposition in New York State from Electricity Sector (ASTRAP Model) 
(Kilograms per Hectare) 
   

















2010         
Wet Sulfur  4.4680  2.0220  2.1510  1.8710  3.1840 
Dry Sulfur  3.0070  1.2820  1.4300  1.3310  2.2460 
Wet NOx – Nitrates  0.7535  0.3006  0.3125  0.3291  0.3055 
Dry NOx – Nitrates  0.5683  0.2099  0.2455  0.2560  0.2743 
2020         
Wet Sulfur  4.2380  2.8400  2.8490  2.6280  3.0880 
Dry Sulfur  2.9030  2.0090  2.0560  2.0300  2.2630 
Wet NOx – Nitrates  0.7788  0.3690  0.3987  0.4226  0.3995 
Dry NOx – Nitrates  0.5856  0.2523  0.2946  0.3199  0.3276 
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6.5 ACID DEPOSITION  
The effects of the different policies on the components of acid deposition in New York State are presented in Table 
26. The baseline column in this table includes total deposition of acid precursors from electricity sources only and 
the subsequent columns report reductions in the different categories of acid precursors resulting from each policy.  
All of the policies yield substantial reductions in acid deposition in New York State. Under the two CAIR policies 
that include the EPA Mercury Cap, wet sulfur deposition falls by about 50–55% in 2010 and 33% in 2020. The 
percentage declines in dry sulfur deposition are slightly greater in 2010 and slightly less in 2020. Wet nitrogen 
deposition and dry nitrogen deposition falls by 50%-60% for these policies. Changes in deposition are always the 
same or slightly higher for sulfur or nitrogen under the CAIR policy coupled with the Seasonal SIP NOx Policy.  
The CAIR policy with the tighter mercury standards yields larger changes in deposition of acid precursors in New 
York that are roughly proportional to the larger changes in emissions of SO2 and NOx. In the tighter mercury policy 
with trading, deposition of wet sulfur falls by more than 70% in 2010 and 2020 from the levels in the baseline. In 
2020, deposition of dry sulfur falls by nearly 80% under the tighter mercury policy with trading. Deposition of wet 
and dry nitrogen falls by more under the Tighter Mercury with MACT policy than under the Tighter Mercury with 
Trading policy in both 2010 and 2020.  
One recent study provides an estimate of willingness to pay for ecological improvements in the Adirondack Park by 
New York State residents (Banzhaf et al. 2004). The modeled level of improvement corresponds roughly to 
improvements expected to result from emission reductions that would be associated with CAIR. The benefit 
estimates for New York State residents range from $305 million to $1.0 billion per year (1999$). The range depends 
on the magnitude of benefits that would result, and on technical assumptions in the modeling. Because these 
estimates are not yet peer-reviewed we do not include them in our central analysis. The footnote to Tables 29 and 30 
points to an illustration of the magnitude of these potential benefits included in Figure 10. 
 
6.6 MERCURY BENEFITS 
Our analysis of the effects of mercury policies focuses on reductions in emissions and does not consider the 
transport or fate of mercury emissions or the health benefits of reduced human exposures to mercury in the 
environment. However, we can speculate about what the likely health benefits of mercury reductions might be by 
drawing on recent estimates. Rice and Hammitt (2005) analyze the mercury benefits associated with compliance 
with the Clear Skies Initiative legislative proposal, which imposes a mercury emission cap of 26 tons by 2010 and 
15 tons by 2020. Drawing on EPA’s analysis of the effects of the Clear Skies Initiative on mercury concentrations in 
the environment, Rice and Hammitt use information from various epidemiological studies to estimate the health 
effects of those changes and information from the environmental economics literature to assign associated dollar 
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benefit values. The authors focus on two health benefits: reductions in intelligence scores (IQ deficits) associated 
with fetal exposure and the somewhat more controversial cardiovascular effects and premature mortality. They 
develop a range of potential benefits depending on assumptions about the size of the relevant exposed populations.  
In the case of both the IQ deficits and the cardiovascular and mortality effects, the benefits of emission reductions 
appear to be roughly linear over the range of reductions analyzed. We exploit this linearity to calculate an average 
benefit per ton of emission reduction from the Rice and Hammitt work and then apply those benefits per ton to the 
total national mercury emission reductions in 2010 and 2020. These benefit estimates are presented in Tables 27 and 
28. Table 27 uses the $2.2 million (1999$) value of statistical life (VSL) employed throughout this study, while the 
second table uses the $5.8 million (1999$) VSL employed in the Rice and Hammitt study. 
Table 27 shows that using the lower VSL estimate, the annual benefits of mercury reductions under the EPA cap in 
2020 range from $121 million to $1.7 billion per year. Under the tighter mercury cap, the annual mercury benefits 
are roughly twice as high, ranging from $230 million to $3.3 billion. Thus the incremental benefits of moving from 
the EPA Mercury Cap to the tighter mercury cap could be as high as $1.6 billion in 2020. Table 28 indicates that if 
the higher VSL is assumed, the mercury benefits under the tighter mercury cap range from $320 million to $8.5 
billion.36 
Table 27. Mercury Benefits  
(Millions and Billions of $1999 using $2.2 VSL) 
 
 
IQ Deficits from 






Benefits per Ton of Mercury 
Reduced  $4.0M – $10.1M  $1.0M – $ 63.2M  $5.0M – $73.3M 
  Total Annual Benefits - 2010 
EPA Mercury Cap  $96M - $239M  $24M - $1.5B  $120M - $1.7B 
Tighter Mercury Cap  $176M - $439M  $44M - $2.7B  $220M - $3.1B 
  Total Annual Benefits – 2020 
EPA Mercury Cap  $97M - $242M  $24 M - $1.5B  $121M – $1.7B 
Tighter Mercury Cap  $184M - $459M  $46M - $2.9B  $230M - $3.3B 
                                                 
36 One other recent study presents an estimate of the benefits and costs of mercury control from power plants. Gayer 
and Hahn (2005) consider only the IQ benefits in children. On the basis of this measure alone, the authors find the 
benefits are much less than the costs of the EPA proposal. 
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Table 28. Mercury Benefits  
(Millions and Billions of $1999 using $5.8 VSL) 
 
 
IQ Deficits from 






Benefits per Ton of Mercury 
Reduced  $4.0M - $10.1M  $2.8M – $172.3M  $6.8M - $182.5M 
  Total Annual Benefits – 2010 
EPA Mercury Cap  $99M - $247M  $68M - $4.2B  $167M - $4.4B 
Tighter Mercury Cap  $176M - $454M  $124M - $7.7B  $300M - $8.2B 
  Total Annual Benefits – 2020 
EPA Mercury Cap  $100M - $250M  $68M - $4.3B  $168M - $4.5B 
Tighter Mercury Cap  $190M - $474M  $130M - $8.1B  $320M - $8.5B 
 
 
6.7 NET BENEFIT ANALYSIS 
To facilitate a comparison of human health benefits and economic costs within the electricity sector, we display the 
national cost and benefit estimates of the different policies together in Table 29. To illustrate that our analysis does 
not include ecological benefits of these policies or any benefits associated with reduced mercury pollution, we 
include placeholder rows for these missing benefits. We also include a placeholder for the effects of the policies on 
economic surplus outside the electricity sector, which we are unable to measure with our model. Thus, the net 
benefits that we report for each policy are incomplete. However, the included categories of benefits and costs are 
thought to constitute the significant majority of quantifiable measures, and these are the measures that are the most 
significant in recent Regulatory Impact Assessments by the EPA. Typically the EPA does not include a measure of 
consumer and producer surplus due to the limitation of the model they use, but instead they report total resource 
costs for the regulatory policy, which will be somewhat less than the surplus measures we report. 
To control for the large differences in mercury emissions under the policies illustrated in the first two and last two 
columns of the table, we use a double line to separate the table into two halves. In the first two columns are the 
measurable net benefits under two versions of the CAIR policy with the EPA Mercury Cap. The last two columns 
include the CAIR with the two policies that impose tighter restrictions on mercury emissions. The relevant 
comparisons are those within each section of the table as total national mercury emissions are not constant across the 
two grouped scenarios.  
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Table 29. Summary of Modeled National Benefits and Costs for Central Case  
(URM Model; Billions of $1999) 
 















2010        
Benefits        
Ozone Health Benefits  0.16 0.16  0.17  0.08 
Particulate Health Benefits  13.31 13.61  13.75  20.40 











Costs        
Economic Surplus Changes in 
Electricity Sector  -2.89 -3.00  -6.46  -16.15 
Economic Surplus Changes in  
Rest of Economy  -N/A -N/A  -N/A  -N/A 
Measurable Net Benefits  10.58 10.77  7.46  4.33 
2020        
Benefits        
Ozone Health Benefits  0.25 0.27  0.27  0.20 
Particulate Health Benefits  19.21 19.03  19.14  21.71 











Costs        
Economic Surplus Changes in 
Electricity Sector  -5.60 -5.20  -8.23  -20.91 
Economic Surplus Changes in 
Rest of Economy  -N/A -N/A  -N/A  -N/A 
Measurable Net Benefits  13.86 14.10  11.18  1.00 
a)  Ecological benefits to NY State residents for reduced acidification in the Adirondack Park and the health benefits or reduced 
mercury emissions are included in the uncertainty analysis in Figure 10.  
  76Resources for the Future                                                                Palmer, Burtraw, and Shih 
All of the policies have positive annual net benefits that generally increase over time. The net benefits of the policies 
that include the EPA Mercury Cap are greater than $10 billion per year in 2010 and roughly $14 billion per year in 
2020, suggesting that the policies are very worthwhile. Furthermore, maintaining the SIP seasonal NOx program 
with the CAIR, when coupled with the EPA Mercury Cap, will produce positive incremental net benefits from a 
national perspective in both 2010 and 2020, compared to the CAIR plus EPA Mercury Cap but without the SIP 
seasonal NOx program.  
It is also noteworthy that our results are consistent with previous studies that find that the efficient level of control of 
SO2 is significantly tighter than in CAIR. Banzhaf et al. (2004) find the average and marginal benefits of particulate-
health related SO2 reductions are approximately equal over an extended range of emission reductions and fairly 
constant over this range. This implies that the average benefit per ton of the emission reductions we model would 
continue for further emission reductions. Our benefit estimates for SO2 reductions are commingled with the benefit 
of NOx reductions. However, the average benefit per ton of NOx emission reductions are less than for SO2 reductions 
in our model, so if we calculate an average benefit per ton of emission reduction based on the sum of benefits for the 
cumulative tons of SO2 and NOx emission reductions we will identify a lower bound of the average benefit for 
further SO2 reductions. This lower-bound average calculates to about $2,900 per ton in 2010 and $3,100 per ton in 
2020. In contrast, we identify the marginal cost of further SO2 reductions as the allowance price for SO2, which is 
about $350 per ton in 2010 and $1,300 per ton in 2020. Hence, although not our central focus we offer compelling 
evidence that further reductions in SO2 emissions would be justified on economic grounds. 
The latter two columns show the effects of the high costs of controlling mercury emissions on net benefits. In 2010 
the annual net benefits of these policies range from $4.3 billion to $7.5 billion. Between 2010 and 2020 net benefits 
under the Tighter Mercury with MACT policy rise from $7.5 billion to $11.2 billion. Under the Tighter Mercury 
with Trading policy net benefits of $4.3 billion in 2010 fall to $1.0 billion in 2020. Despite the fact that trading 
allows generators to lower the costs of reducing mercury, relative to a technology standard, allowing for mercury 
trading introduces an opportunity cost associated with mercury emission allowances (over $1,000,000 per pound) 
that stimulates switching from coal- to gas-fired generation. The switch results in higher prices to electricity 
consumers and associated consumer surplus losses. Thus, even though the trading scenario produces greater 
ancillary reductions in SO2 in 2010, the large increase in electricity price more than offsets that difference compared 
to the Tighter Mercury with MACT policy. In 2020, the measured net benefits of CAIR coupled with Tighter 
Mercury with Trading are one-tenth those of CAIR coupled with Tighter Mercury with MACT. 
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Table 30. Summary of Modeled New York Benefits and Costs for Central Case  
(URM Model; Billions of $1999) 
 















2010        
Benefits        
Ozone Health Benefits  .02 .02  .02  .02 
Particulate Health Benefits  1.66 1.78  1.83  2.51 










Costs        
Economic Surplus Changes in 
Electricity Sector  .03 -.02  .06  -.25 
Economic Surplus Changes in  Rest 
of Economy  -N/A -N/A  -N/A  -N/A 
Measurable Net Benefits  1.71 1.79  1.90  2.27 
2020        
Benefits        
Ozone Health Benefits  .03 .03  .03  .03 
Particulate Health Benefits  2.60 2.63  2.60  2.75 










Costs        
Economic Surplus Changes in 
Electricity Sector  -.07 -.02  .11  -.17 
Economic Surplus Changes in Rest 
of Economy  -N/A -N/A  -N/A  -N/A 
Measurable Net Benefits  2.56 2.63  2.73  2.61 
a)  Ecological benefits to NY State residents for reduced acidification in the Adirondack Park and the health benefits or reduced 
mercury emissions are included in the uncertainty analysis in Figure 10. 
  78Resources for the Future                                                                Palmer, Burtraw, and Shih 
The costs and benefits of the different policies in New York State are reported in Table 30. As in Table 29, 
a double line is used to divide the table into those scenarios that incorporate EPA’s Mercury Cap and those 
that include the more stringent mercury policies. Also, this table only includes the benefits and costs 
analyzed in this study. Therefore, it excludes the costs outside the electricity sector and the benefits of 
mercury reductions. When looking at this table it is important to keep in mind that the costs and the 
benefits included here are not necessarily directly linked. Actions to reduce emissions from electricity 
generators in New York State will yield environmental benefits in New York, but they will also yield 
environmental benefits outside of New York. Likewise, the benefits obtained in New York under the 
various policies will be the result of a mixture of actions taken at generating units in New York and those 
undertaken in upwind states. Thus the costs and the benefits are not necessarily directly comparable. 
Nevertheless, the net benefits estimates are very relevant for New York residents and businesses and 
therefore we include them in this report.  
The results show that in 2010 all of the policies generate net benefits in New York. The net benefits in New 
York State are highest under the Tighter Mercury with Trading scenario and lowest under the EPA 
Mercury Cap scenario. This happens because the particulate health benefits for that scenario in that year are 
nearly 40% higher than under any other scenario, substantially outweighing the $300 million in additional 
cost within the state. In 2020, the net benefits in New York are virtually identical under all four scenarios.  
 
6.8 MAGNITUDE OF IMPORTANT UNCERTAINTIES 
Four prominent uncertainties are woven through our analysis of benefits. Systematically we have chosen to 
make cautious choices about these uncertainties that lead our estimates of benefits to be toward the low side 
of the range of defensible estimates. For instance, two uncertainties underlie the estimates we provide of 
health benefits associated with reduced emissions of SO2 and NOx, including the atmospheric modeling of 
pollution formation and transport and the value of a statistical life. The net benefits reported in Table 29 
rely on the URM source-receptor coefficients for particulates. If the alternative case benefits calculated for 
2020 using ASTRAP coefficients are used, the net benefits estimates will increase by about $4 billion for 
the two scenarios that include the EPA Mercury Cap, as well as for the Tighter Mercury with MACT 
policy, and about $4.9 billion for the Tighter Mercury with Trading policy. Use of a value of statistical life 
equal to $6.1 million, the value preferred by the U.S. EPA, would increase the mortality related portion of 
measured benefits, which is the lion’s share of what we estimate, by over two-and-one-half times. 
We also choose not to include in our main analysis the estimates of two potentially important benefit 
categories. These two omissions are the health benefits associated with reduced mercury emissions 
(described in Tables 27 and 28) and the ecological benefits of reduced acidification. Their inclusion would 
increase our estimate of benefits and net benefits. 
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Nonetheless, two important questions drive further consideration of uncertainties. Would alternative 
assumptions or inclusion of additional benefit categories (1) cause net benefits for any policy option to be 
negative, meaning benefits are less than costs; or (2) change the ranking of policies we examine with 
respect to their net benefits to society?  
Figure 10 provides an illustration of the range of potential net benefits when the four sources of uncertainty 
outlined above are included in the analysis. The policy scenarios are arrayed across the horizontal axis, 
with three associated values of net benefits. The Low value represents net benefits under the lowest 
defensible values for each uncertain item. The Preferred value is that which is described throughout this 
paper, with a small amendment. The High value is that which would obtain under the highest defensible 
values for each uncertain item. 
 
Figure 10. The Effect of Uncertainties on Annual Net Benefits  













































In the Low value case, the atmospheric transport model is the URM model, the same as in our preferred 
case. However, we use the low end of $1 million for the value of a statistical life from the range of values 
surveyed by the U.S. EPA as background for determining the value in recent regulatory impact assessments 
(EPA 2004b). The category of mercury-related benefits is included, but the Low estimate includes only IQ-
related benefits for mercury. The ecological benefit in the Adirondack Park, based on Banzhaf et al., is also 
included, but at the low value in the range of reported values of $305 million to $1 billion per year. 
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The Low value case preserves the ranking of CAIR plus the EPA Mercury Cap and with the continuation of 
the Seasonal SIP NOx policy as the policy yielding the greatest net benefits, and the ranking of the other 
policies also are unchanged from the Preferred case. However, in the Low value case the CAIR plus 
Tighter Mercury with Trading policy yields negative net benefits, meaning that benefits are less than costs. 
This results because the costs of this policy within the electricity sector are greater than for any other 
policy, and the benefits are significantly reduced due to the Low value case assumptions. The most 
influential of these assumptions is the $1 million value of a statistical life. 
The Preferred value case also includes use of the URM atmospheric transport model. The value of a 
statistical life is $2.25 million. This is still substantially lower than the value that is used by the U.S. EPA. 
We continue to use cautious assumptions about the mercury-health and ecological values that we used in 
the Low value case. These values were not included in Tables 29 and 30, and they have little influence on 
the calculation of net benefits. In the Preferred value case, the CAIR plus the EPA Mercury Cap and with 
the continuation of the Seasonal SIP NOx policy continues to be the policy yielding the greatest net 
benefits. In the Preferred value case, all policy options yield positive net benefits. 
The High value case yields a different ranking of policy options. The High value case includes use of the 
ASTRAP atmospheric transport model for particulates. Most importantly, however, it includes a value of 
statistical life of $10 million, which is the high end of the range of values surveyed by the U.S. EPA (EPA 
2004b). This value is over four times greater than the value used in the Preferred value case. Also, the value 
incorporates the high end of mercury-health related benefits, including cardiovascular effects and 
premature mortality. It also includes the high end of ecological benefits.  
Use of High values for benefit estimates dramatically boosts the net benefits of all the policy options, but it 
also changes the ranking of policies. The CAIR plus Tighter Mercury with Trading emerges as the policy 
yielding the greatest net benefits. This is driven by two factors. The most influential is the value of 
statistical life, which raises the estimated value of reduced particulate exposure sufficiently to overcome the 
higher cost of the policy. Also, the mercury-health benefits are significant and this raises the ranking of 
both policies with the tighter mercury standard relative to the EPA Mercury Cap.  
Throughout the majority of this presentation we continue to use cautious assumptions about benefit 
estimates. Our primary motivation for doing so is that even with cautious assumptions we find that the 
annual net benefits of the proposed policies are significant. Given the important uncertainties that surround 
these estimates, we feel it is useful for the policymaker to know that estimates are not likely to overstate the 
benefits of the policy, especially given that the estimates support the policy.  
Finally, we note there are many other sources of uncertainties and omissions on the benefits as well as the 
costs that extend beyond the current capability to model in a quantitative manner. For instance, benefits 
from improved visibility and from improved ecological health for the entire nation are not included in this 
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analysis. On the other hand, costs incurred outside the electricity sector due to the interaction of 
environmental policy with preexisting regulations and taxes tend to increase the overall cost of 
environmental policy to the nation (Goulder et al., 1999). We feel the sources of benefits and costs that we 
include are the most important and most relevant to policymakers and their constituencies, given current 
knowledge and modeling capability. 
 
6.9 COMPARISON WITH EPA’S ANALYSIS OF CAIR RULE AND EIA’S ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVE 
MERCURY CONTROL STRATEGIES 
In January of 2004, EPA issued an analysis of the benefits and costs of the CAIR, called the Interstate Air 
Quality Rule (IAQR) at that time (EPA 2004a).37 The EPA analysis estimated the annual costs of the rule 
to be $2.9 billion and the annual health benefits associated with particulates and ozone to be $56.9 billion. 
Their analysis also included $0.9 billion in visibility benefits and yielded a net benefit estimate of $55 
billion or $54.1 billion excluding visibility. 
Our estimate of the annual cost of the CAIR policy combined with the EPA Mercury Cap in 2010 is $2.9 
billion, the same as that of the EPA. Our estimates include the economic cost of changes in consumer 
responses to changes in electricity price, so one would expect our estimate to be greater than the EPA’s, 
which is simply a measure of resource cost. Since electricity price changes are very small the two estimates 
are proximate.  
However, our benefits estimates are substantially lower than those in the EPA study. The difference shrinks 
when we use the alternate case benefits estimates, which raises total health benefits in 2010 to $16.3 
billion. A more important explanation of the difference is the difference in the value of a statistical life that 
is assumed in the two different analyses. As discussed above, EPA uses an estimate of $6.1 million per life 
saved, but we rely on an estimate that is more than 60% lower. If one factors up our alternate health 
benefits estimate to adjust for this difference one gets a value for net benefits of $39.6 billion, thereby 
accounting for most of the difference between this study and EPA (2004a).  
A small portion of the remaining $14.5 billion difference in these two health benefits estimates can be 
attributed to differences in the NOx emission findings for the two analyses. First, the EPA analysis of the 
CAIR model finds that the seasonal caps on NOx are achieved without explicitly imposing them, just by 
virtue of compliance with the NOx piece of the CAIR policy. In our analysis, we find that seasonal 
emissions of NOx in the SIP region exceed the SIP seasonal NOx cap without explicitly imposing that cap. 
                                                 
37 This analysis does not include any restrictions on mercury emissions.  
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When we do the analysis including the SIP NOx policy (keeping national annual emissions of NOx 
unchanged), we obtain an additional $0.2 billion in health morbidity and mortality benefits, which when 
translated in terms of the EPA VSL assumptions, amounts to $0.3 billion. Another source of difference is 
the roughly 230,000 additional tons of reduction in national annual emissions of NOx that EPA finds 
compared to our estimate of national annual NOx emissions with the CAIR policy in 2010. Roughly 
speaking this could contribute another $1 billion to the difference in estimates. This accounting leaves 
about $13 billion difference in the estimated benefits between our analysis and that of EPA for the CAIR 
plus EPA Mercury Cap model. This is about 24% of the EPA estimated health benefits.  
The results of our study can also be compared to a recent analysis that the Energy Information 
Administration (EIA) undertook of several different proposals to reduce mercury emissions from electricity 
generators. In response to a request from Senators James M. Inhofe (R-OK) and George V. Voinovich (R-
OH), the EIA used its NEMS model of the U.S. energy sector to analyze the costs and effects on fuel mix 
and use of emission controls of several different mercury control policies. The policies analyzed include 
EPA’s mercury cap-and-trade proposal, the EPA mercury MACT standard and three versions of a stricter 
mercury MACT that required 90% reduction in mercury emissions, but included different assumptions 
about the performance and availability of ACI technology by 2008. The EPA Mercury Cap-and-Trade 
proposal is modeled using the assumed $35,000 per ton safety valve and that safety valve price is binding 
in the analysis. In the most pessimistic case, they assume that ACI technology is not available until after 
2025. All of these policies were compared to a baseline scenario that included the proposed CAIR rule.  
In this analysis EIA found that none of the mercury control cases except the one where ACI is precluded 
during the forecast horizon has any real effect on electricity price relative to the baseline scenario that 
includes the CAIR rule. This result is consistent with our finding that a strict mercury MACT policy will 
result in only a very small increase in electricity price relative to the case with the EPA Mercury Cap 
included. We did not run a scenario that included CAIR with no cap on mercury and thus we cannot make 
the same comparison that can be made using the EIA model runs. The EIA study also concludes, 
comparable to our findings, that there is very little fuel switching away from coal with the stricter mercury 
MACT policy. Only when EIA restricts the performance of ACI or its availability does fuel switching 
become a more frequently chosen method for reducing mercury emissions. When ACI is assumed to be 
unavailable the EIA model also installs almost twice as many new scrubbers as in other cases and 
substantially more SCR as well. 
Under optimistic technology assumptions, the EIA study finds that the discounted value of total resource 
costs over the forecast horizon of the mercury MACT standard that requires 90% reduction are about four 
times the size of the sum of total resource costs plus allowance payments of the EPA Mercury Cap-and-
Trade policy. Our incremental cost calculation is not directly comparable to EIA’s because each of the cost 
estimates in our report include the cost of complying with the CAIR rule in addition to the cost of 
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complying with the mercury regulations, whereas EIA has included the CAIR rule in their baseline and 
reports only the incremental cost of mercury controls. Our analysis focuses on costs in particular years and 
does not calculate present discounted value. For 2010 we find that the resource costs of the MACT standard 
we model, which is more stringent than the one modeled by EIA, are just 30% greater than the sum of 
resource costs plus allowance payments for the CAIR plus EPA Mercury Cap policy. Our preferred way to 
represent costs is in changes in economic surplus. In 2020 the MACT policy is just 26% greater in our 
model. We find that the annual cost in economic surplus losses of the mercury MACT program is twice the 
cost of the combination of the CAIR rule plus the EPA Mercury Cap in 2010 and roughly 1.5 times as large 
in 2020.  
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Section 7 
CONCLUSION 
Recent federal policy proposals to reduce emissions of SO2, NOx, and mercury from the electricity sector 
promise important improvements in air quality and reductions in acid deposition in New York State and 
across the nation. In this study we look at EPA’s proposed CAIR to reduce annual emissions of NOx and 
SO2 in 28 states and the District of Columbia coupled with a number of different policies for mercury and, 
in one case, a continuation of the SIP seasonal NOx cap.  
This project uses four models to analyze the costs and benefits of the different policies within the electricity 
sector. The Haiku model looks at the effects of the policies on the behavior of electricity producers and 
consumers and the resulting implications for costs, prices to consumers, and the level and location of 
emissions. The TAF model is used to translate changes in emissions of SO2 and NOx from power plants into 
changes in air quality, human health, and monetary benefits of those changes in health status. For this 
project we incorporate a new set of source-receptor coefficients derived from the URM-1ATM air quality 
model and an associated post-processing model called the SRG into TAF. Previously, TAF contained 
source-receptor coefficients from the ASTRAP model for particulates, but had no source-receptor 
coefficients for ozone. In this analysis, we use the ASTRAP model as a point of comparison for the new 
coefficients. For deposition of sulfur and nitrogen we continue to rely on ASTRAP. 
We find benefits to the nation and to New York State significantly outweigh the costs associated with 
reductions in SO2, NOx, and mercury, even under cautious assumptions about the valuation of the expected 
health effects. Depending on the policy, between 11 and 13% of the total national health benefits occur in 
New York State, a function of the state’s population and its location downwind of major emission sources. 
We calculate and value expected improvements in human health resulting from changes in particulate 
matter and ozone concentrations, which are thought to capture the most important benefits. We find the 
health benefits of reducing particulate matter are nearly two orders of magnitude greater than the health 
benefits of reducing ozone. Several benefit categories including improved visibility, reduced acidification, 
and other ecological improvements and the effects of mercury on human health and the environment would 
unambiguously increase the calculated net benefits even further. While we do not assign monetary values 
to the effects in our central analysis, we do find that the policies yield important reductions in deposition of 
acid precursors in New York State, particularly when the tighter mercury targets are in place. We discuss 
the potential value of reductions in acidification to the Adirondack Park, based on one recent study. 
The mercury emission levels that we model are taken from EPA analysis that accounts for the opportunity 
for emission banking and for a safety valve price on mercury emissions. The effect of the safety valve is to 
cause total emissions to exceed the intended emission cap. We do not model explicitly the benefits of 
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mercury reductions, however we can extrapolate based on estimates in other recent studies to infer the 
potential magnitude of mercury reductions.  
We find that, with the exception of the Tighter Mercury with Trading, the set of policies will have fairly 
small impacts on the average price of electricity nationwide and in New York. However, how mercury 
emissions are regulated will have important implications not only for the cost of the regulation, but also for 
emission levels for SO2 and NOx and where those emissions are located. 
Our research shows that contrary to EPA’s findings, the originally proposed CAIR rule by itself will not 
keep summer emissions of NOx from electricity generators in the SIP region below the current SIP seasonal 
NOx cap. As a result, average summertime 8-hour and 24-hour ozone concentrations in New York and 
elsewhere are higher under the originally proposed version of the CAIR policy that we model than under 
the baseline. Two possible remedies are tighter annual caps or continuation of the seasonal cap. We model 
the latter and find that combining a continuation of the SIP seasonal NOx cap with the CAIR plus EPA 
Mercury Cap corrects this situation and does so at relatively low cost to firms and no cost to electricity 
consumers nationwide. In the final version of the CAIR rule, EPA reconstitutes a seasonal cap-and-trade 
program for NOx in a subset of the region to address this concern. The CAIR with the seasonal NOx cap 
produces higher net benefits relative to the originally proposed CAIR. 
We compare the EPA Mercury Cap with more stringent mercury policies that lead to about 67% further 
reductions in mercury emissions by 2020. An important environmental effect of the tighter mercury cap is 
that it brings about substantial ancillary reductions in emissions of NOx and SO2. Under the MACT version 
of this policy, additional NOx reductions equal to 11% of baseline emissions are achieved by 2020. Under 
Tighter Mercury with Trading smaller additional reductions in NOx are achieved but the SO2 cap goes slack 
by 2010 as generators rely more on installation of flue gas desulfurization (FGD) units (known as SO2 
scrubbers) to reduce mercury and less on activated carbon injection (ACI). In 2020 this results in 1 million 
tons fewer emissions of SO2 relative to the other policies.  
We find that all four policies to regulate multiple pollutants from the electricity sector that we investigated, 
including policies with the tighter mercury controls, would deliver substantial benefits to residents of New 
York State and the nation. Our modeling indicates that additional SO2 emissions reductions beyond those 
called for by the EPA rules would yield benefits that substantially exceed the additional cost. Our 
evaluation of scenarios with tighter mercury emission controls shows that the net benefits of a maximum 
achievable control technology (MACT) approach exceed the net benefits of a cap and trade approach. It is 
important to note that we do not include estimates of the benefits of mercury reductions, which if included, 
could improve the net benefits of more stringent mercury controls. Extrapolating from Rice and Hammitt’s 
(2005) findings suggest that adding in these benefits could increase the benefits of the tighter mercury 
policies by roughly $1 billion. 
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Use of the EPA assumption about the value of a statistical life would have the single biggest effect on the 
calculation of net benefits, but it would do little to distinguish the EPA Mercury Cap policies and the 
Tighter Mercury with MACT because the particulate-related health benefits of these three would be 
inflated about equally. However, use of the EPA assumption would boost the relative net benefits of 
Tighter Mercury with Trading, making it the policy with the greatest net benefits in 2010. However, in 
2020 it would still not yield net benefits as great as the other policies.  
In New York the health benefits from reduced exposure to ozone and fine particulates are the highest under 
the Tighter Mercury with Trading Scenario, especially in 2010. However, the benefits in New York in 2020 
under the Tighter Mercury with Trading are roughly only 6% greater than with MACT or with the EPA 
Mercury Cap policies. For the rest of the nation they are roughly 12% greater. The difference stems from 
the location of emissions and emission reductions. 
We give less emphasis to monetary estimates of the benefits of reduced acidification and from improved 
health due to lessened exposure to mercury because the literature on which this is built is not yet completed 
peer-reviewed. However, the evidence suggests that reduced acidification would contribute another $305 
million to $1 billion in annual benefits, accounting just for the benefits that would accrue to residents of 
New York State from improvements in the Adirondack Park. The benefits from reduced emissions of 
mercury at the national level range from $121 million to $1.7 billion under the EPA Mercury Cap, and 
from $230 million to $3.3 billion under the tighter cap, depending on which health effects are included. 
We explore the major uncertainties in our estimates in order to see if it is likely that different values would 
identify a different policy option as more efficient. The range of parameter uncertainties include low and 
high values resulting from the choice of atmospheric model for predicting particulate concentrations and 
low and high values for the value of a statistical life, based on the range of values in the literature. We also 
add in recent estimates of the value of mercury reductions for human health and ecological improvements 
in the Adirondack Park. This uncertainty analysis indicates that all policies continue to yield positive net 
benefits (benefits greater than costs) with one exception. Under the Low value case illustrated in Figure 10, 
the CAIR plus Tighter Mercury with Trading yields benefits less than costs. The most important factor 
causing this reversal is the use of a value of statistical life of $1 million, less than one-half of our preferred 
value, and less than one-sixth of the EPA’s preferred value. We also find that for the Low and Preferred 
value cases in the uncertainty analysis, the CAIR plus EPA Mercury Cap with continuation of the Seasonal 
SIP NOx policy yields the greatest net benefits. However, for the High value case, while net benefits for all 
policies increases dramatically, the CAIR plus Tighter Mercury with Trading emerges as the policy with 
the greatest net benefits.  
The effect of the different policies on the mix of fuels used to supply electricity is also fairly modest in 
most cases. The scenarios that combine CAIR plus the EPA Mercury Cap, and with the Tighter Mercury 
with MACT policy, see a small switch away from coal to natural gas. The switch from coal to natural gas is 
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much larger under the Tighter Mercury with Trading Scenario. The current federal administration has often 
stated that it is not the purpose of environmental regulation to force fuel switching away from coal. From 
this perspective, a MACT approach may be preferred to a trading approach as a way to achieve tighter 
mercury targets (beyond EPA’s proposal) because it preserves the role of coal in electricity generation. 
The Tighter Mercury with Trading produces large ancillary reductions in emissions of CO2 of 11% of 
baseline levels nationally in 2010 and 9% in 2020. In New York State carbon emissions fall by almost one-
third in 2010 and by over one-quarter in 2020. The other policies never lead to a decrease in carbon 
emissions of more than 2.5%. 
A key factor in the design of environmental policy is the incidence of burden, which varies for consumers 
and for producers depending on whether a trading approach is used. Consumers bear virtually all of the cost 
of EPA’s proposed policies in 2010. In New York, producers benefit from the policies. By 2020, 
nationwide we find the burden is shared fairly equally between consumers and producers, although 
consumers still bear the greater cost. In 2020 the cost in New York State is very small, due in part to the 
implementation of New York’s multipollutant rule that is included in the baseline. Producers bear the entire 
cost in 2020. 
Combining the CAIR rule with tighter mercury standards yields substantial changes in the incidence of 
burden. Nationwide in 2010, consumers still bear most of the cost under a MACT approach but consumers 
and producers share in the incremental cost of the tighter mercury standard. In 2020 consumers are entirely 
bearing the additional cost. There is no additional cost of the tighter mercury standards using a MACT 
approach in New York State in 2010 or 2020.  
However, implementing tighter mercury standards using a trading approach imposes significantly more 
cost on the electricity sector, due to the internalization of the opportunity cost of mercury emission 
allowance prices and the corresponding change in resources use including fuel switching to natural gas. 
Consumers bear the entire burden from tight mercury controls with trading, while producers in the 
aggregate actually benefit due to higher electricity prices. It is important to note that the effect on 
individual firms is likely to vary greatly, depending on the portfolio of generation assets they operate. 
Our analysis has several limitations and three primary ones should be kept in mind. First, we focus on the 
electricity sector, and thus are unable to account for the general equilibrium social costs of the different 
policy scenarios, which could significantly raise the estimate of costs.  
Second, we do not assign monetary values to changes that would result from the reduction in acid 
deposition in New York State resulting from the policies. We also do not value visibility improvements or 
other ecological effects from reduced particulate matter and ozone. And, most importantly we do not value 
the benefits of a reduction in mercury. The benefits of mercury reductions are the reason for considering 
the alternative policies. Quantifying and valuing these pathways could significantly raise the estimate of 
benefits as the Rice and Hammitt (2005) findings suggest.  
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Third, some important assumptions play a significant role in the analysis. One of these is the assumed value 
of reducing premature mortality, known as the value of a statistical life. We use estimates that are roughly 
one-third of those preferred by the EPA. The choice of different estimates would alter the estimate of 
mortality-related health improvements in a direct manner, and these health improvements are thought to be 
the significant majority of benefits accruing from pollution reduction. 
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Appendix 1. Glossary of Economic Terms and List of Acronyms 
 
Glossary: 
Cap-and-Trade Regulation: A regulation that caps total emissions of a particular pollutant from all 
relevant sources, creates allowances for each unit of emissions and allows individual 
sources to trade in those emission rights. Emission allowances may be distributed or 
auctioned to industry sources. 
Constant Elasticity Demand Function: A demand function that states that consumer demand for a 
product or service responds in constant proportion to a change in price at all underlying 
price levels.  
Demand Elasticity: The degree to which consumer demand for a product or service responds to a 
change in price. When there is no perceptible response, demand is said to be inelastic. 
Generally elasticity is represented by an estimate of the percentage change in quantity 
demanded in response to a percentage change in price. 
Dynamic Framework: An economic model is said to have a dynamic framework when it includes the 
possibility for capital investment and retirement. 
Endogenous: Within the context of a model such as the RFF Haiku model of the electricity sector, an 
endogenous variable is one that is generated by the model.  Endogenous variables in the 
Haiku model include investment, generation, electricity transmission, price of coal and 
natural gas, emissions of different pollutants, emission allowance prices, and retail 
electricity price.  
Exogenous: Within the context of a model such as the RFF Haiku model of the electricity sector, an 
exogenous variable is one that is not generated by the model but instead is parametric.  
Examples of exogenous variables in the Haiku model include the price of oil, the 
quantity of existing generation capacity and the heat rate of existing capacity.  Resources for the Future                                                                         Palmer, Burtraw, and Shih 
  A-2
Factor Demand: The demand for inputs used in the production of a product or service. In the case of 
electricity production, the input factors include fuel, labor and equipment. 
Factor Prices: The prices of the inputs used to produce a product or service. 
Market Equilibrium: A market equilibrium is when total demand for a particular good in a market at a 
given price equals total supply of that good at the same price. 
Opportunity Cost: The choice that is forgone when another choice is made. For example, when a firm 
invests in a particular piece of pollution-control equipment it may be unable to make 
other productive investments and the loss of the returns on the best of those investments 
is the opportunity cost of the investment in pollution control equipment. 
Short-Run Variable Cost: Costs that vary with the level of production holding capital investment fixed. 
Value of a Statistical Life: The monetary value associated with avoiding a premature mortality. This 
value is derived from measurement of individuals’ willingness to pay to avoid small 
changes in risk of premature mortality, and those changes are then extrapolated to a 





ACI     activated carbon injection 
ADE     atmospheric diffusion equation 
ASTRAP   Advanced Source Trajectory Regional Air Pollution, model name 
Btu     British thermal unit 
CAAAC   Clean Air Act Advisory Committee 
CAIR     Clean Air Interstate Rule 
CAIR/m   Clean Air Interstate Rule with Mercury 
CART     Classification and Regression Tree 
CO2     carbon dioxide 
ECAR     Ohio Valley region of NERC, see below 
EIA     Energy Information Administration 
EPA     Environmental Protection Agency 
SO2    sulfur  dioxide 
ERCOT      Texas region of NERC, see below 
FGD     flue gas desulfurization  
GHG     greenhouse gas   
MAAC  Mid-Atlantic region of NERC, see below 
MACT  maximum  achievable control technology 
MAIN    NERC  Region  containing  Illinois  and parts of surrounding states, see below 
MAPP     Mid-Continent Area Power Pool 
NERC     North American Electric Reliability Council 
NOx     nitrous oxides 
NOx SIP Call     EPA regulatory cap-and-trade program restricting emissions of NOx in 
summertime in 19 eastern states and the District of Columbia 
NOx SIP Call Region Shorthand for group of 19 states plus DC covered by EPA NOx SIP Call 
NYSERDA   New York State Energy Research and Development Authority 
PM     particulate matter 
RADM  Regional Acid Deposition Model 
RAMS     Regional Atmospheric Modeling System, model name 
SCR    selective  catalytic  reduction 
SNCR     selective noncatalytic reduction 
SIP     State Implementation Plan 
SRG     Source-Receptor Generator, model name   
TAF     Tracking and Analysis Framework, model name 
URM     Urban-to-Regional Multiscale, abbreviated model name  
URM-1 ATM     URM One Atmosphere Model, full model name  
 
Appendices 2-5 attached as separate documents 
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Appendix 2. 
Legislative Comparison of Multipollutant Proposals S. 366, S. 1844, and S. 843.
1  
Features  S. 366 – Jeffords (108
th)  S. 1844 – Clear Skies (108
th)
2  S. 843 – Carper (108
th) 
Affected Facilities  Electricity-generating facilities 
with a nameplate capacity of 15 
MW or more. 
Electricity-generating facilities 
with a nameplate capacity of 25 
MW or more. 
Electricity-generating facilities 
with a nameplate capacity greater 
than 25 MW. 
National Annual Allowance Allocation Caps 
Sulfur Dioxide 
(SO2) 
2.25 million tons in 2009. 
Split into two regions.
3 
4.5 million tons in 2010. 
3.0 million tons in 2018. 
4.5 million tons in 2009. 
3.5 million tons in 2013. 
2.25 million tons in 2016. 
Nitrogen Oxides 
(NOx) 
1.51 million tons in 2009.  2.19 million tons in 2008. 
1.79 million tons in 2018.
 
Split into two regions.
4 
1.87 million tons in 2009. 
1.7 million tons in 2013. 
Mercury 
 
5 tons in 2008. 
Facility specific emissions 
limitations without trading. 
34 tons in 2010. 
15 tons in 2018. 
24 tons in 2009. 





2.05 billion tons in 2009.
6 No  CO2 policy.  2.57 + billion tons in 2009.
7 
2.47 + billion tons in 2013.
8 
+ additional tonnage through 
sequestration incentives. 
Allowance Allocation Cap Changes and Additional Annual Allowance Availability 
High Costs  None except to exercise penalty Units  can  purchase future  None except to exercise penalty 
 
1 Prepared by David Lankton, Billy Pizer, Karen Palmer, and Dallas Burtraw.  
2 The Bush administration has proposed regulatory rules, similar to the policies in S. 1844, to be published in the Federal Register by early February of 2004. 
3 Under S. 366, the western region has a 0.275 million ton cap on SO2 and the non-western region has a 1.975 million ton cap on SO2. 
4 Under S. 1844, the western region has a 0.715 million ton cap on NOx and the eastern region has a 1.475 million ton cap on NOx. The eastern NOx cap is reduced to 
1.074 million tons in 2018. 
5 For S. 843, from 2009 to 2012, mercury emissions cannot exceed 50% of the total mercury present in delivered coal at each affected facility. After 2012, the 
percentage drops to 30%. Also, emissions may not exceed an output-based rate determined by the administrator. 
6 The CO2 cap is specified in S. 366 and it approximates 1990 level CO2 emissions from the electricity sector. 
7 The S. 843 2009 allowance cap is equal to 2006 electricity sector CO2 emissions as projected by EIA in the most recent report as of date of enactment. The number we 
report is EIA’s AEO 2003 projection for 2006. 
8 The S. 843 2013 emissions cap is equal to actual 2001 electricity sector CO2 emissions. The number we report is EIA’s AEO 2003 projection for 2001. Resources for the Future                                                                                                                             Palmer, Burtraw, and Shih 
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Features  S. 366 – Jeffords (108
th)  S. 1844 – Clear Skies (108
th)
2  S. 843 – Carper (108
th) 
“Safety Valve”  provisions for excess emissions.  allowances for current use: 
SO2: $2,000 (per ton). 
NOx: $4,000 (per ton). 
Mercury: $2,187.50 (per ounce).
9 
provisions for excess emissions. 
Carryover from 
Title IV SO2 and 
NOx SIP Call 
programs 
SO2, NOx: Banked pre-2008 Title 
IV NOx and SO2 allowances can 
be traded 4:1 for S. 366 NOx and 
SO2 allowances, respectively. 
SO2, NOx: SO2 and NOx 
allowances banked as a result of 
meeting new source performance 
standards between 2001 and 2008 
are considered full value S. 366 
allowances of the appropriate type. 
SO2: Banked pre-2010 Title IV 
SO2 allowances can be traded 1:1 
for S.1844 SO2 allowances. 
NOx: Banked allowances from the 
regional, seasonal SIP Call trading 
program can be traded 1:1 
beginning in 2008.  
SO2: Banked pre-2009 Title IV 
SO2 allowances carryover 1:1 for 






  CO2: Additional CO2 allowances 
for carbon sequestration are added 
to the annual CO2 allowance cap. 
See “CO2-Specific Allocation 
Methods” below. 
CO2: Allowances from other 
international or U.S. CO2 







The administrator may limit 
localized emissions to avoid 
significant adverse health impacts. 
Non-Attainment: Units 
contributing to non-attainment of 
S. 1844 does not interfere with 
states continued authority over 
local compliance with NAAQS.  
The federal or state government 
may limit emissions from a 
specific facility to address local air 
quality problems. 
Non-Attainment: After 2008, 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
9 For S. 1844, purchased allowances reduce the allowances (of the purchased type) that would otherwise be allocated the next year. If these allowances are not used, they 
are taken by the administrator (without refund). Prices are adjusted for inflation based on the Consumer Price Index. If more allowances are sold than would otherwise 
be allocated in the next year, then the allocation in the second next year is reduced (continuing as necessary). 
10 S. 843 establishes an independent review board consisting of members from the EPA, DOE, state governments, the electricity sector, and environmental organizations 
that must certify additional CO2 allowance allocations. Resources for the Future                                                                                                                             Palmer, Burtraw, and Shih 
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th)  S. 1844 – Clear Skies (108
th)
2  S. 843 – Carper (108
th) 
(NAAQS)  the ozone standard must submit 
three NOx allowances for each ton 
of NOx emitted. Units contributing 
to non-attainment of the PM-2.5 
standard must submit two SO2 
allowances for each ton of SO2 
emitted. 
sources within non-attainment 
areas would no longer be required 





For 2009 and each following year, 
the allowance caps are reduced by 
the emissions from small 
electricity generators (< 15 MW) 




Each year, any additional 
reductions the administrator finds 
necessary to protect public health 
and welfare may be made. 
  Within 15 years of enactment, the 
administrator must determine 
whether or not to adjust the annual 
allowance allocation caps. If it is 
determined that adjustments are 
required, they will take effect 20 
years after enactment. 
Allowance Banking and Trading Programs 
Banking 
Restrictions 
Mercury: Cannot be banked.     
Trading 
Restrictions 
SO2: Allowances cannot be traded 
between regions. 
Mercury: Cannot be traded. 
NOx: Allowances cannot be traded 





 Two  measures  trigger the start of 
the WRAP program: 
1)  After 2013, the third year after 
which the SO2 emissions from 
WRAP states are projected to 
exceed 271,000 tons. 
   OR 
Two measures trigger the start of 
the WRAP program: 
1)  Any year from 2016 or later 
that is the third year after 
projected WRAP SO2 
emissions exceed 271,000 tons 
OR Resources for the Future                                                                                                                             Palmer, Burtraw, and Shih 
  A-7
Features  S. 366 – Jeffords (108
th)  S. 1844 – Clear Skies (108
th)
2  S. 843 – Carper (108
th) 
2)  After 2018, beginning the third 
year after which actual SO2 
emissions from states in the 
WRAP exceed 271,000 tons. 
As of the start date, the 
administrator will allocate 271,000 
SO2 allowances to electricity-
generating units (EGUs) in those 
states each year. Only these 
allowances may be used by EGUs 
in the WRAP states. 
2)  Any year 2021 or later that is 
the third year after actual 
WRAP SO2 emissions exceed 
271,000 tons. 
As of the start date, SO2 emissions 
from WRAP states may not exceed 
the number of SO2 allowances 
allocated to units in WRAP states. 
The administrator will determine 
the method and number of these 




The regional summertime NOx SIP 
Call trading program would exist 
separate from S. 366. 
The regional summertime NOx SIP 
Call trading program would 
terminate after 2007. 
The regional summertime NOx SIP 
Call trading program would exist 




  By July 1, 2009, the administrator 
will submit a study to Congress 
regarding the environmental and 
economic effects of inter-pollutant 
trading of NOx and SO2. 
 
Allowance Allocation Methods 
In General  Auctions with revenues returned to 
consumers and allowances set 
aside for impacted sectors. 
Grandfathering.  Grandfathering for SO2 and 
output-based allocations for NOx, 





Existing Sources; SO2, NOx, 
CO2: 10% of all SO2, NOx, and 
CO2 allowances in 2009 will be 
grandfathered to affected units 
based on their share of electricity 
generation in 2001. Allocations 
decrease by 1% until 2018. 
Transition Assistance; SO2, NOx, 
CO2: 6% of all SO2, NOx, and 
Baseline Heat Input; NOx, 
Mercury: Baseline heat input is 
the average annual heat input used 
by a unit during the 3 years in 
which the unit had the highest heat 
input for the period 1998 to 2002. 
See the NOx and Mercury sections 
below for applicability. 
 
New Unit Reserve; SO2, NOx, 
Mercury, CO2: The administrator 
and the Secretary of Energy will 
determine the size of the new unit 
reserve every five years for the 
next five-year period based on 
projections of electricity output 
from new units. Resources for the Future                                                                                                                             Palmer, Burtraw, and Shih 
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CO2 allowances in 2009 are 
allocated to non-electricity 
generating firms for transition 
assistance. This amount declines 
by 0.5% until 2018. Of these 
allowances, 80% go to dislocated 
workers and adversely impacted 
communities. The remaining 20% 
go to producers of electricity-
intensive products. 
Renewable Generation and 
Clean Product Incentives; SO2, 
NOx, CO2: Not more than 20% of 
all SO2, NOx, and CO2 allowances 
will be allocated each year to 
renewable generation facilities and 
owners of energy-efficient 
buildings, producers of energy-
efficient products, entities that 
carry out energy-efficient projects, 
owners of new clean fossil-fuel 
electricity generating units, and 
owners of combined heat / power 
generators.
11 
Household Allocations; SO2, 
NOx, CO2: Any allowances not 
allocated to other sectors are given 
to electricity consumers through 
Early Reduction Credits; SO2, 
NOx: Additional allowances will 
be allocated (1 allowance for each 
1.05 ton reduction) for installation 
or modification of pollution 
control equipment or combustion 
technology improvements after the 
date of enactment but prior to 
2010. No allowances will be 
allocated for equipment in 
operation or under construction 
prior to enactment, attributable to 





11 For S. 366, renewable electricity-generating units receive an allocation based on renewable electricity production and the national average emissions per MWh by all 
electricity-generating facilities. For energy efficiency, the allocation is based on electricity or natural gas saved and the national average emissions per MWh or cubic 
foot of natural gas. For new, clean fossil-fuel-fired electricity generating units, allocations are based on the previous year’s MWhs produced by new, clean fossil-fuel-
fired electricity generating units and one half of the national average emissions per MWh. For combined heat and power electricity generating facilities, allocations are 
the product of Btu produced and put to use by each facility and the previous year’s national average quantity of emissions per pollutant per Btu. Resources for the Future                                                                                                                             Palmer, Burtraw, and Shih 
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an appointed trustee. Households 
receive allowances based on the 
number of people in the household 
and their state’s ratio of residential 





  Grandfathering Rules; SO2: 93% 
of allowances are given to affected 
electricity-generating units 
proportional to Title IV SO2 
allowance allocations. 
Non-Title IV Units and 
Additional Units; SO2: 7% of the 
SO2 allowances are allocated 
(based on baseline heat input and 
SO2 emission rates) to units that 
were non-Title IV units and 
additional units built after 2001. 
These allocations are made on a 
first construction basis. 
Control Incentives; SO2:
 12 A 
total of 250,000 allowances (out of 
the 4.5 million annual allocation) 
are allocated over the first three 
years of the program as incentives 
for SO2 control technology. 
Existing Sources: SO2: Existing 
fossil-fuel-fired units (includes 
Title IV existing units and units 
built at least three years before the 
current year) receive allowances 
based on Title IV allowance 
allocation rules, pro-rated to 
comply with the difference 
between the S. 843 allowance cap 
and the new unit reserve for SO2.
13 
New Sources: SO2. New units 
receive allowances based on future 





  Grandfathering Rules; NOx: 
95% of allowances (in each 
region) are given to affected 
electricity-generating units based 
Existing Sources; NOx: Existing 
fossil-fuel-fired units receive 
allowances equal to the product of 
1.5 pounds of NOx per MWh times 
 
12 For S. 1844, in the first three years, the number of grandfathered SO2 allowances is reduced by 0.083 million allowances. These allowances are offered via 
competitive bidding to coal-fired facilities that reduce their SO2 emissions through improved technology. 
13 For S. 843, allocation to existing units that are not specifically mentioned in Title IV is determined by the administrator on a fair and equitable basis. Resources for the Future                                                                                                                             Palmer, Burtraw, and Shih 
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on baseline heat input relative to 
total baseline heat input across all 
affected units. 
Additional Units; NOx: 5% of the 
NOx allowances (in each region) 
are allocated (based on baseline 
heat input) to units that commence 
operation after enactment of S. 
1844. These allowances are 
allocated on a first construction 
basis. 
the quotient of the average 
quantity of electricity generated 
during the most recent three-year 
period in MWh divided by 2,000 
pounds of NOx per ton. If this total 
is not equal to the difference 
between the allowance cap and the 
new unit reserve for NOx, 
allowances are allocated on a pro-
rata basis.  
New Sources: NOx: New units 






Mercury: Mercury emissions are 
not to exceed 2.48 grams per 1,000 
MWh. This is an emissions 
limitation, not an allocation of 
allowances, and may not be 
banked or traded. 
Grandfathering Rules; 
Mercury: 95% of allowances are 
given to affected electricity-
generating units based on baseline 
heat input relative to total baseline 
heat input across all affected units. 
Additional Units; Mercury: 5% 
of the Mercury allowances are 
allocated (based on baseline heat 
input) to units that commence 
operation after enactment of S. 
1844. These allowances are 
allocated on a first construction 
basis. 
Existing Sources; Mercury: 
Existing coal-fired units receive 
allowances equal to the product of 
0.0000227 pounds of mercury per 
MWh multiplied by the average 
quantity of electricity generated 
during the most recent 3-year 
period in MWh. If this total is not 
equal to the difference between the 
allowance cap and the new unit 
reserve for mercury, allowances 
are allocated on a pro-rata basis. 
New Sources; Mercury: New 






Sequestration Incentives; CO2: 
Not more than 0.075% of total 
CO2 allowances shall be allocated 
  Sequestration Incentives; CO2: 
Additional CO2 allowances are 
allocated for carbon sequestration Resources for the Future                                                                                                                             Palmer, Burtraw, and Shih 
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to encourage biological carbon 
sequestration and not more than 
1.5% of total CO2 allowances shall 
be allocated to encourage 
geological carbon sequestration. 
and for programs to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions. In 
2009, allocations are made for 
projects from 1990 to 2008, and 
these allowances are limited to 
10% of the CO2 allowance cap for 
2009. After 2009, allocations are 
made for current projects, and 
there is no limitation on the 
number of additional allowances. 




15 units receive 
allowances equal to their average 
generation over the most recent 
three-year period divided by the 
total average generation over the 
same period by all such units 
multiplied by the difference 
between the allowance cap and the 
new unit reserve for CO2.  
New Sources; CO2: New fossil-
fuel-fired and renewable units 
receive allowances based on their 
projected share of total generation. 
Compliance With Legislation 
Penalties for 
Excess Emissions 
SO2, NOx, CO2: Three times the 
excess emissions in tons (or failed 
allowance submissions) multiplied 
by the average annual market price 
SO2, NOx, Mercury: The excess 
emissions in tons (for NOx, SO2) 
or ounces (for Mercury) multiplied 
by the average sale price between 
SO2, NOx, CO2, Mercury: Excess 
emissions must be offset in a 
future year, as determined by the 
administrator. Also: 
 
14 For S. 843, nuclear units receive (and must submit) allowances based only on their incremental generation from 1990 levels. 
15 For S. 843, renewable units include wind, organic waste (excluding incinerated municipal solid waste), biomass, fuel cells, hydroelectric, geothermal, solar thermal, 
photovoltaic, and other non-fossil fuel, non-nuclear sources. Resources for the Future                                                                                                                             Palmer, Burtraw, and Shih 
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for the appropriate allowances. 
Mercury: Three times the excess 
emissions in grams multiplied by 
the average cost of mercury 
controls. 
 
holders of allowances. Excess 
emissions must also be offset the 
following year (a violator’s 
allocation is reduced by the 
quantity of excess emissions). 
SO2: $2,000 (1990$) penalty for 
each ton of excess emissions. 
NOx: $5,000 penalty for each ton 
of excess emissions. 
CO2: $100 penalty for each ton of 
excess emissions. 
Mercury: $10,000 penalty for 
each pound of excess emissions. 
SO2, NOx, CO2, Mercury: Fees 




Each affected facility must install 
and operate a continuous 
emissions monitoring system. 
Facilities must provide the 
administrator with data on 
emissions and emissions per MWh 
for each covered pollutant. 
The administrator will keep an 
inventory of emissions from all 
small electricity-generating 
facilities (less than 15 MW). 
Coal-fired facilities with an 
aggregate generating capacity of 
50 MW or more must monitor 
ambient air quality within a 30-
mile radius of the facility. 
Each affected facility must install 
and operate a continuous 
emissions monitoring system. 
Facilities must provide the 
administrator with data for 
opacity, volumetric flow, and 
emissions of SO2, NOx, and 
mercury. 
The administrator will promulgate 
regulations for monitoring 
requirements.  
SO2: Title IV reporting for SO2 is 
required. 
NOx, CO2, Mercury: At least 
quarterly, facilities must submit to 
the administrator a report on the 
emissions of NOx, CO2, and 
mercury. 
Modernization 





Beginning on January 1, 2014, or 
40 years after the beginning of 
generation at a facility (whichever 
date is later), the facility is subject 
to emissions limitations reflecting 
best available control technology 
A unit whose hourly emissions of 
a pollutant increases at maximum 
capacity from modifications must 
either meet the national emissions 
standards for affected units or 
apply best available control 
NSR: Construction of a new unit 
(including existing boiler 
replacement) or any modification 
to an existing unit that increases 
the hourly emissions rate of an 
NSR covered pollutant will subject Resources for the Future                                                                                                                             Palmer, Burtraw, and Shih 
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Emissions Rate 




(BACT) on a new source facility 
of the same generating capacity. 
technology. 
Facilities that are more than 50 
kilometers from a Class I area can 
exempt themselves from new 
source review and best available 
retrofit control technology if they 
commit within three years to 
meeting a limit for particulate 
matter (PM) of .03 lb/MMBtu, 
have begun to operate control 
technology to reduce PM 
emissions, or otherwise reduce PM 
emissions according to best 
operational practices. 
that facility to the NSR program. 
Beginning in 2020, each facility 
which began construction before 
August 17, 1971 must meet 
performance standards of 4.5 lbs / 
MWh and 2.5 lbs / MWh for SO2 
and NOx, respectively. 
LAER and BACT: Identified 
biennially. The cost of LAER may 
not exceed twice that of BACT. 
Non-Attainment: As noted above, 
sources within non-attainment 
areas would no longer be required 




  The bill delays until 2011 EPA 
action on petitions by downwind 
states to reduce emissions in 
upwind states under section 126 of 
the Clean Air Act. 
Some units would be exempt from 
mercury emissions standards under 
section 112 of the Clean Air Act 
(CAA) and visibility protection 
requirements (haze) under section 
169 of the CAA. 
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Appendix 3: Proposed and Final CAIR Rules 
 
EPA Proposed SO2 NOx Rule: A Supplement to the RFF Legislative Comparison Table.
 16 
EPA Proposed SO2 NOx Rule (Clean Air Interstate Rule CAIR) (Including June 10, 2004, Supplement) 
Federal Register Title (Date)  Part III 
Environmental Protection Agency  
40 CFR Parts 51, 72, 75, 96 
[Supplemental Proposal for the] Rule to Reduce Interstate Transport of Fine Particulate Matter and 
Ozone (Clean Air Interstate Rule); Proposed Rule 
(January 30, 2004) [Supplement: June 10, 2004] 
Summary  EPA proposes implementing a cap and trade program for 28 eastern States
17 and the District of 
Columbia to reduce emissions of SO2 and NOx from electricity generating units. Participation in the 
regional trading program is optional for the 28 States and the District of Columbia. States that opt-out 
of the trading program must meet State-level emission caps. 
Affected Facilities  Fossil fuel-fired
18 electricity generating units with a capacity greater than 25 MW, AND 
Fossil fuel-fired steam co-generation units with a capacity greater than 25 MW that sell more than 1/3 
of their potential electric output. 
Regional Annual Allowance 
Allocation Caps
19 
SO2:  3.86 million tons by 2010 and  
  2.70 million tons by 2015. 
NOx:  1.60 million tons by 2010 and  
  1.33 million tons by 2015. 
 
 
16 Prepared by David Lankton.  
17 The 28 States are: Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, 
Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, West Virginia, and 
Wisconsin. 
18 Fossil-fuel fired units are those that fire: natural gas, petroleum, coal, or any fuel derived from such materials, alone or in combination with any other fuel. 
19 Allocation of NOx emission allowances to electricity generating units in New York State as originally proposed in CAIR and as modeled in this analysis was 52,448 
tons in 2010 and 43,707 tons in 2015. In the final version of CAIR, the New York State allowance was reduced to 45,617 in 2010 and 38,014 in 2015. The reduction 
raises costs to producers in New York State. Many state allocations were increased or decreased in the final rule.  
 Resources for the Future                                                                                                                             Palmer, Burtraw, and Shih 
  A-15
 
EPA Proposed SO2 NOx Rule (Clean Air Interstate Rule CAIR) (Including June 10, 2004, Supplement) 
Allowance Allocation 
Method 
SO2:  Allowances are allocated to States proportional to a State’s share of total Title IV allowances. 
States that choose to participate in the regional trading program must grandfather their allowances to 
facilities in a manner consistent with Title IV. States have flexibility in allocating any allowances 
created using a 3:1 retirement ratio (see Carryover section below). 
NOx:  Allowances are allocated to States based on a State’s historic annual heat input and a NOx 
emission rate.
20 States have flexibility in allocating their allowances, including auction, updating, and 
grandfathering allocation. Connecticut is subject to an ozone-season-only NOx cap beginning in 
2010. Connecticut, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island may opt-in to the annual trading program. 
States are responsible for creation and maintenance of any allowance set-aside programs. 
Both:  States choosing to participate in either the SO2 or NOx trading program must participate in 
both the SO2 and NOx trading programs. 
Banking  Allowances for the proposed regional trading programs may be banked without restriction. 
Carryover  SO2:  Pre-2010 Title IV allowances banked before the implementation date of the proposed rule 
may be used in the regional trading program. The proposed SO2 program would allow: 
  Pre-2010 Title IV allowances to be used at a 1:1 ratio, and 
  2010 to 2014 Title IV allowances to be used at a 2:1 ratio, and 
  2015 and later Title IV allowances to be used at a 2.86:1 ratio OR retired at a 3:1 ratio, 
creating CAIR allowances equal to the difference between the retirement ratio and the cap.
21 
EPA proposes that these ratios for Title IV allowances will prevent States that are not included in the 
new regional trading program from abusing the abundance of inexpensive Title IV allowances that 
would be created without these ratios. All states must use the same ratios. 
NOx: Banked  NOx SIP Call allowances may be carried forward for use in the proposed cap and 
trade program at a 1:1 ratio. 
Penalties  EPA proposes that any facility emitting pollutants in excess of their permits must surrender future 
year allowances in an amount equal to their excess emissions. In addition, EPA suggests than an 




20 Historic annual heat input is a State’s highest annual average heat input from 1999 to 2002. Historic annual heat input is multiplied by a NOx emission rate (0.15 lb / 
mmBtu for phase 1 or 0.125 lb / mmBtu for phase 2) to determine a State’s NOx allocation. 
21 Because the proposed 2.86:1 trading ratio meets EPA’s goals for SO2 reduction, a 3:1 retirement ratio of Title IV allowances for CAIR allowances would result in 




EPA Final Clean Air Interstate Rule: A Supplement to the RFF Legislative Comparison Table.
 22   
 
EPA Final Clean Air Interstate Rule (CAIR) 
Federal Register Title 
(Date) 
Environmental Protection Agency  
40 CFR Parts 51, 72, 73, 74, 77, 78, and 96 
Rule to Reduce Interstate Transport of Fine Particulate Matter and Ozone (Clean Air Interstate Rule); 
Revisions to Acid Rain Program; Revisions to the NOx SIP Call 
(March 10, 2005) [OAR-2003-0053; FRL ] [RIN 2060-AL76] 
Summary  Implements an annual cap and trade program for 25 States and the District of Columbia to reduce 
emissions of SO2 and NOx from electricity generating units.  Implements a seasonal cap and trade 
program for 25 States and the District of Columbia to reduce emissions of NOx from electricity 
generating units during the ozone season (May to September).  Seasonal program replaces the NOx 
SIP Call.  Participation in the cap and trade programs is optional.  States that opt-out of a trading 
program must meet State-level emission caps. 
Affected States
23  States included in both the annual SO2 / NOx program and the seasonal NOx program: AL, DE, FL, 
IL, IN, IA, KT, LA, MD, MI, MS, MO, NJ, NY, NC, OH, PA, SC, TN, VA, WV, and WI.
24 
States included in only the annual SO2 / NOx program: GA, MN, and TX. 
States included in only the seasonal NOx program: AR, CT, and MA. 
Affected Facilities  Fossil fuel-fired
25 electricity generating units with a capacity greater than 25 MW, AND 
Fossil fuel-fired steam co-generation units with a capacity greater than 25 MW that supply more than 
1/3 of their potential electric output to an electricity generator. 
 
 
22 Prepared by David Lankton.  This document can be found at Hwww.rff.org/multipollutantH/. 
23 States may opt-out of any or all trading programs.  If states opt-out, they may achieve reductions from non-EGU sources (state allowance budgets would be adjusted 
to take this into account).  If states opt-out of the trading program, they may choose allocation method and carryover ratios, among other options. 
24 A separate proposed regulation (EPA 40 CFR Parts 51 and 96 (March 10, 2005) [OAR-2003-053; FRL] [RIN 2060-AM95] Inclusion of Delaware and New Jersey in 
the Clean Air Interstate Rule) includes DE and NJ in the annual SO2 / NOx program.  We assume this regulation will also be implemented. 
25 Fossil-fuel fired units those that fire: natural gas, petroleum, coal, or any fuel derived from such materials, alone or in combination with any other fuel. Resources for the Future                                                                                                                             Palmer, Burtraw, and Shih 
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EPA Final Clean Air Interstate Rule (CAIR) 
Annual SO2 / NOx 
Allowance Allocation Caps
26 
SO2:   3.674 million tons by 2010 and  
   2.572 million tons by 2015. 
NOx:   1.522 million tons by 2009 and  
   1.268 million tons by 2015. 
Seasonal NOx 
Allowance Allocation Caps 
NOx:   0.568 million tons by 2009 and 
   0.485 million tons by 2015 
Allowance Allocation 
Method 
SO2: Allowances are allocated as prescribed by Title IV (grandfathering). 
NOx (Annual and Seasonal): EPA allocates allowances to States according to each State’s 
allowance pool.  States are free to choose the method of allocating allowances (including auction, 
updating, and grandfathering) to individual units.  However, EPA suggests that allowances be 
allocated to units based on their share of historic heat input (adjusted by fuel type).  Also, a new unit 
allowance pool is created (5% of total permits from 2009 to 2014, 3% thereafter). 
NOx Supplement Pool  A supplemental annual NOx program allowance pool of 199,997
27 permits is created.  Units that 
reduce NOx emissions beyond other Federal or State requirements in 2007 and 2008 or require 
additional permits for grid reliability may apply for these permits, which are distributed in 2009. 
Banking  Allowances from the annual SO2 / NOx and seasonal NOx programs may be banked for future use. 
Carryover  SO2:  Pre-2010 Title IV allowances banked before the implementation date of the rule may be used 
in the annual trading program.  The SO2 program would allow: 
  Pre-2010 Title IV allowances to be used at a 1:1 ratio, and 
  2010 to 2014 Title IV allowances to be used at a 2:1 ratio, and 
  2015 and later Title IV allowances to be used at a 2.86:1 ratio. 
NOx: Banked  NOx SIP Call allowances may be carried forward for use in the seasonal NOx cap and 
trade program at a 1:1 ratio.  Vintage 2009 and later SIP Call permits may not be used. 
Penalties for 
Excess Emissions 
Any unit in non-compliance must surrender permits to cover excess emissions.  That unit’s next 
future year allocation is reduced by 3 times the amount of excess emissions.  Additionally, the 
offending unit must pay fines under the Clean Air Act or any applicable State regulation. 
 
 
26 Includes state budgets for DE and NJ.  Without those states, the annual SO2 allowance allocation caps are 3.619 M tons in 2010 and 2.533 M tons in 2015 and the 
annual NOx allowance allocation caps are 1.504 M tons in 2009 and 1.254 M tons in 2015. 
27 This figure assumes that DE and NJ are part of the annual program.  Without those states, the supplement pool is 198,494 NOx permits. Resources for the Future                                                                                                                             Palmer, Burtraw, and Shih 
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Appendix 4:  Proposed and Final EPA Mercury Rules 
 
EPA Proposed Mercury Rule: A Supplement to the RFF Legislative Comparison Table.
 28  
EPA Proposed Mercury
29 (Hg) Rule 
Federal Register Title (Date)  Part IV 
Environmental Protection Agency  
40 CFR Parts 60 and 63 
Proposed National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants; and, in the Alternative, 
Proposed Standards of Performance for New and Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Steam 
Generating Units; Proposed Rule 
(January 30, 2004) 
Summary  The EPA proposes two options for reducing national Hg emissions from coal-fired utility units: 
1.  Maximum Available Control Technology (MACT), OR 
2.  National Mercury Cap and Trade Program. 
Choice of program will depend on legal interpretation of the Clean Air Act (CAA) and its 
amendments: 
  EPA believes it has the authority, under section 111 of the CAA, to implement a national cap 
and trade program for mercury. 
  However, some interpretations of sections 111 and 112 of the CAA and two (apparently 
contradictory) amendments passed in Congress may restrict EPA’s authority. If this is the 
case, EPA suggests MACT. 
Affected Facilities 
(Both Proposals) 
Coal-fired electricity generating units with a capacity greater than 25 MW, AND 
Coal-fired steam co-generation units with a capacity greater than 25 MW that supply more than 1/3 
of their potential electric output to an electricity generator. 
 
28 Prepared by David Lankton.  
29 The rule also proposes Nickel emission limitations on oil-fired generators, which are not discussed in this summary.  Resources for the Future                                                                                                                             Palmer, Burtraw, and Shih 
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EPA Proposed Mercury (Hg) Rule 
Option 1: Maximum Available Control Technology (MACT)
30 
Existing Units: Mercury 
Emission Limitations 
 
Input or Output Based 
(Unit’s Choice) 
 
Unit Type  Input Limitation 
(lb Hg / TBtu) 
Output Limitation 
(10
-6 lb Hg / MWh) 
Bituminous-Fired
31      2.0 21
Subbituminous-Fired      5.8 61
Lignite-Fired      9.2 98
IGCC Unit  19  200 
Coal Refuse-Fired  0.38  4.1   





Unit Type  Output Limitation 
(10
-6 lb Hg / MWh) 
Bituminous-Fired    6.0
Subbituminous-Fired    20
Lignite-Fired    62
IGCC Unit  20 
Coal Refuse-Fired  1.1   
Date of Compliance  Existing units must comply with the MACT standards within 3 years of the effective date of the final 
rule’s publication in the Federal Register. 
New
32 units must comply with the MACT standards upon initial startup or upon the effective date of 
the final rule’s publication in the Federal Register, whichever is later. 
Fuel Blending  Units that fire blended coals would have unit specific emission limitations. The emission limitations 
would be based on weighted average limitations over the different types of coal fired at that unit. 
Emissions Averaging  The proposal would allow emissions averaging as a compliance option for existing coal-fired units 
located at a single contiguous plant. 
 
30 MACT is based on the average emission limitation achieved by the best-performing 12 percent of existing sources in each category or subcategory. 
31 The bituminous category includes anthracite. 
32 A new unit is a unit that commences construction, modification, or reconstruction after January 30, 2004. Resources for the Future                                                                                                                             Palmer, Burtraw, and Shih 
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EPA Proposed Mercury (Hg) Rule 
Option 2: National Mercury Cap and Trade Program 
National Annual Allowance 
Allocation Caps 
34+ tons
33 beginning in 2010. 
15 tons beginning in 2018. 
Allowance Allocation 
Method 
A State is allocated allowances based on its relative baseline heat input
34 to other States, which the 
State would then allocate to its utility units. Though States are free to choose an allocation method for 
utilities, EPA proposes a ‘model rule’: that allocations to existing sources be based on a unit’s share 
of baseline heat input and adjusted according to coal type: 
  Bituminous Unit: 1.0 times the share of heat input. 
  Subbituminous Unit: 1.25 times the share of heat input. 
  Lignite Unit: 3.0 times the share of heat input. 
A supplemental notice will address set-asides for new units and / or an updating allocation method. 
New Source Performance 
Standards (NSPS) 
New
35 coal-fired utility units will be subject to the following emission limitations for Hg (lb / GWh): 
  Bituminous: 0.0060, 
  Subbituminous: 0.020, 
  Lignite: 0.062, 
  Waste Coal: 0.0011, and 
  IGCC: 0.020. 
Re-Opener  After the implementation of requirements by 2010 and 2018, EPA will evaluate the Hg emission 
levels, control methods, and health impacts of the trading program and allowance allocation caps. 
Safety Valve  Facilities may purchase Hg allowances for $2187.50 (per ounce and adjusted for inflation). Purchased 
allowances reduce the size of the allowance allocation in the following year. 
Trading  States may choose not to participate in the national allowance-trading program. If a State ops out of 
the trading program, facility specific emission limitations apply (using ‘model rule’ calculations). 
Banking  Current Hg allowances may be banked for future use. 
State Authority  States may require Hg emission reductions in addition to those proposed by EPA. 
Allowance Auctions  The EPA asks for comment on the possibility of auctioning a portion of the allowances each year. 
 
33 The 2010 Hg allowance cap is not specified. Instead, the 2010 allowance cap is equal to the Hg reductions that result as a co-benefit of SO2 and NOx emission 
reductions proposed in a separate rule in the Federal Register (Part III, EPA, 40 CFR Parts 51, 72, 75, and 96, Rule To Reduce Interstate Transport of 
Fine Particulate Matter and Ozone (Interstate Air Quality Rule); Proposed Rule). The 34-ton allowance cap is based on EPA’s analysis, and it is also the 2010 Hg 
allowance cap in the most recent version of the proposed Clear Skies Act (108
th Congress: S. 1844). 
34 Baseline heat input is based on the average heat input at a facility over the highest of the three years from 1998 to 2002. 





EPA FINAL Clean Air Mercury Rule: A Supplement to the RFF Legislative Comparison Table
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EPA FINAL Clean Air Mercury (Hg) Rule 
Federal Register Title 
(Date) 
Environmental Protection Agency  
40 CFR Parts 60, 63, 72, and 75 
Standards of Performance for New and Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Steam 
Generating Units 
(March 15, 2005) [OAR-2002-0056; FRL-] [RIN 2060-AJ6J] 
 Summary  Establishes a national annual cap and trade program for Mercury emissions from coal-fired
37 
electricity generating units (EGUs).  The program covers all 50 states and three EGUs in what the 
rule calls “Indian country.”
38  States may opt-out of the Hg trading program.  Any State that opts-out 
must meet State-level emissions caps equal to that State’s share of the national allowance pool.  
Phase I of the program begins in 2010; Phase II, which further reduces Hg emissions, begins in 2018. 
Affected Facilities  Coal-fired EGUs with a capacity greater than 25 MW, AND 
Coal-fired steam co-generation units with a capacity greater than 25 MW that supply more than 1/3 
of their potential electric output (or 290,000 MWh, whichever is greater) to an electricity generator. 
National Annual Allowance 
Allocation Caps 
38 tons
39 beginning in 2010. 
15 tons beginning in 2018. 
 
36 Prepared by David Lankton.  This document can be found at Hwww.rff.org/multipollutantH/. 
37 A coal-fired unit is any unit that fires coal or coal in combination with any other fuel. 
38 The three EGUs in “Indian country” are: Navajo Generating Station (Salt River Project; Page, AZ), Bonanza Power Plant (Deseret Generation and Transmission 
Cooperative; Vernal, UT), and Four Corners Power Plant (Salt River Project / Arizona Public Service; Fruitland, NM).  In this document, the term “States” will refer to 
the 50 States and the three EGUs in “Indian country.” 




EPA FINAL Clean Air Mercury (Hg) Rule 
Allowance Allocation 
Method 
EPA apportions allowances to states according to each State’s allowance pool.  States are free to 
choose the method of allocating allowances (including auction, updating, and grandfathering) to 
individual units.  However, EPA suggests that allocations to existing sources be based on a unit’s 
share of baseline heat input and adjusted according to coal type: 
  Bituminous Unit: 1.0 times the share of heat input, 
  Subbituminous Unit: 1.25 times the share of heat input, 
  Lignite Unit: 3.0 times the share of heat input. 
EPA also suggests that allocations to new units be based on their modified share of output (output in 
kWh * 7900 Btu / kWh) among total modified output of all new units. 
A new unit pool of 5% of total allowances is established from 2010 to 2014.  In 2015 (and beyond), 
the new unit pool is 3% of total allowances.  
New Source Performance 
Standards (NSPS) 
New coal-fired utility units will be subject to emission limitations for Hg (* 10
-6 lb / MWh): 
  Bituminous: 21, 
  Subbituminous (Wet Scrubber): 42, 
  Subbituminous (Dry Scrubber): 78, 
  Lignite: 145, 
  Waste Coal: 1.4, and 
  IGCC: 20. 
Penalties for 
Excess Emissions 
Any unit in non-compliance must surrender permits to cover excess emissions.  That unit’s next 
future year allocation is reduced by 3 times the amount of excess emissions. 
Banking  Hg allowances may be banked for future use without restriction. 
State Authority  States may require Hg emission reductions in addition to those proposed by EPA. 




Modeling State Multi-Pollutant Rules Affecting the Electricity Sector in Haiku for NYSERDA
40    
Connecticut 



























Assumed: Typically forced annual 
operation of NOX controls and 



























Assumed: SO2 default rate for oil-






40 Based on major known approved rules or imminently pending rules as of fall, 2003. Resources for the Future                                                                                                                             Palmer, Burtraw, and Shih 
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Massachusetts 













Modeling Compliance in Haiku 
 






























































85% reduction from 




Not modeled (rule in proposal stage 
when compliance assumptions last 
updated) 
 
41 Evaluation of The Technological and Economic Feasibility of Controlling and Eliminating Mercury Emissions from the Combustion of Solid Fossil Fuel. 
www.mercurypolicy.org/new/documents/MApowerplantstudy1202.pdf and http://www.state.ma.us/dep/bwp/daqc/daqcpubs.htm Resources for the Future                                                                                                                             Palmer, Burtraw, and Shih 
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Missouri 


























standard based on 
source’s previous year’s 
heat input.  
 
EPA\IPM assumes 
43,950 tons cap in 2005.  
 
Exchange rate between 
two regions. 
 
May 1, 2004. 
 
Known and assumed: Mostly SCR 
installations. 
 
We force compliance with EPA/IPM 
assumed cap. 
 



























Assumed and known: Retirement, 
repowering to gas and biomass, 
combustion controls.  









Assumed and known: Retirement, 
scrubber installation, repowering to 
gas and biomass.  
   
CO2  
 
Merrimack 1, 2 
Schiller 4,5,6 
Newington 1 






2006  Not modeled separately. 
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New York 






















Cap for non-ozone 
season (Oct. 1-April 



















Caps   
133,000 tons  2008 
Modeled endogenously. Resources for the Future                                                                                                                             Palmer, Burtraw, and Shih 
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North Carolina 

























owned by Progress 
Energy (Carolina 
Power & Light) 
and Duke Energy 
 
































Known and assumed: Firm compliance 
plans
42 achieve caps in most cases using 
historic capacity factors. Haiku shows 
project increasing capacity factors so 
additional controls are assumed to 
maintain compliance with SO2 caps. 
 
 
42 As reported in; http://daq.state.nc.us/news/leg/CO2_912003.pdf Resources for the Future                                                                                                                        Palmer, Burtraw, and Shih 
Texas 














Modeling Compliance in Haiku 
 
East: 255,510 tons 
 














El Paso: 2,157 tons 
 
May 1, 2003  Assumed and known: Existing 
controls operated annually and 
SCR and SNCR retrofits (known 
plans from diffuse sources)  
 
East: 532,021 tons 
 














El Paso: 0 tons 
 
May 1, 2003  Assumed and known: Existing 
controls operated annually and 
SCR and SNCR retrofits (known 





43 There is also a NOX emissions trading program that affects all sources of NOX emissions annual emissions above 10 tons specifically in nonattainment regions 
that is not modeled in Haiku (30 TAC Chapter 117). 
44 List of affected sources and calculation of caps determined from data on TCEQ website. 































Known: Firm compliance plan in 













Known: Firm compliance plan in 
NSR consent decree. 
 







5 coal plants in 









Not modeled separately due to 
uncertainty in plan. Planned NOX and 
SO2 controls will likely achieve goal. 
 
 
45 WEPCO settlement for NSR violations also achieves these goals. 
  A-30